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Politicians have an incentive to enhance their power by creating institutions
that give them greater freedom to act and by undermining institutions designed
to check their influence. Presidents are particularly likely to test the limits of
their power. Legislators must compromise in order to pass statutes.I Judges are
aware that the executive or the legislature may refuse to comply with their
rulings. An independently elected President, in contrast, can sometimes act
without seeking legislative approval or provoking judicial constraints. Although
Presidents are generally subject to impeachment, this is almost always an
extraordinary remedy invoked only in response to a crisis. 2
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1. Even in a pure parliamentary system with strong party discipline, party leaders must
negotiate with backbenchers over policy. The possibility of a vote of no confidence or of an internal
party revolt limits their freedom of action.
2. See, e.g., Juan J. Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism, 1 J. DEMOCRACY 51 (1990)
[hereafter "Perils"]. But see Donald L. Horowitz, Comparing Democratic Systems, I J. DEMOCRACY
73 (1990) (responding to "Perils"), and Seymour Martin Lipset, The Centrality of Political Culture,
I J. DEMOCRACY 80 (1990) (responding to "Perils"). See also Juan J. Linz, The Virtues of
Parliamentariism, 1 J. DEMOCRACY 84 (1990) (responding to Horowitz and Lipset); THE FAILURE
OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMCRACY: VOL 1: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVEs and VOL II: THE CASE OF
LATIN AMERICA (Juan J. Linz & Arturo Valenzuela eds., 1994); ROBERT A. DAHL, How
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In testing the limits of their power, Presidents may subvert constitutional
and legal structures designed to check and balance them.3 To show how this can
happen, we study Argentina and the Philippines, two countries often criticized in
the past for their hyper-presidential systems, where the electorate only weakly
controls the President and other political actors.4 In response to these concerns,
both countries recently amended their constitutions and established modem
accountability and transparency institutions designed to check their Presidents.
Argentina enacted constitutional reforms in 1994, and the Philippines did the
same in 1987. We demonstrate how strategic Presidents in both countries were
able to undermine most of the constitutional attempts to control unilateral
executive action. This occurred because of design flaws in the institutions
established to control the presidency; the inability of other actors, such as weak
opposition parties, to constrain the President; and the support of political allies.
The essence of Presidentialism is the separation of powers, but the
overlapping notion of checks and balances is equally important. However, in a
hyper-presidential system, Presidents who are challenged use the rhetoric of
separation of powers to defend their actions and argue against the imposition of
checks and balances by the other branches and institutions. To understand the
difficulties these claims create it is important to unpack the notion of the
separation of powers to see the contradictions at its core. According to the
conventional view, the legislature is primarily responsible for legislation, the
executive is responsible for implementation of the law, and the judiciary is
responsible for enforcement. Two distinct but overlapping theories of
democratic government justify such separation.
One theory emphasizes the division and specialization of labor: each
branch should do what it does best without interference from the others. In this
view, the executive branch should be organized as a hierarchical bureaucracy
under the control of the elected President and his or her cabinet. The goal of the
presidential election is to select a person who can operate as a strong manager
independent of the legislature, and who can concentrate on administering the
law fairly and competently. 5 To assure this independence, the president is
DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? (2002); TORSTEN PERSSON AND GUIDO TABELLINI,
THE ECONOMIC EFFECT OF CONSTITUTIONS (2003).
3. Our focus is "not so much on the institutions themselves (formal and/or informal) but on
how actors 'within' these institutions behave, and on how they strategically shift according to
varying contexts." See Guillermo O'Donnell, On Informal Institutions, Once Again, in INFORMAL
INSTITUTIONS AND DEMOCRACY: LESSONS FROM LATIN AMERICA 285, 287 (Gretchen Helmke &
Steven Levitsky eds., 2006).
4. Linz, Perils, supra note 2; Guillermo O'Donnell, Delegative Democracy, 7 J. DEMOCRACY
55 (1994).
5. This was the position taken in the 1937 Brownlow Report on administrative management,
prepared for US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. See D.R. Brand, The President as Chief
Administrator: James Landis and the Brownlow Report, 123 POL. SCI. Q. 69 (2008).
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elected separately, governs for a fixed term, and cannot be removed by a
legislative vote of no confidence. Each branch has a well-specified role. No
branch can exceed its mandate, and the ideal is limited and effective
government.
A second theory accepts the pervasiveness of politics, especially for elected
officials-be they legislators or Presidents. The separation of powers operates
conjointly with checks and balances. Each branch has a set of specialized
functions, in part designed to constrain the others. The legislature, for example,
reviews the performance of the executive and can call cabinet secretaries to
testify. It sets budget priorities and negotiates with the President over policy.
The President, operating under delegated legislative authority or constitutional
mandates, makes policy subject to legislative oversight and override. The
judiciary not only decides private law disputes and interprets vague statutory
and constitutional terms; it also polices the outer limits of executive and
legislative power vis-A-vis society and the other branches. Subject to
professional qualifications, the appointment of judges is a political exercise
under which the President and the legislature seek to reflect the nation's political
balance. Thus, each branch is both an independent political actor and a check on
the other two. This normative argument for checks and balances is the familiar
Madisonian claim that they help assure that no part of the government holds
enough power to dominate the other branches. Government is self-limiting
because of the checks that each branch imposes on the others. If these checks do
not operate properly, one or another branch may be able to dominate the other
organs of state power.
Most modem governments have not left the separation of powers frozen in
its original tripartite form inherited from Montesquieu. Governments have
created other institutions, such as specialized courts, autonomous regulatory
agencies, central banks, supreme audit bodies, ombudsmen, electoral
commissions, and anti-corruption bodies.6 Some of these institutions monitor
the core branches of government; others operate with substantive authority to
make policy or implement the law in individual cases.
In practice, all presidential systems have elements of both separation-of-
powers models, and they rely on specialized government institutions with
problem-solving and monitoring functions. Problems arise, however, when
political actors use one model to justify actions under the other. For example, as
6. The tripartite division of power is laid out in CHARLES DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF
THE LAWS (1748). For background information about modem multi-partite divisions, see generally
Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARv. L. REV. 633 (2000) [hereafter "New
Separation"]. But cf, Steven G. Calabresi, Why Professor Ackerman is Wrong to Prefer the German
to the US. Constitution, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 51 (2001). See also Bruce Ackerman, Goodbye
Montesquieu, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter Lindseth
eds., 2010); John Ackerman, Understanding Independent Accountability Agencies, in COMPARATIVE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter Lindseth eds., 2010); and O'Donnell,
Delegative Democracy, supra note 4.
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we will see in our case studies, Presidents may justify unilateral action by
invoking the first theory of the separation of powers, which divides the
government into three distinct branches. The President claims to be able to act
free of any checks from the legislature, the courts, or governmental oversight
bodies. He or she seeks to use the constitutional text to avoid external review.
This is particularly problematic if the President acts in an overtly political
manner that does not correspond to the role as "chief executive" of a large
hierarchical body or that neglects the interests of large segments of the
population.
In examining the presidential systems in Argentina and the Philippines, we
focus on presidential efforts to undermine constitutional controls in the face of
weak legislative oversight and inadequate political pushback. We demonstrate
how determined Presidents have repeatedly undermined institutional efforts to
limit their power either by finding legal loopholes or by pushing the boundaries
of the law. Redesign could improve some of the institutional checks, but others
are flawed in principle. Still others may operate as effective controls in some
presidential systems but work poorly in systems without complementary
institutions or norms of behavior.
Although each case has its own distinctive features, we do not believe that
the problematic behavior we describe is unique to Argentina and the Philippines.
Rather, we suggest that all presidential systems, including the United States,
face difficulties in constraining a determined chief executive. 7 Our broader aim,
therefore, is to alert reformers elsewhere to the inherent weaknesses of structural
solutions. Institutional reforms will often not be sufficient if they simply
multiply nominal checks without real teeth. Reforms need to be structured in a
way that acknowledges and confronts predictable efforts to limit their impact.
Our studies of Argentina and the Philippines demonstrate the negative
consequences for democracy from presidential assertions of unilateral power
that undermine democratic notions of limited government. We illustrate how the
new constitutional texts have proved inadequate in checking Presidents who are
determined to interpret or ignore the text in their own interests. In our two cases,
constitutional efforts to limit presidential unilateralism had little impact when
faced with Presidents determined to expand their power. These efforts faced
only modest pushback from the legislature, the judiciary, and other oversight
bodies.
Emergency powers-arising from poor economic conditions in Argentina
and from civil strife in the Philippines-have enhanced presidential power in
spite of opposition from some political and social actors. The Presidents took
7. Scott Mainwaring & Timothy R. Scully, Latin America: Eight Lessons for Governance, 19
J. DEMOCRACY 113, 120-21 (2008) argue that the study of formal institutions is insufficient because
in many cases "informal institutions counteract the effects of formal ones." They mostly focused on
electoral institutions and party structures. We emphasize the interactions between Presidents and
institutions nominally designed to constrain them.
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unilateral actions, especially in times of crisis, and then asserted that the
constitutional separation of powers shielded them from scrutiny. At times, they
relied on the need for efficient and centralized management to overcome
criticism of their actions. Whatever the merits of the administrative efficiency
argument in a particular case, once a hyper-powerful presidency takes root, the
existing checks and balances risk irrelevance even after the emergency or other
special situation has passed.
To demonstrate these contentions, we review five linked issues. Section I
sets the stage with a description of the President's position in the formal
constitutional structure in Argentina and the Philippines. Section II concerns the
use of presidential decrees and other law-like instruments. Sections III and IV
discuss, respectively, the management of the budget and appointments powers.
Section V considers oversight bodies, including the courts and the way outside,
civil society groups have sometimes been able to mount successful challenges,
especially in Argentina. We conclude by relating our case studies to research on
the perils of presidentialism.
I.
THE PRESIDENT IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
In Argentina and the Philippines the citizens directly elect the President,
who possesses considerable constitutional authority. This section outlines these
formal powers. They are the background conditions against which incumbents
act to test the limits of their authority.
A. Argentina
As in the United States, the Argentine President is Head of State, Head of
Government, and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.8 Her powers are
similar to those of the American President with respect to the legislative process
and the appointment of judges. Unlike the American President, the Argentine
President has the authority to appoint her Cabinet and many other high-level
officials without approval by a legislative body.9 Thus, she can form her Cabinet
quickly because she need not appeal to political opponents in making
appointments. 10 The 1994 constitutional amendment has not provided effective
checks either because its provisions have not been implemented or because of
design flaws. Central/provincial relations illustrate the former, and the operation
8. Art. 99, Secs. 1, 12, CONSTITUCI6N NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.).
9. Cristina Fernindez de Kirchner assumed her duties as President of Argentina on December
10, 2007.
10. Unlike the U.S. President, she has less reason to appoint close advisors with portfolios that
overlap those of cabinet departments. The growth of the White House staff including the
appointment of "czars" with mandates similar to those of cabinet members is discussed in BRUCE
ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 152-56 (2010).
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of the newly created Chief of Cabinet is an example of the latter.
The President has considerable authority vis-i-vis the provinces. Although
Argentina is formally a federal state, 11 the chief executive's influence over the
provinces is high because of her discretionary distribution of funds. Argentina
has a system of revenue sharing: the provinces delegate the power to collect
revenues to the central government, and they sign a comprehensive agreement to
determine the distribution of revenues. The current agreement, dating from
1988, gives the executive discretion to distribute 1% of the revenues through a
special fund, which is supposed to be used for situations of emergency or
financial imbalance in the provinces. 12 Furthermore, several laws and
regulations created special subsystems of revenue sharing that significantly
reduced the share of revenue going to the provinces and increased the discretion
of the central government, 13 and many tax laws have established specific
allocations that are not shared through the general system. 14
The 1994 constitutional amendment attempted to correct this situation,
providing that most national taxes have to be divided through a system of
revenue sharing determined through a formal legal agreement between the
Nation and the provinces. 15 The agreement has to guarantee the automatic
remittance of funds, use objective sharing criteria, and base the distribution on
principles of equity and solidarity. The law has to originate in the Senate, and its
enactment requires the vote of an absolute majority of all the members of each
House, and approval by the provinces. But although the 1994 amendment
stipulated that this law had to be enacted by the end of 1996,16 after more than
15 years, the law has still not been passed. Thus, the 1988 system is still in
force, with subsequent amendments and subsystems that allow the executive to
distribute funds in a largely discretionary manner.
Other provisions of Argentina's 1994 constitutional amendment both
strengthened the popular nature of the President's mandate and reduced its
length in order to ameliorate political instability produced by the zero-sum game
nature of the system. Thus, under the original constitution, the citizens elected
the President and Vice President indirectly to six-year terms with no reelection
11. Art. 1, CONSTfTUcI6NNACIONAL [CoNsT. NAC.] (Arg.).
12. Establ6cese el Rdgimen Transitorio de Distribuci6n entre la Naci6n y las Provincias, Law
No. 23548, Art. 3, Jan. 7, 1988 (Arg.), available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegIntemet/
anexos/20000-24999/21108/texact.htm.
13. See, e.g., Ratificase el "Acuerdo entre el Gobiemo nacional y los gobiemos provinciales,"
Law No. 24130, Sept. 2, 1992 (Arg.), available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegIntemet/
anexos/0-4999/17/norma.htm.
14. For a comprehensive account of the system of revenue sharing by source, see generally
DIEccIN NACIONAL DE INVESTIGACIONES Y ANALISIS FISCAL, DESTINO DE LA RECAUDACION DE
LOS IMPUESTOS AL 30/06/2010 (2010), http://www.mecon.gov.ar/sip/dniaf/destino-recaud.pdf.
15. Art. 75, Sec. 2, CONSTITUCI6NNACIONAL [CoNsT. NAC.] (Arg.).
16. Id. Temporary Provision 6.
2512011]
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through an electoral college. 17 The 1994 amendment reduced the President's
term from six years to four with the possibility of one reelection. The
amendment replaced the electoral college with the direct election of the
President and Vice President, in which the nation votes as a single district, and it
established a run-off or ballotage system. 18 However, the main effort to limit
the powers of the president was the creation of the new position of Chief of
Cabinet. The aim was to create some distinction between the powers of the Head
of State and those of the Head of Government, although not with as complete a
division as in a non-presidential system. The Constitution still provides that the
president is the Head of the Nation and the Head of Government, 19 so that the
Chief of Cabinet is more a super minister than a weak prime minister.
The Chief of Cabinet executes the budget, overseas the country's general
administration, and makes all administrative appointments with the exception of
those delegated by the Constitution to the President alone. 20 He or she also
plays a significant role in enacting the executive branch's emergency decrees
and other law-like instruments, and in exercising its budgetary authority.
Although appointed and removed by the President, the Chief of Cabinet is
politically accountable to the legislature. 2 1 He must attend Congress at least
once a month to report on the overall progress of the government. Each House
can summon the Chief of Cabinet, like any other Minister, to provide
explanations or reports. 22 Under the Constitution, and unlike any other Minister,
he can be removed through a vote of censure by an absolute majority of the
members of each House. 23 This contrasts with the United States, where,
although top appointments require Senate approval, the President has the
discretion to remove cabinet and sub-cabinet officials from their posts. 24 The
Argentine process for removing a Chief of Cabinet is similar to a specialized
impeachment process.
The Chief of Cabinet has been ineffective in reducing the President's
power because the office's constitutional design is quite weak.2 5 Censure by the
17. Arts. 77, 81-82, CONSTITUCI6NNACIONAL DE 1853 [CONST. NAC. 1853] (Arg.).
18. Id. arts. 90, 94, 97-98, CONSTITUCI6N NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.).
19. Id. art. 99, Sec. 1.
20. Id. art. 100, Secs. 1, 3, 7.
21. Id. art. 99, Sec. 7; Art. 100.
22. Id. art. 71.
23. Id. art. 101.
24. Article 2, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution covers appointments but does not mention
removals. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2. Of course, many officials in independent agencies are only
removable "for cause" or serve for terms fixed by statue. For a good compilation see the appendices
to Justice Stephen Breyer's dissent in Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 130 S.
Ct. 3138 (2010).
25. In 2001, President Fernando De la Ria resigned two years before completing his term,
during an economic and financial crisis that generated massive street protests, supermarket lootings,
and that resulted in the killing of approximately 33 people at the hands of police forces. De la Ria,
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legislature is a difficult process, and there is no process for the President or the
Chief of Cabinet to dissolve the legislature and call for new elections. Although
the Chief of Cabinet is in charge of the general administration of the country, the
President is still politically responsible for that administration, so that the
difference between these two functions remains unclear, and the main functions
of government are still concentrated in the presidency 26. Under the Constitution,
she can make all administrative appointments, although in practice many are
delegated to her ministers and secretaries. 27 Although the Chief of Cabinet is
formally responsible for executing the budget, the President supervises that
authority under the Constitution. 28
The design of this position illustrates the folly of expecting a person
unilaterally appointed by the President to act as a check on her power. Even if
the Congress has the formal power of removal, this means little if not
complemented by up-front legislative approval. Of course, the threat of removal
should keep the President from appointing someone that the legislature strongly
opposes. However, the difficulty of initiating the censure process implies that it
is a weak check on the President, especially in times of unified government.
Countering the President's strong executive powers and the weakness of
supposed checks, such as the Chief of Cabinet, impeachment represents a
potential response to executive over-reaching. Two-thirds of members present in
the House of Representatives may vote to impeach either the President or Vice
President for engaging in official misconduct or committing a criminal offense.
If this occurs, the Senate then holds a public trial to judge the President or Vice
President. 29 It may convict and remove the guilty individual from office, subject
to a two-thirds vote of those present. 30 The impeachment process is harder to
initiate than in the United States, where the House of Representatives requires
only a simple majority vote to impeach an official. In Argentina, as in the U.S.,
impeachment and the subsequent trial are entirely a legislative responsibility; the
courts have no role. 3 1 Most importantly, it is an extraordinary remedy that does
not function as a credible check on the President. It may provide some ultimate
unable to gain support from a legislature dominated by the opposition, offered them effective control
over the Chief of Cabinet's position in order to regain political stability. Given the position's
weakness vis-A-vis the presidency, the opposition refused and, instead, insisted on discrediting the
president until he resigned. See Gabriel Bouzat, Presidential Power and Political Crisis in
Argentina, YALE LAW SCHOOL SEMINARIO EN LATINOAMERICA DE TEORIA CONSTITUCIONAL Y
POLITICA at 24 (2006) available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdflPresidentialPower
and PoliticalCrisis.pdf.
26. Art. 99, Sec. 1, CONSTITUC[6N NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.).
27. Id. sec. 9.
28. Id sec. 10.
29. Id. arts. 53, 59.
30. Id.
31. See HELIO JUAN ZARINI, CONSTITUCI6N ARGENTINA COMENTADA Y CONCORDADA 234-
37(1998).
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background constraint on her power, but, in practice, it leaves a large space for
discretionary action.
As we demonstrate in subsequent sections, the President's influence over
the provinces and the weakness of the Chief of Cabinet are not the only sources
of the President's power. In addition, she has standing authority to issue
emergency decrees, and she may issue nonemergency decrees where Congress
has delegated this authority to her. If the legislature declares a state of
emergency, it may subsequently authorize the President to exercise discretion in
the use of public funds. In practice, the President has wielded her decree powers
in ways that stretch constitutional understanding, used her control over public
spending to further partisan goals, and undermined legislated appointments'
provisions to maintain control over regulatory and monitoring bodies. In all
these situations, she asserted the legality and constitutionality of her actions, but
as we will see, the net result is to extend, not limit, presidential power subject
only to modest constraints imposed by the judiciary.
B. Philippines
The Philippines also has a strong President and a weaker legislature and
judiciary. It therefore suffers from limited or ineffective constitutional checks on
the executive branch. The President often further aggrandizes her power by
referring to the separation of powers to justify assertions of authority and to
avoid oversight from other branches or governmental bodies.32 As in the
Argentine case, a tension exists between constitutional checks on the President
and the President's de facto exercise of that power.
When drafting the Constitution of 1899, the Philippine political community
envisaged a relatively weak executive dominated by a powerful legislature.
Later, the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973 changed the balance of power by
establishing a strong executive. The 1987 Constitution, like the 1994
amendments in Argentina, attempted to restrict presidential power and to return
to some of the goals of the original Constitution of 1899. Nevertheless, as in
Argentina, contemporary scholars agree that the Philippine President remains
extremely powerful. 33
Executive power is "vested in the President of the Philippines" who is
"elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six years" and is ineligible for
re-election. 3 4 The constitution does not specify whether a former President can
32. When discussing the Filipino President, this article mainly refers to Maria Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, who left office in Spring 2010.
33. See IRENE R. CORTES, THE PHILIPPINE PRESIDENCY: A STUDY OF EXECUTIVE POWER
(1966); VICENTE V. MENDOZA, FROM MCKINLEY'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NEW CONSTITUTION:
DOCUMENTS ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM (1978); PACIFICo AGABIN,
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ESSAYS (1996); JOAQUIN BERNAS, CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS
OF GOVERNMENT: NOTES AND CASES (2005).
34. CONST. (1987) art. VII (Phil.).
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run for office after a hiatus-a possibility that former President Joseph Estrada
raised and that the Constitutional Commission on Elections approved in January
2010.35
Unlike Argentina, the Philippines is not a federal state. The 1987
Constitution states that "the President shall exercise general supervision over
local governments," 36 and devolution of powers to local government units refers
to the "act by which the national government confers power and authority upon
the various local government units to perform specific functions and
responsibilities." 37 However, supervision is meant to exclude control, and the
President exercises authority only to ensure local governments and their officials
are performing constitutional and statutory duties. 38 The Local Government
Code of 1991 provides for autonomy in the form of decentralization of
administration while recognizing some devolution of power. 39 Local
government units are entitled to a just share in the national taxes (through the
Internal Revenue Allotment or IRA), and they can generate their own
revenues. 40 According to the Supreme Court, the IRA should be automatically
and promptly released to local government units. 4 1
Over the past decade, however, the President delayed the release of the IRA
to local government units. In 2000 the Supreme Court declared that such
withholding was unconstitutional in a case filed by the Province of Batangas. 42
The incumbent President, however, did not order the release of the IRA
differential until mid-2008. 4 3 The delay in IRA releases, as well as the
35. Kristine L. Alave, Comelec: Estrada Can Run For President In May, PHILIPPINES DAILY
INQUIRER, Jan. 20, 2010, available at http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/topstories/topstories/view/
20100120-248406/Comelec%3AEstrada can run forjpresident in May.
36. CONsT. (1987), art. X, sec. 4 (Phil.).
37. See An Act Providing for a Local Government Code of 1991, Rep. Act No. 7160, Sec.17
(1991) (Phil.), available at http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ral991/ra_7160_1991.html. This
Act is known as the Local Government Code. See Plaza II v. Cassion, G.R. No. 136809 (S.C., Jul.
27, 2004) (Phil.), available at http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2004/jul2004/
136809.php.
38. Id. sec. 25.
39. See Disomangcop v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Pub. Works and Highways, G.R. No. 149848,
(S.C., Nov. 25, 2004) (Phil.) (en banc), http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2004/
nov2004/149848.php.
40. Rep. Act No. 7160, supra note 37, sec. 18.
41. Pimentel v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988 (S.C., Jul. 19, 2000) (Phil.) (en banc), available at
http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2000/july2000/132988.php.
42. Press Release, Senate of the Philippines, Drilon endorses automatic appropriation of IRA
in national budgets (Aug. 3, 2006), http://www.senate.gov.ph/press release/2006/0803 drilonl.asp;
Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, (S.C., May 27, 2004) (Phil.) (en banc), available
at http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2004/may2O04/152774.php. See also Alt.
Ctr. for Org'l. Reforms and Dev., Inc. v. Zamora, G.R. No. 144256 (S.C., Jun. 8, 2005) (Phil.) (en
banc), available at http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2005/jun2005/144256.php.
43. Lira Dalangin-Fernandez, Arroyo orders release of P12.57B IRA differential to LGUs,
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER,May 14, 2008, available at http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/
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preferential treatment of some local government units that received IRAs, led to
criticisms that the President has used the IRA as political leverage to attract
potential allies and pressure local opponents:44 Instead of encouraging the
development of "self-reliant communities" envisaged under the Local
Government Code, in practice, the President's control over the allocation of
funds has been a source of political influence.
As in Argentina, impeachment acts as the ultimate check on presidential
misuse of power, but it is a remedy of last resort. The legislature can impeach
the President and other high-level officials for a "violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public
trust." 4 5 Any member of the House of Representatives and any citizen endorsed
by a member of the House may file a complaint for impeachment, subject to
statutory limitations. 46 The complaint will be referred to a House Committee for
investigation. If a majority of the House Committee members vote to endorse
the complaint, a vote of one-third of all members of the House of
Representatives will convert the complaint into formal Articles of Impeachment,
which will then be forwarded to the twenty-four member Philippine Senate for
trial. An impeachment conviction requires a two-thirds vote of the Senate. 47 The
Supreme Court has held that its power of judicial review extends to oversight of
the constitutional processes of impeachment, a check that is missing in the case
of Argentina. 48
In what follows we illustrate how the Filipino President's express and
implied powers have figured in recent controversies. Former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo asserted her constitutionally "implied" and "residual"
powers during nearly a decade as President in constitutionally questionable
ways. First, she issued executive orders without prior legislative sanction.
Second, she unilaterally reorganized government agencies without regard for the
functional objectives and constitutional independence of other institutions.
Third, she controlled appointments to key public offices originally intended to
counterbalance executive authority. Fourth, she largely sought to insulate herself
from accountability for impasses that resulted from institutional deadlocks,
nation/view/20080514-136555/Arroyo-orders-release-of-Pl257B-IRA-differential-to-LGUs.
44. Karen Tiongson-Mayrina, Arroyo seeks allies in villages, doles out more power, perks,
GMA News Research (October 29, 2007), http://www.gmanews.tv/story/66355/Arroyo-seeks-allies-
in-villages-doles-out-more-power-perks.
45. CONST. (1987), art. XI, sec. 2 (Phil.).
46. Id. secs. 1-3; See ANTONIO R. TUPAZ & A. EDSEL C.F. TUPAz, FUNDAMENTALS ON
IMPEACHMENT (2001).
47. CONST. (1987), art. XI, sec. 3 (Phil.). On the interpretation of "initiating" impeachment
complaints, see Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. Nos. 160261 el seq., (S.C., Nov. 20,
2003) (Phil.) (en banc), available at http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/nov2003/
gr_1602612003.html [hereafter "Francisco v. House"].
48. Id. n. 48.
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which she partially created.4 9
II.
DECREE POWERS
The constitutions of both Argentina and the Philippines give Presidents
authority to issue decrees with legal force in a wider range of situations than in
the United States. Presidents have taken full advantage of these powers to
stretch the constitutional limits of their office, especially in emergency
situations. Nominal constraints, such as a requirement to seek ex post legislative
approval are only sometimes effective and, in any case, cannot undo most harms
imposed during the decree's time in force. We begin by discussing the use of
Presidential decrees in Argentina, mostly in the context of financial and
budgetary crises. Then we turn to the Philippines, where emergency decrees
have been a central and controversial means of dealing with violent domestic
conflict.
A. Argentina
In Argentina the President can issue executive documents that have legal
force, at least for a limited period of time. However, they frequently require
legislative approval ex post. Four practices are significant: (1) delegated decrees,
(2) legislative declarations of emergency, (3) partial presidential vetoes, and (4)
necessity and urgency decrees [decretos de necesidad y urgencia (DNUs)].
Under the first type, the legislature can delegate to the President the power to
issue decrees with the force of law on specific issues, and the Supreme Court
has upheld such delegations. 50 Article 76 of the Constitution provides that
"legislative powers shall not be delegated to the Executive Power except for
issues concerming administration and public emergency, with a specified term
for their exercise and according to the delegating conditions established by
49. See Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Exec. Ord. No. 464
(Phil.), Exec. Ord. No. 474 (Phil.); Proclamation Declaring A State of National Emergency, Pres.
Proc. 1017 (Phil.); Directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the Face of National
Emergency, Gen. Ord. 5 (Phil.); Ban On Firearms, Gen. Ord. 6 (Phil.). See also Michael Lim Ubac,
Mining Out of DENR; Now Under President's Office, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER,Jul. 27, 2007,
available at http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/topstories/topstories/view/20100120-248406/Comelec%
3AEstradacan run for_president inMay; Purple S. Romero, GMA Returns Shortlist to JBC
(Judicial and Bar Council), ABS-CBN NEWS (Jul. 27, 2009), http://www.facebook.com/
ext/share.php?sid-121754536227&h-yll4y&u=2RvMs&ref-nf; Raul Pangalangan, The Arguments
for Inaction, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER,Feb. 21, 2008, available at http://opinion.inquirer.net/
inquireropinion/columns/view/20080221-120384ffhe-arguments-for-inaction.
50. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice],
20/06/1927, "A. M. Delfino y Cia," Fallos (1927-148) (Arg.); Corte Suprema de Justicia de la
Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 17/05/1957, "Mouviel, Ra6l 0. y otros," Fallos
(1957-237-636) (Arg.); Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of
Justice], 02/12/1993, "Cocchia, Jorge D. c. Estado nacional y otro," Fallos (1993-316-2416) (Arg.).
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Congress" (author's translation). Although some legal scholars argue that this
language sharply limits such delegation, 5 1 in practice this has not happened, and
much delegated authority concerns policymaking. Under the second type, if the
legislature declares an emergency (economic, social, sanitary, etc.), it usually
delegates to the President broad power to take measures designed to overcome
the crisis, including the discretionary use of budgeted public funds. 52 Partial
presidential vetoes are mostly used with respect to spending bills and are
discussed in a later section.
Necessity and urgency decrees are the most important presidential
documents from the perspective of understanding executive power. The issuance
of such decrees often occurs simultaneously with the invocation of formal
emergency powers. In the last two decades, Argentine Presidents have often
relied on DNUs to achieve their political and policy agendas. We concentrate
our analysis on them in this section.
Under the Constitution, the President can issue DNUs during a state of
emergency, without prior legislative authorization or explicit delegation.
Because the decree can concern matters that normally require legislative
approval, and because its legal force is equivalent to an act of legislation, the
President can use a DNU to encroach on Congress' law-making prerogatives. As
Gabriel Bouzat has noted, "hundreds ... of decrees have been issued to govern
such important decisions as changing the legal currency, modifying contracts,
renegotiating the external debt, and freezing banking deposits." 53 He also
highlights how likely the Argentine presidency is to use decrees in times of
emergency. They have issued emergency decrees since the beginning of the
country's institutionalization in 1853. Their use, however, rapidly increased in
the 1990s, when Argentina suffered from economic difficulties and initiated a
wave of privatizations. DNUs increased from 0.1 per month during the first
post-1983 government, when the country returned to democracy, to 4.4 per
month in the 1990s. 54 Presidential reliance on DNUs continued once the 1990s
crisis abated. They reached a high during the 2001-2003 crisis of 9.3 per
month.55
As an example of how DNUs have been used, in the fall of 2008 President
Cristina Fernimdez de Kirchner issued her first DNU to increase the size of the
51. See Volume 1, Chapter VII in AGUSTIN GORDILLO, TRATADO DE DERECHO
ADMINISTRATIVO 27 (8th ed. 2006), available at www.gordillo.com/Pdfl-8/1-8VII.pdf.
52. Under former President Carlos Menem's administration, for example, the executive branch
largely carried out state reform and privatizations under economic emergency powers. Bouzat, supra
note 25.
53. Id.
54. En 15 Meses de Gobierno, Cristina Kirchner Firm6 5 Decretos de Necesidady Urgencia,
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budget by $11.6 billion. 56 To do this, she argued that there was an urgent need
for budgetary increases that could not wait for the delay that the legislative
procedure would entail. However, the opposition complained that her actions
were unlawful because there was no real emergency.57 In another example from
Mrs. Kirchner's presidency, the Ministry of Economy attempted to raise revenue
by issuing a simple resolution that imposed a steep tax on certain agricultural
exports based on delegated legislation. In response to strong opposition from
farmers and their powerful representatives in Congress, President Kirchner then
sent a bill to Congress asking it to ratify the Ministry's resolution. The lower
house approved the agricultural export tax on by a vote of 128 to 122, but the
Senate rejected the tax by one vote, 37 to 36, with President Kirchner's Vice
President casting the deciding vote. 58 The executive branch repudiated the
agricultural tax the next day.59 However, the President claimed that
Congressional support was not strictly necessary and that she had submitted the
bill of her own free will, not because of a legal mandate. 60
As a second example, in January 2010, President Kirchner forced the Chief
of the Central Bank to resign by issuing a controversial DNU removing him
from office 61 when he refused to comply with another DNU requiring him to
shift a massive amount of funds from the Bank to the government to pay
Argentina's debt.62 This DNJ was stopped by lower courts in response to
injunctions requested by members of the opposition who claimed that the decree
was unconstitutional. The courts argued that there was no real urgency or
emergency to issue a DNU, because payments were not due until August, and
56. See Modificase el Presupuesto General de la Administraci6n Nacional para el Ejercicio
2008, Decree No. 1472, Sept. 15, 2008 (Arg.), available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/
infoleglnternet/anexos/140000-144999/144600/norma.htm.
57. See Sebastidn Premici, Debate Sobre Ntmeros de la Discordia, PAGINA 12, Sep. 18, 2008,
available at http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/economia/2-111785-2008-09-18.html.
58. See La Cdmara Baja Aprobd la Resolucidn 125, y Ahora el Debate Serd en el Senado,
PAGINA 12, Jul. 5, 2008, http://www.paginal2.com.ar/diario/ultimas/20-107291-2008-07-05.html;
see Tras una Dramatica Sesidn, LA NACI6N, Jul. 17, 2008, available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar
/nota.asp?nota id=1 030952.
59. See Instrfyese al Seflor Ministro de Economia y Producci6n de la Naci6n, Decree No.
1176, Jul. 18, 2008 (Arg.), http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infoleglntemet/anexos/140000-
144999/142613/norma.htm; see Limitase la vigencia de las Resoluciones Nros. 125/2008 y N'
141/2008, Res. No. 180, Jul. 18, 2008 (Arg.), available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegIntemet/
anexos/140000-144999/142614/norma.htm.
60. President Femndez de Kirchner's effort to obtain congressional approval constituted tacit
acknowledgement that her claims regarding the resolution's validity were questionable. However,
the fact that Congress rejected a bill that upheld the validity of the Ministry's resolution does not
imply that the resolution was constitutionally invalid.
61. See Remu6vese del cargo al Presidente, Decree No. 18, Jan. 7, 2010 (Arg.), available at
http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infoleglntemet/anexos/1 60000-164999/162676/norma.htm.
62. See Cr6ase el Fondo del Bicentenario para el Desendeudamiento y la Estabilidad, Decree
No. 2010, Dec. 14, 2009 (Arg.), available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infoleglntemet/anexos/
160000-164999/161506/norna.htm.
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because, although the legislature was not in session, the President could have
called for an extraordinary session. 63 While one of these cases was under review
by the Supreme Court, and when the DNU was about to be rejected by
Congress, the President revoked it and issued an almost identical DNU.64
Legislators from the opposition requested injunctions against the new DNU,
which were granted but eventually reversed by an appellate court. 65
As for the DNU that removed the Central Bank's Chief from office, the
courts stopped the DNU at his request, through an injunction holding that it
violated provisions of the Central Bank Act that called for congressional
involvement. The Act in Section IV requires the previous non-binding advice of
a special congressional bicameral committee. The Chief finally resigned, the
government did not accept his resignation, and the bicameral committee
eventually advised in favor of his removal, which led the former Chief to end his
judicial challenges. Hence, the courts could not rule on the substance of the
President's actions. 6 6
Although the legal challenges never led to a Supreme Court decision, the
arguments pro and con merit review because they illustrate how the President
used separation-of-powers language to try to insulate herself from judicial
oversight. The executive branch argued that in light of the constitutional
separation of powers the judiciary had no power to review the factual basis for
issuing the DNU. The lower courts, however, asserted that the judiciary does
have a strong role in reviewing the factual bases of DNUs and that in this case
no emergency existed. This produced sharp criticism from the Executive, which
again cited its authority under the separation of powers.67 The basic issue of the
role of separation of powers as a shield against review or as a justification for
oversight remains unresolved.
In spite of the controversy surrounding the issuance of DNUs, they have
strong constitutional grounding, granted by the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
prior and post-constitutional amendment, and by the amendment itself, which
institutionalized the DNU as a tool of the executive branch. The constitutional
63. There were several rulings in different cases. See, e.g., Banco Central: la Cdmara Ratific6
Que no se Pueden Usar las Reservas, CENTRO DE INFORMACI6N JUDICIAL (Jan. 22, 2010), available
at http://www.cij.gov.ar/nota-3301-Banco-Central--la-Camara-ratifico-que-no-se-pueden-usar-las-
reservas.html.
64. Decree No. 298, Mar. 1, 2010 (Arg.), available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/
infoleglnternet/anexos/160000-164999/164707/norma.htm.
65. See La Justicia Revocd las Cautelares Que Frenaron el Uso de Reservas, CENTRO DE
INFORMACION JUDICIAL (Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.cij.gov.ar/nota-3724-La-Justicia-revoco-las-
cautelares-que-frenaron-el-uso-de-reservas.htmi.
66. See Con Fuertes Criticas, Redrado Renuncid al BCRA, Pero el Gobierno ya Adelant6 Que
no Aceptari la Dimisidn, LA NAcI6N (Jan. 29, 2010), http://www.lanacion.com.ar/
nota.asp?notaid=1227491; Mariano Obarrio, Marc6 del Pont Presidird el Central, LA NACI6N,Feb.
4, 2010, available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?notaid=1229371.
67. Some in the executive branch accused the courts of seeking to overthrow the government.
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recognition of DNUs was a political decision intended to limit excesses.6 8
DNUs have existed since the country's founding as an independent state in
1853. Furthermore, they were deemed constitutional by the Supreme Court in
the 1990 case Peralta Luis A. y otro c. Estado Nacional (hereafter, Peralta),69
which was forcefully questioned by a majority of legal scholars. Particularly
severe were the words of constitutional law scholar Miguel A. Ekmekdjidn, who
referred to Peralta as "seventy pages of fallacies (... .) inconsistent with both the
letter and the spirit of the Constitution, and which have the sole excuse of
supporting an arbitrary level of Executive Power." 70 In Peralta the Court
accepted the constitutionality of an emergency decree, but also established three
limits: (1) there has to be a situation of grave social risk that endangers the
existence of the Nation and the State; (2) the measures have to be reasonable in
terms both of the means chosen by the rule and their goals, and of the
proportionality between the measures and the period in which they are in force;
(3) the decree has to be recognized by Congress, either expressly or tacitly.71
The 1994 amendment provides that "[t]he Executive Power shall in no
event issue provisions of legislative nature, in which case they shall be
absolutely and irreparably null and void," but, nonetheless, it authorizes the
President to issue DNUs subject to several limitations, set forth in Article 99.3.
First, such decrees can only be issued when extraordinary circumstances make it
impossible to follow ordinary constitutional procedures for the enactment of
statutes. Second, only the President can issue DNUs, and the entire cabinet,
including the Chief of Cabinet, must sign them. 72 Third, DNUs may not concern
criminal issues, taxation, electoral matters, or the party system. Fourth, the Chief
of Cabinet must submit the DNU to a Permanent Bicameral Congressional
Commission no more than ten days after its enactment. The Commission's
membership proportionally reflects the political representation of the parties in
each House. The Commission then has ten days to issue its opinion and send it
to the plenary of both Houses for immediate consideration. The amendment
provided that a special statute should regulate the procedure and scope of
legislative participation. The constitutional provisions constrain the President,
but at the same time, they give a firm textual grounding to the use of decree
power. These provisions mostly codify the holding in Peralta.73
In addition to the fact that the 1994 amendment retained a presidential tool
68. See ZARINI, supra note 31.
69. See Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice],
27/12/1990, "Peralta, Luis A. y otro c. Estado Nacional," Fallos (1990-313-1513) (Arg.).
70. MIGUEL ANGEL EKMEKDJIAN ET AL., REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL 27-8 (1994). The
translation is the authors.
71. For an outline of these limits, see Maria Ang6lica Gelli, Controles sobre los decretos de
necesidad y urgencia. De "Rodriguez" a "Verrocchi." El regreso de "Peralta?" La Ley [L.L.]
2000-A-1 125 (2000) (Arg.).
72. See Gordillo, supra note 51.
73. See Peralta, supra note 69.
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that is uniquely tailored to circumvent constitutional prohibitions on lawmaking
by the executive branch, the statute regulating the procedure and scope of
legislative participation was not enacted until July 2006.74 Congressional
oversight of DNUs was thus absent for 12 years. Furthermore, the 2006 statute
suffers from three main problems. First, a vote of both Congressional Houses is
required to reject a DNU. De facto this means that Congress can approve a DNU
by the positive vote of only one House, making it more difficult for the
legislature to reject a DNU than it is to approve a new law according to the
formal procedure established in the Constitution. 7 5 Second, it does not impose
time limits for Congressional action. Thus, if Congress does not explicitly
accept or reject a DNU, it remains in effect during congressional inaction. This
infringes upon the constitutional prohibition against tacit congressional
approval. 76 The 2006 law regulating the procedure and scope of legislative
participation further provides that if the legislature rejects a DNU, vested rights
remain unaffected. Hence, if the effects of a DNU are short-lived but far-
reaching or permanent, later legislative action may be ineffectual or irrelevant. 7 7
The dangers of such exercises of presidential power are compounded if the
President issues a DNU while Congress is on recess. This happened in 2009,
when President Kirchner issued the DNJ describe earlier that ordered the
Central Bank to use its reserves to pay Argentina's external debt.7 8 Third, the
statute does not require sunset clauses for DNUs, thus allowing emergency
decrees to stay in force even after the emergency has passed.
In light of these shortcomings, a civil rights nongovernmental organization
filed an amparo suit-a remedy to protect constitutional rights, common to
Latin America-in September 2006. The organization asked the court to declare
the amendment unconstitutional. However, both the trial and appellate courts
found that the plaintiffs lacked proper standing. The amparo is pending in the
Supreme Court, which has developed an inconsistent line of reasoning with
74. Regdlase el trdmite y los alcances de la intervenci6n del Congreso respecto de decretos
que dicta el Poder Ejecutivo, Law No. 26122, Jul. 20, 2006 (Arg.), available at www.infoleg.gov.ar/
infoleglnternet/anexos/1 15000-119999/118261/norma.htm.
75. Id. art. 24.
76. Article 28 of the Argentine Constitution provides that: "The will of each House shall be
expressly stated; the tacit or fictitious approval is excluded in all cases."
77. In March 2010, President Kirchner revoked the first DNU that ordered the use of Central
Bank reserves to pay external debt. That DNU had been suspended by the lower courts, was under
review by the Supreme Court, and was about to be rejected by Congress. Instead, she issued an
almost identical DNU, and in a joint move with the board of the Central Bank, reserves to pay
external debt were moved to the Ministry of Economy only hours after the President delivered her
speech. That afternoon the DNU was formally published (a requirement for its validity) in an
unusual special edition of the Official Bulletin. Because the funds had already been transferred, any
payments to external debt creditors would not be recoverable, even if the legislature rejects the new
DNU.
78. The DNU ordering the shift of funds had been issued only a few days after the end of the
ordinary session. The government was arguably trying to avoid Congress because it had lost its
legislative majority in the recent elections, and thus it would have likely lost the vote over a bill.
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respect to the 1994 amendment over the last 15 years. We summarize this
shifting pattern in the next paragraphs.
In 1995, in Video Club Dreams c. Instituto Nacional de Cinematografia
(hereafter Video Club Dreams), the Supreme Court strengthened its oversight of
DNUs compared with Peralta. It followed the first requirement of Peralta: a
DNU requires a situation of grave social risk that endangers the survival of the
Nation. Due to new constitutional provisions that were absent in Peralta's time,
it further held that the emergency had to involve exceptional circumstances that
make it impossible to follow the ordinary constitutional procedures for the
enactment of statutes. 79 The Court also followed Peralta in holding that the
measures must be reasonable. But it tightened the case's third requirement and
held that DNUs could neither be ratified by legislative silence nor implicitly
ratified by their inclusion in a budget statute.80
In 1997, however, the judiciary refused to review a DNU, holding instead
that oversight of DNUs is an exclusive power of Congress with which the
judiciary cannot interfere. 8 1 The Court limited itself to analyzing whether the
matter covered by the decree was expressly prohibited by the Constitution, that
is, whether the decree concerned taxation, criminal law, electoral system, and
political parties. Thus, the Supreme Court evoked the doctrine of the separation
of powers to limit the judiciary's role as a check on the executive branch.82
Unlike the Peralta case, the Court did not consider whether there was a situation
of "grave social risk that endangers the existence of the Nation."
In 1999, the Court reinstated Peralta 's stringent review of DNUs in
Verrocchi Ezio Daniel c/ Poder Ejecutivo Nacional-Administraci6n Nacional
de Aduanas (hereafter Verrocchi).83 It held that in order for the executive
legitimately to exercise powers that are, in principle, reserved to the Congress,
one of two circumstances must occur. Either, Congress cannot meet due to force
majeure circumstances, or the situation is so urgent that it must be solved so
quickly that normal legislative procedures cannot be used. Thus, the Court
reversed course and asserted a role for itself in policing the legislative/executive
79. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice],
06/06/1995, "Video Club Dreams c. Instituto Nacional de Cinematografia," La Ley [L.L.] (1995-D-
247) (Arg.). See Section 16 of Justice Belluscio's concurring opinion.
80. Id.; see also Gordillo, supra note 51.
81. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice],
17/12/1997, "Rodriguez, Jorge en: Nieva, Alejandro y otros c. Poder Ejecutivo Nacional," La Ley
[L.L.] (1997-E-884) (Arg.).
82. Id. The Court held that citizens could still challenge the constitutionality of DNUs. This
holding, however, is incompatible with the rest of the decision because if DNUs' oversight is an
exclusive function of the legislature, then how can courts review their constitutionality? See Gelli,
supra note 71.
83. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice],
19/08/1999, "Verrocchi Ezio Daniel c/ Poder Ejecutivo Nacional - Administraci6n Nacional de
Aduanas s/ acci6n de amparo," Fallos (1999-322-1726) (Arg.).
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boundary with respect to DNUs.
Finally, in May 2010 in Consumidores Argentinos c/ EN (hereafter
Consumidores Argentinos), the Court reaffirmed its commitment to Verrocchi's
stringent standard of review. It reasoned that the 1994 amendment intended to
limit the President's use of the DNU and that the exercise of legislative
functions by the executive branch was only constitutionally appropriate in
exceptional circumstances. Hence, the judiciary must determine whether the
circumstances invoked by the executive branch to justify a DNU indeed amount
to a state of necessity and urgency. The Court reaffirmed that a DNU must meet
one of the two situations established in the Verrocchi case to be constitutional. 84
It argued that its holding did not invade the executive branch's own powers but
rather reflected the judiciary's independence and its role as a check on the
executive.
The Supreme Court issued its decision in Consumidores Argentinos at an
opportune time. First, the Central Bank controversy had just been resolved by
the Chief's resignation and the withdrawal of legal challenges. Second, the case
concerned a DNU issued by a previous administration. Thus, in issuing its
decision, the Supreme Court revealed its position to the executive branch and
seemed to warn against future presidential attempts to strong-arm the other
branches through DNU orders such as the one used in the Central Bank
controversy.
In spite of the Consumidores Argentinos decision, the civil rights
organization's amparo suit before the Supreme Court challenging the
constitutionality of the 2006 statute regulating congressional oversight of DNUs
remains relevant. Consumidores Argentinos refers to a DNU issued before the
enactment of the 2006 statute, and hence does not resolve the petitioner's
challenge. Further checks on the executive branch's DNU power may be
forthcoming. The lower House recently approved a bill amending the 2006
statute to require a positive vote of both Houses to consider a DNU approved by
the legislature. This bill was still pending in the Senate when this article went to
print.
B. The Philippines
Turning to the Philippines, we see a similarly wide use of emergency
presidential decrees although its emergencies generally involve civil strife, not
economic crisis. A degree that establishes a state of emergency permits the
President to suspend legal protections for individuals. This produces conflicting
claims concerning whether Filipino security forces can handle the civil strife
without suspending such legal protections. More generally, executive orders are
84. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice],
19/05/2010, "Consumidores Argentinos c/ EN - PEN -Dto. 558/02-SS - ley 20.091 s/ amparo ley
16.986," Fallos (2010-C-923) (Arg.).
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issued in other situations simply to assert presidential prerogatives and limit
oversight.
The Philippine President's quasi-legislative authority has statutory and
constitutional dimensions. The 1987 Revised Administrative Code (Chapter 2,
Sections 2-7) categorizes the President's Ordinance Powers into five groups: (1)
executive orders of a general or permanent character that implement or execute
constitutional or statutory powers; (2) administrative orders that relate to
governmental operations; (3) proclamations that fix a date or declare a status or
condition of public interest; (4) memorandum orders and circulars that relate to
administrative details; and finally, (5) orders issued by the President in his or her
capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. 85 We
discuss only the first and fifth types of executive orders, that is, those that make
policy or affect national security.
If the President issues an executive order pertaining to a power that the
Constitution entrusts to the legislature, the President must obtain prior statutory
authority. Permissible legislative delegations to the President include: tariff rates
and emergency powers. The legislature may also delegate to the people at
large, 86 to local governments, and to administrative bodies. 87 Non-delegable
matters include "appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing the
increase of the public debt, bills of local application and private bills," among
85. Instituting the "Administrative Code of 1987," Exec. Ord. No. 292, secs. 2-7 (Phil.)
[hereafter "Admin. Code 1987"], available at http://www.lawphil.net/executive/execord/
eol987/eo 292_1987.html.
86. Direct legislative delegation to the Filipino polity can take place in various forms, First,
direct delegation can occur at the lowest level of government through the system of local initiative
and referendum, where "registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or
amend any ordinance." See Rep. Act No. 7160, supra note 37.
A second form of direct delegation is through a system of 'statutory' initiative and referendum,
which permits registered voters to enact or reject any law passed by Congress. See An Act Providing
for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, Rep. Act No. 6735
(1989) (Phil.), available at http://www.chanrobles.com/republicactno6735.htm.
Finally, apart from the statutorily-created mechanisms for local and statutory initiative and
referendum, the 1987 Philippine Constitution also gave Filipinos the direct power to amend the
Constitution through a constitutionalized system of initiative and referendum. See CONST. (1987),
art. XVII, sec. 2 (Phil.) ("Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum
of the registered voters therein."). See also Garcia v. Comm'n on Elections, G.R. No. 111230 (S.C.,
Sept. 30, 1994) (Phil.) (en banc), http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudencel994/
sepl994/gr I1l230_1994.php.
87. CONST. (1987), art. VI, sec. 23-24, 28; art. XVII, sec. 2 (Phil.). See also Rep. Act No.
6735, supra note 86; In re Santiago v. Comm'n on Elections, G.R. No. 127325 (S.C., Mar.19, 1997)
(Phil.) (en banc), http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudencel997/marl997/127325.php;
Lambino v. Comm'n on Elections, G.R. No. 174153, 174299 (S.C., Oct. 25, 2006) (Phil.) (en banc),
available at http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2006/october2006/174153php;
and Rep. Act No. 7160, supra note 37.
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others. 88 Further, to be valid, such delegation must be complete so that "the only
thing [the delegate] will have to do is to enforce it." The statute must contain
language that sets "the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot."89 In spite of this restrictive language, in practice,
the Philippine Supreme Court uses a permissive standard to assess congressional
delegations of policymaking authority to the President. It has accepted the
following terms as adequate: interest of law and order, adequate and efficient
instruction, public interest, justice and equity, public convenience and welfare,
simplicity, economy and efficiency, standardization and regulation of medical
education, and fair and equitable employment practices.9 0 The Court has held
that the President's administrative power "enables the President to fix a uniform
standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his
agents." 9 1 In practice, this gives her broad discretion to manage administrative
agencies mostly by relying on her executive power so long as there is no explicit
statutory or constitutional language that vests discretion elsewhere in the
constitutional system. 92
In addition to exercising delegated powers, President Arroyo frequently
asserted implied and residual constitutional powers. During her nine-year
presidency, she wielded her powers as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces and Chief Executive to issue a number of controversial orders. Relying
on "residual" powers inherent in the presidency, the President issued
controversial proclamations declaring a state of emergency and directing "the
Armed Forces of the Philippines in the Face of National Emergency, to Maintain
Public Peace, Order and Safety and to Prevent and Suppress Lawless
Violence." 93 Also provoking criticism was an Executive Order that limited the
appearance of executive branch officials before Congress. 94 We begin with
88. CONsT. (1987), art. VI, sec. 24 (Phil.).
89. Gerochi v. Dep't of Energy, G.R. No. 159796 (S.C., Jul. 17, 2007) (Phil.) (en banc),
available at http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2007/july2007/159796%20.php.
The language of Gerochi echoes Justice Cardozo's concurring opinion in A. L. A. Schechter Poultry
Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), one of only a few cases where the court declared the
delegation of legislative powers to the President unconstitutional. Justice Cardozo wrote that the
delegated power was "unconfined and vagrant" and that it was "delegation running riot." 295 U.S. at
551, 553.
90. See Justice Romero's dissenting opinion in Ass'n of Philippine Coconut Dessicators v.
Philippine Coconut Auth., G.R. No. 110526 (S.C., Feb 10, 1998) (Phil.), available at
http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudencel998/febl998/110526 romero.php.
91. Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685 (S.C., Jul. 23, 1998) (Phil.) (en banc), available at
http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudencel998/jullI998/127685.php.
92. After assuming the presidency following President Joseph Estrada's resignation in 2001,
President Arroyo earned a fresh six-year term in the 2004 presidential elections. See Diane Desierto,
The Presidential Veil of Administrative Authority over Foreign-Financed Public Contracts in the
Philippines, UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. (forthcoming under submission).
93. Pres. Proc. 1017 and Gen. Ords. 5, 6, supra note 49.
94. Exec. Ord. 464, supra note 49.
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proclamations of states of national emergency and then discuss assertions of
executive privilege that seek to limit legislative oversight. We conclude with a
brief section on the use of executive orders by the newly elected President
Benigno Aquino III.
1. The State of "National Emergency"
Presidential declarations of states of emergency can override constitutional
protections for individual rights. Because Filipino Presidents frequently have
used decrees to declare states of national emergency, we examine these actions
in some detail because of their potential threat to constitutional values. Two
recent cases illustrate the risks of unchecked emergency power.
In February 2006, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation No.
1017 (hereafter "PP 1017"), declaring that the Philippines faced a state of
national emergency and commanding the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) to "maintain law and order." 95 On the same day, she issued General
Order Nos. 5 and 6 commanding the AFP to coordinate with the Philippine
National Police (PNP) to carry out PP 1017. She cited national security threats
posed by "authoritarians of the extreme Left" and "military adventurists of the
extreme Right."9 6 One week after the issuance of PP 1017, she issued
Presidential Proclamation No. 1021 lifting PP 1017, declaring that the state of
national emergency had ceased.
Many coercive acts occurred throughout the week that PP 1017 was in
force. The Office of the President cancelled all rally permits issued by local
governments. The police dispersed assemblies and raided "oppositionist"
newspapers. They confiscated news stories, documents, pictures, and mock-ups.
The police even arrested an opposition legislator and denied him contact with
his relatives during his detention. The police also attempted to arrest five other
perceived opposition legislators, but the House of Representatives extended
"sanctuary protection" to these individuals.9 7
A lawsuit brought by seven petitioners challenged the constitutionality of
PP 1017 and General Order No. 5 before the Supreme Court. Apart from
assailing the government's ongoing violations of constitutional rights, the
petitioners also questioned the factual and constitutional basis for declaring a
state of emergency. The Court, in an eleven to three vote, partially affirmed the
constitutionality of the Presidential actions in Prof Randolf S. David et al. v.
95. Pres. Proc. 1017, supra note 49.
96. Id.
97. David v. Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 171396 et. seq., (S.C., May 3, 2006) (Phil.) (en banc),
available at http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2006/may2006/G.R.%2No.%
20171396.php. See also Amando Doronila, Proclamation No. 1017: Policy Matrix of Slaughter,
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, Sept. 4, 2006, available at http://newsinfo.inquirer.net'
inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20060904-18819/ProclamationNo._101 7%3A Policymatrix ofsla
ughter.
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Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, as President and Commander-in-Chief-98 However,
the Court limited its inquiry to "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government." 99 The Court explicitly rejected assertions of presidential authority
to issue decrees that direct the military to enforce obedience to all laws. At the
same time, it made the factual basis for the President's proclamation virtually
beyond review. 100 Its inquiry did not consider the correctness of the President's
decision, but only whether her decision was arbitrary. The Court stated that no
branch of government has a monopoly over public power in times of
emergency. 0 1 Rather, at such times the Constitution "reasonably demands that
we repose a certain amount of faith in the basic integrity and wisdom of the
Chief Executive." 1 02 The Chief Executive, however, must respect certain
98. David v. Arroyo, supra note 97
[The Court finds] ... that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by
the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. ... However, PP
1017's extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to
issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not
related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President; and (3) to
impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires
and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under ... the Constitution, the
President, in the absence of legislation, cannot take over privately owned public utility
and private business affected with public interest.
In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the
President --- acting as Commander-in-Chief--- addressed to subalterns in the AFP to
carry out the provisions of PP 1017. Significantly, it also provides a valid standard ---
that the military and the police should take only the 'necessary and appropriate actions
and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.' But the words 'acts of
terrorism' found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined and made punishable by
Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O. ...
On the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts narrated earlier, it is also pristine
clear that: (1) the warrantless arrest of petitioners Randolf S. David and Ronald
Llamas; (2) the dispersal of the rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU and
NAFLU-KMU members; (3) the imposition of standards on media or any prior
restraint on the press; and (4) the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and the
whimsical seizures of some articles for publication and other materials, are not
authorized by the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. Not even by the valid
provisions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
99. Id, citing CONST. (Phil.), art. VIll, sec. 1.
100. Id.
101. Id
102. Id. (the Court explaining: "Our Constitution has fairly coped with this problem. Fresh from
the fetters of a repressive regime, the 1986 Constitutional Commission, in drafting the 1987
Constitution, endeavored to create a government in the concept of Justice Jackson's 'balanced power
structure.' Executive, legislative, and judicial powers are dispersed to the President, the Congress,
and the Supreme Court, respectively. Each is supreme within its own sphere. But none has the
monopoly of power in times of emergency. Each branch is given a role to serve as limitation or
check upon the other. This system does not weaken the President, it just limits his power, using the
language of McIlwain. In other words, in times of emergency, our Constitution reasonably demands
that we repose a certain amount of faith in the basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive but,
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procedural limitations. 103 Thus, the Court accepted the President's
determination that a national emergency existed. However, because the Supreme
Court declined to review the factual basis for a declaration of national
emergency, it encouraged future attempts at Presidential lawmaking using
implied or residual executive powers.104
The President's response to one particularly violent event illustrates the
way that the executive can use emergency powers to limit its accountability. On
November 23, 2009 in Maguindanao Province, over sixty-seven journalists,
civilians, and lawyers, most of them women, were on their way to file an
opposition candidate's certificate of candidacy for governor. They were attacked
by at least 100 armed men, and most were brutally raped and murdered.105
Survivors as well as an alleged co-perpetrator identified Mayor Andal Ampatuan
Jr., a member of a prominent political family, as the leader of the massacre.
However, Ampatuan Jr. was not detained or arrested. The Office of the
President instead encouraged the Ampatuan family to voluntarily surrender their
family member, which it did. Searches in and near Ampatuan Jr.'s mansion
yielded large weapons caches, some containing material appropriated from the
Department of Defense. On December 5, President Arroyo issued Proclamation
No. 1959 (hereafter "PP 1959") placing Maguindanao under martial law, a level
above military emergency. She cited "deterioration of peace and order" and
"failure of the local judicial system" as justification for her declaration. 106
However, standard criminal procedures and police enforcement measures were
already well in motion, and there was no visible resistance to government forces.
Before PP 1959, in fact, the President already had declared Maguindanao
province to be in a state of emergency, which allowed military troops to take
control of the area. The police had made numerous arrests in addition to that of
Ampatuan Jr., and they had gathered and were examining forensic evidence.
Prosecutors were already preparing criminal charges. The Constitutional
Commission on Human Rights deputized a public interest lawyers group,
at the same time, it obliges him to operate within carefully prescribed procedural limitations.").
103. Id.
104. Diane Desierto, A Universalist History of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (I), 10
HISTORIA CONSTITUCIONAL 383 (2009) (sensitivity to the Constitution of 1987's universalist design,
orientation, and philosophy should constrain executive discretion, where the President characterizes
an ongoing situations as a "national emergency."), http://www.historiaconstitucional.com/
index.php/historiaconstitucional/article/viewFile/236/209; Diane Desierto, A Universalist History of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution (II), 11 HISTORIA CONSTITUCIONAL 427 (2010),
http://www.historiaconstitucional.conindex.php/historiaconstitucionallarticle/view/277/ 2 44 .
105. See Analyn Perez and TJ Dimacali, The Ampatuan Massacre: A Map and Timeline, GMA-
7 NEws (Dec. 9, 2009), http://www.gmanews.tv/story/177821/the-ampatuan-massacre-a-map-and-
timeline.
106. Report of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on Proclamation No. 1959,
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, Dec. 6, 2009, (complete report on the declaration of martial law in
Maguindanao), available at http://media.inquirer.net/inquirer/media/PGMA-Report-on-Proclamation
-No. 1959.pdf.
2692011]
HeinOnline  -- 29 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 269 2011
270 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Centerlaw, to assist in bringing international forensic experts to conduct a
parallel investigation of the massacre. 107 Days before PP 1959 was issued, the
Armed Forces of the Philippines said that Maguindanao Province was already
restored to a "level of normalcy" and there was "no need for the declaration of
martial law." 108
PP 1959 was the first time that a President declared martial law and
suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under the 1987
Constitution. Indeed, it was the first such declaration since Ferdinand Marcos,
who ruled as a dictator, imposed martial law in 1972. Under the Constitution,
only cases of "invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it" justify
the declaration of martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. 109 if
any of these grounds exist, the President must report to Congress within 48
hours on the factual basis for the proclamation of martial law and/or the
suspension of habeas corpus.1 10
In her short report to Congress, President Arroyo asserted that there was an
"on-going rebellion" that justified the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of habeas corpus.1 11 This report noticeably lacked an official report
from the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The House majority, dominated by
the President's supporters, initially refused to convene Congress while citing its
support for PP 1959. After a public uproar, the House of Representatives agreed
to convene a joint session with the Senate, which took place 96 hours after the
declaration of martial law. Congress conducted a marathon public joint session,
but later suspended it without reaching the constitutionally-required vote to
extend or overturn the martial law declaration. 112 In the meantime, numerous
senators, citizens, lawyers, and public interest groups filed petitions with the
107. Nikko Dizon, CHR looks for more possible massacre victims, PHILIPPINE DAILY
INQUIRER, Dec. 9, 2009, available at http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/
20091209-241072/CHR looks forpossible more massacre victims; Mark D. Meruefias, Agency
would not hesitate to bring case to the international court, GMA-7 NEWS, (Dec. 9, 2009),
http://www.gmanews.tv/story/178938/agency-would-not-hesitate-to-bring-massacre-case-to-
international-court.
108. Aie Balagtas See, AFP: no need for martial law in Maguindanao, GMA NEWS (Dec. 30
2009), http://www.gmanews.tv/story/1 78190/no-need-to-declare-martial-law-in-maguindanao-afp.
109. CONST. (1987), art. VII, sec. 18 (Phil.).
110. Id.
111. Proclamation 1959: Proclaiming a State of Martial Law and suspending the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in the province of Maguindanao except for certain areas, GMA NEWS,
Dec. 5, 2009 (text of martial law declaration as read by Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita),
available at http://www.gmanews.tv/story/178582/full-text-arroyos-declaration-of-martial-law-in-
maguindanao.
112. Solita Collas-Monsod, No need for martial law, BUSINESS WORLD, Dec. 9, 2009,
available at http://www.bworldonline.com/main/content.phpid=2962; Maila Ager and Lira
Dalangin-Fernandez, Congress suspends joint session on law, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, Dec. 9,
2009, available at http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20091209-241041/
Congress-suspends-joint-session-on-martial-law.
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Philippine Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of PP 1959.113
Sixteen out of twenty-four Senators passed a "sense of the Senate" resolution
stating that PP 1959 was unconstitutional because there was no actual rebellion
in Maguindanao.11 4 Before the Court could rule on the petitions or Congress
could take a formal vote, the President revoked PP 1959.115 Instead, the
President has maintained a less constitutionally-stringent state of emergency
over Maguindanao and neighboring provinces. 1 16
As of this writing, the Philippine Supreme Court has yet to act on the
petitions challenging PP 1959. Regardless of the outcome of these petitions, the
importance of this case lies in the fact that the President relied on her sole
executive discretion (for example, characterizing events in Maguindanao as a
"rebellion" notwithstanding the Armed Forces of the Philippines' contrary
assessment) to declare martial law and suspend habeas corpus.' 1 7 With a few
months left before the expiration of her term and the conduct of fresh
Presidential elections, the President's action was troubling because Congress did
not constrain her and because of the inevitable time lag ofjudicial review.
During the ten days that PP 1959 was in effect in Maguindanao, the
President exercised absolute power that neither the Legislature nor the Supreme
Court was able to check effectively. While PP 1959 remained in effect, it
severely impaired the ability of police and other actors to independently gather
and preserve evidence. 1 1 8 Senior government officials worried that PP 1959
might have been issued as a pretext to clear the Ampatuan family's involvement
in the massacre or at least to lessen their potential legal responsibility.1 19 Both
PP 1017 and PP 1959 illustrate the symbolic and substantive power of the
113. Michael Lim Ubac and Leila Salaverria, Senators oppose martial law proclamation,
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, Dec. 6, 2009, available at http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerhead
lines/nation/view/20091206-240387/Senators-oppose-Arroyos-martial-law-proclamation; Carlos H.
Conde, Critics challenge martial law in the Philippines, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/08/world/asia/08phils.html; Christina Mendez, Supreme Court
asked to rule on martial law proclamation, PHILIPPINE STAR, Dec. 14, 2009, available at
http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleld=532388&publicationSubCategoryld=63.
114. Aurea Calica and Jess Diaz, 16 senators: '1959' unconstitutional, THE PHILIPPINE STAR,
Dec. 9, 2009, available at http.//www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleld=530799.
115. Arroyo lifts martial law in Maguindanao, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER (Dec. 12, 2009),
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20091212-241634/Arroyo-lifts-martial-law-
in-Maguindanao.
116. See Paolo Romero, State of emergency remains in Maguindanao, THE PHILIPPINE STAR,
Dec. 30, 2009, available at http://www.philstar.com/microsite/noynoy-first-100-days/article.aspx?
articleld=536754&publicationSubCategoryld=63.
117. See Diane Desierto, Universalist History Iand II, supra note 104.
118. Maria Althea Teves, More mass graves in Maguindanao, says human rights chief, ABS-
CBN NEWS (Dec. 9, 2009), http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/12/09/09/more-mass-graves-
maguindanao-says-human-rights-chief.
119. Dona Pazzibugan, Petitions to high court stopping '1959' now total 7, PHILIPPINE DAILY
INQUIRER, Dec. 11, 2009, available at http://services.inquirer.net/mobile/09/12/12/html output/
xmlhtml/20091211-241314-xml.html.
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executive in the Philippines. Despite numerous constitutional limitations and a
rigid structural design for dealing with emergencies, President Arroyo eluded
these constraints by acting unilaterally, in a context where she could rely on key
majorities in Congress and the Supreme Court to accept afait accompli.
2. Executive Privilege
Allegations of bribery and the fraudulent execution of public infrastructure
and procurement contracts led to a 2005 inquiry by the Philippine Senate. It
issued subpoenas to obtain the testimony of various executive officials. 120 In
response, the President issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 464 that elaborated
her office's position on the doctrine of executive privilege. The Order invokes
the separation of powers to shield the executive from oversight and entirely
ignores the complementary principle of checks and balances. Section One of
E.O. No. 464 states that "to implement the Constitutional provisions on the
separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government, all Heads of
Departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent
of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress."l 2 1 in
addition, it gives the President the authority to require hearings to be conducted
in executive session. Section Two states that confidentiality based on executive
privilege is "fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in the
separation of powers under the Constitution."1 22 It then gives a very broad
definition of what and who is covered. Petitioners challenged the
constitutionality of E.O. No. 464 in the Philippine Supreme Court in 2006 in
Senate of the Philippines et al. v. Eduardo R. Ermita, in his capacity as
Executive Secretary and alter-ego, et al.12 3 The Court unanimously declared
parts of E.O. No. 464 unconstitutional, but it upheld a number of key
provisions. 124 The net result was that E.O. No. 464 continued to extend
executive privilege to officials in the executive branch. 125
120. See Gil C. Cabacungan Jr. and Tonette Orejas, Senate May Reopen Northrail Probe,
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, Nov. 13, 2007, available at http://newsinfo.inquirer.netibreakingnews/
nation/view article.php?articleid=100560.
121. Executive Order No. 464 (series of 2005), sec. 1.
122. Id. sec. 2.
123. Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, G.R. Nos. 1697777 et seq., (S.C., Apr. 20, 2006)
(Phil.) (en banc), available at http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/apr2006/gr_169777_ 2006.
html.
124. Id. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No. 464 (series of 2005), "Ensuring
Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on
Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in
Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other
Purposes," are declared VOID. Sections I and 2(a) are, however, VALID. (Emphasis
and capitalization in the original.)
125. Executive Order No. 464 (series of 2005), sec. 2.
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Nearly two years later, a controversial government procurement contract
sparked a new investigation by the Senate. Romulo Neri, the Secretary of the
National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), testified that he was
offered a bribe to endorse a particular procurement contract. When Senators
asked about the President's involvement in approving the contract, Neri invoked
the executive privilege afforded to him by E.O. No. 464. After the Senate
ordered his arrest for refusing to answer its questions, Neri filed a petition with
the Philippine Supreme Court. In a nine to six vote, the Court majority upheld
the claim of executive privilege in Romulo L. Neri v. Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, et al., which expanded the
doctrine of executive privilege beyond Senate v. Ermita.126 The decision
imported doctrinal tests from foreign sources, particularly American
jurisprudence, without undertaking an analysis of the nature of executive power
under the Philippine Constitution. The Court majority relied on a conception of
broad residual executive power to justify the expansion of the privilege, even
against constitutional rights to public information. 127
3. Executive Orders under President Benigno Aquino III
The May 10, 2010 elections ushered in the new administration of President
Benigno Aquino III, who earned a strong mandate from the Filipino electorate,
leading the other presidential candidates by about five million votes. 128 At the
same time, former President Arroyo moved to the legislature after winning the
congressional race for her local district in Pampanga.129
During his first three months in office, President Aquino III issued four
executive orders, three of which are presently subject to challenges before the
Philippine Supreme Court for alleged subversion of constitutional checks and
balances. Executive Order No. 1 created the Philippine Truth Commission. The
Truth Commission is an investigative body charged with submitting "reports of
graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the
moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed . .. during the previous
administration."1 30 It is also supposed to issue recommendations to the Office of
the President, the Congress, and the constitutionally-independent Office of the
126. Neri v. Senate Comm., G.R. No. 180643 (S.C., Mar. 25, 2008) (Phil.) (en banc), available
at http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2008/march2008/180643.php.
127. For the extended analysis of Senate v. Ermita and the current state of the doctrine of
executive privilege in the Philippine constitutional system, see Diane Desierto, Universalist
Constitutionalism in the Philippines: Restricting Executive Particularism in the Form of Executive
Privilege, I VERFASSUNG UND RECHT IN UBERSEE/J.L. & POL. IN AFR., ASIA, & LATIN AMERICA 80
(2009).
128. Kate McGrown, Benigno Aquino sworn in as new Philippine President, BBC NEWS (Jun.
30, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10457448.
129. Arroyo wins Congress seat in Pampanga, GMA NEWS (May 12, 2010),
http://www.gmanews.tv/story/190811/arroyo-wins-congress-seat-in-pampanga.
130. Executive Order No. 1 (series of 2010).
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Ombudsman. 131 Arroyo allies in the House of Representatives have
characterized the Commission as an unlawful creation of the Executive
Branch, 132 claiming that the Commission requires a legislative mandate because
it has considerable fact-finding, subpoena and investigative powers. 133 On
131. Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, Exec. Ord. No. I (Phil.), available at
http://www.gov.ph/2010/07/30/executive-order-no- 1/.
132. Paolo Romero, Truth body faces legal challenge, THE PHILIPPINE STAR, Aug. 1, 2010,
available at http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleld=598633&publicationSubCategoryld=63;
Sophia Dedace and Amita Legaspi, Arroyo allies ask SC to void EO on Truth Commission, GMA
NEWS (Aug. 10, 2010), http://www.gmanews.tv/story/198384/arroyo-allies-ask-sc-to-void-eo-on-
truth-commission.
133. Section 2 of Executive Order No. 1 states:
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. - The Commission, which shall have all the
powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding
investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1,
involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration and
thereafter submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. In particular, it shall:
a) Identify and determine the reported cases of such graft and corruption which it will
investigate;
b) Collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence related to or regarding the cases of
large scale corruption which it has chosen to investigate, and to this end require any
agency, official or employee of the Executive Branch, including government-owned
or controlled corporations, to produce documents, books, records and other papers;
c) Upon proper request or representation, obtain information and documents from the
Senate and the House of Representatives records of investigations conducted by
committees thereof relating to matters or subjects being investigated by the
Commission;
d) Upon proper request and representation, obtain information from the courts,
including the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Court Administrator, information
or documents in respect to corruption cases filed with the Sandiganbayan or the
regular courts, as the case may be;
e) Invite or subpoena witnesses and take their testimonies and for that purpose,
administer oaths or affirmations as the case may be;
f) Recommend, in cases where there is a need to utilize any person as a state witness
to ensure that the ends of justice be fully served, that such person who qualifies as a
state witness under the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines be admitted for that
purpose;
g) Turn over from time to time, for expeditious prosecution, to the appropriate
prosecutorial authorities, by means of a special or interim report and recommendation,
all evidence on corruption of public officers and employees and their private sector
co-principals, accomplices or accessories, if any, when in the course of its
investigation the Commission finds that there is reasonable ground to believe that they
are liable for graft and corruption under pertinent applicable laws;
h) Call upon any government investigative or prosecutorial agency such as the
Department of Justice or any of the agencies under it, and the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission, for such assistance and cooperation as it may require in the discharge of
its functions and duties;
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December 7, 2010, the Philippine Supreme Court voted 10-5 to declare the
Truth Commission unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause of
the Constitution "as it singles out for investigation reports of graft and
corruption in the previous administration". 134
Executive Orders Nos. 2 and 3 were also challenged before the Philippine
Supreme Court when they became the basis for President Aquino III's mass
removal of President Arroyo's appointees. 135 E.O. No. 2 specifically revoked all
midnight appointees made by the former President and other appointing
authorities. 136 Executive Order No. 3 revoked former President Arroyo's E.O.
No. 883, which had automatically vested government lawyers with a high civil
service rank (CESO III) without complying with the rules and procedures of the
Career Executive Service Board. 137 E.O. Nos. 2 and 3 have been challenged
i) Engage or contract the services of resource persons, professionals and other
personnel determined by it as necessary to carry out its mandate;
j) Promulgate its rules and regulations or rules of procedure it deems necessary to
effectively and efficiently carry out the objectives of this Executive Order and to
ensure the orderly conduct of its investigations, proceedings and hearings, including
the presentation of evidence;
k) Exercise such other acts incident to or are appropriate and necessary in connection
with the objectives and purposes of this Order.
134. See the report at: http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/12/07/10/sc-rules-truth-
commission-unconstitutional.
135. Aquino fires Arroyo 'midnight appointees', ABS-CBN NEWS (Oct. 7, 2010),
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/08/04/10/aquino-fires-arroyo-midnight-appointees. See also
Genalyn Kabiling and David Cagahastian, EO No. 2 legal, Palace insists, MANILA BULLETIN (Oct.
7, 2010), http://www.mb.com.ph/node/270920/eo-no-2-legal-palace-in; see Edu Punay, Palace
urged to wait for SC ruling on appointments, PHILIPPINE STAR, Oct. 7, 2010, available at
http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleld=602260&publicationSubCategoryld=63; see also
Joker chides Palace lawyers for 'rush jobs' on 3 EOs, toll VAT issue, BUSINESS MIRROR, Oct. 7,
2010, available at http://businessmirror.com.ph/home/nation/155-joker-chides-palace-lawyers-for-
rush-jobs-on-3-eos-toll-vat-issue.
136. Recalling, Withdrawing, and Revoking Appointments Issued by the Previous
Administration in Violation of the Constitutional Ban on Midnight Appointments, Exec. Ord. No. 2
(Phil.), available at http://www.gov.ph/2010/07/30/executive-order-no-2/. This order defines
midnight appointments in the following manner:
SECTION 1. Midnight Appointments Defined. - The following appointments made
by the former President and other appointing authorities in departments, agencies,
offices, and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered as midnight appointments:
(a) Those made on or after March 11, 2010, including all appointments bearing dates
prior to March 11, 2010 where the appointee has accepted, or taken his oath, or
assumed public office on or after March 11, 2010, except temporary appointments in
the executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety as may be determined by the appointing authority.
(b) Those made prior to March 11, 2010, but to take effect after said date or
appointments to office that would be vacant only after March 11, 2010.
(c) Appointments and promotions made during the period of 45 days prior to the May
10, 2010 elections in violation of Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code.
137. See An Executive Order Revoking Executive Order No. 883, Exec. Ord. No. 3. (Phil.),
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both on the grounds of legislative encroachment and as an exercise in the
arbitrary misuse of executive power.1 38 On October 13, 2010, the Philippine
Supreme Court issued a status quo ante order preventing President Aquino from
implementing E.O. No. 2 while the petitions were being heard by the Court. 139
E.O. 3 is still before the Court.
C. Conclusions on the Use ofExecutive Decrees
Argentine and Philippine Presidents have used executive decrees to
exercise power in ways that override or limit legislative oversight and control.
The supreme courts in both countries have provided limited oversight, and even
when it does occur, court review is likely too slow to be effective. If the
President's quasi-legislative authority is not based on legislative authorization, it
is difficult to ensure institutional accountability when the President asserts that
she has residual or implied powers to make law under the constitution. Her basic
claim is that if the legislature has not acted in certain areas, the President can act
unilaterally unless Congress intervenes. Even when that power is exercised
under legislative authorization, the Argentine and Filipino cases show how
difficult it can be to constrain Presidents operating with weak or politically
supportive legislatures.
Review of executive decrees by the Supreme Courts in Argentina has until
recently been inconsistent. In 1995, the Court held that DNUs cannot be ratified
through legislative silence, but in 1997 it held that the oversight of DNUs is an
exclusive function of Congress, with no role for the courts as a check on
executive action. In 1999 the Court swung toward stringent review of decrees by
limiting DNUs to cases where ordinary constitutional procedures are impossible
to follow due to force majeure circumstances, or where immediate action is
necessary. By May 2010, the Argentine Court seemed to have found a consistent
approach to handling the intertwined concepts of the separation of powers and
checks and balances. It declared that it would review both the factual basis of
DNUs and the underlying rationale while at the same time claiming to respect
the separation of powers.
In contrast, the Philippine Supreme Court has been moving in a more
consistently deferential direction. In two recent cases, it first chose not to review
the factual basis for the President's declaration of national emergency despite
having done so in previous cases. Then it simply referred to a "larger concept of
executive privilege"' 4 0 within the Constitution to justify transposing broader
available at http://www.gov.ph/2010/07/30/executive-order-no-3/.
138. Edmer F. Panesa, 2 petitions vs. EO 2 filed with High Court, MANILA BULLETIN (Aug. 9,
2010), http://www.mb.com.ph/node/271539.
139. Tetch Torres, SC stops Aquino from revoking Arroyo midnight appointments, PHILIPPINE
DAILY INQUIRER, Oct. 13, 2010, available at http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/
nation/view/20101013-297557/SC-stops-Aquino-from-revoking-Arroyo-midnight-appointments.
140. Neri v. Senate Comm., supra note 126.
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forms of executive privilege in such a way as to limit the constitutional right to
public information. Ultimately, the problem lies in the way the Supreme Court
has articulated the concept of "residual" executive power."1 4 1 A narrow Court
majority first articulated this notion in 1989 as something, which is
"traditionally considered as within the scope of 'executive power."' 4 2 Under
this nebulous formulation, that court later appeared to rely on conceptions of
residual executive power that resonated with the strong executive model of the
1935 and 1973 Philippine Constitutions.
Both the Argentine and the Philippines constitutions give Presidents a
range of decree powers, but at the same time they seek to limit the exercise of
these powers. However, the legislatures in each country have seldom operated as
an effective check on executive power. Nor have the supreme courts, despite
periodically hearing cases that require them to determine the limits of these
powers. Furthermore, they have been reluctant to review mixed questions of fact
and law that might lead to charges of political interference, although the recent
Consumidores Argentinos case in Argentina established that the judiciary may
evaluate the factual circumstances supporting DNUs. The courts' acceptance of
emergency justifications seems incompatible with the paradigm of diffuse
powers and constitutional rights that lie behind the new constitutions in place in
each country. Until the May decision, the Argentine court had not developed a
consistent jurisprudence, in some cases refusing to review executive action by
claiming that the legislature is the proper body to exercise oversight, not the
courts. The Philippine Supreme Court also recognizes a sphere of unreviewable
executive discretion as an indispensable aspect of the doctrine of separation of
powers and the nature of executive power. Both courts used the separation of
powers as a principle for limiting the reach of checks and balances. Until the
Argentine Court's May 2010 decision, they did not invoke checks and balances
as a necessary complement to executive power. It remains to be seen how this
recent decision will play out in practice.
III.
BUDGETARY MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION
A key aspect of constitutional design is the placement of responsibility for
determining overall levels of government taxation and expenditures and for
making budgetary allocations to particular programs. In all presidential systems
the legislature is deeply involved in these decisions, but at the same time
expediency requires that the executive have some freedom to allocate funds and
141. See the discussion of residual executive power in Province of North Cotabato v. Gov't of
the Republic of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 183591 et seq., (S.C., Oct. 14, 2008) (Phil.) (en banc),
available at http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/oct2008/gr_183591_2008.html.
142. Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211 (S.C., Sept. 15, 1989) (Phil.) (en banc), available at
http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudencel989/sepl989/gr 8821 1_1989.php.
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shift spending between categories to deal with unexpected contingencies. Thus,
this aspect of government acutely raises the tension between separation of
powers in its bureaucratic rationality form and checks and balances as an aspect
of popular control.
A. Argentina
According to the Argentine Constitution, the legislature promulgates the
government budget and estimates revenue needs. The executive, in turn,
executes the budget. The 1994 amendment transferred the power to execute the
budget from the President to the Chief of Cabinet; however, this has little
practical effect because the President oversees the Chief of Cabinet. 14 3 In
practice, the National Budget Office, an office within the Ministry of Economy
under control of the executive branch, prepares the budget bill based on
submissions from the national administration. 144 The President must submit the
final budget bill to the legislature before September 15, and the bill must include
an explanation of the objectives that the government intends to achieve, as well
as of the methodology that it used to estimate revenues and expenditures. 145
The Constitution provides several legislative checks on executive
budgetary authority, but all of them work poorly. First, Congress reviews past
government spending through a document called the "investment account" that
explains the budget's execution, the treasury's state of affairs, the state of the
public debt, the accounting and financial state of the government, and the
economic and financial results of past government spending. It also paints a
general picture of the degree to which the government has accomplished the
goals and objectives of the budget bill. The President is supposed to submit the
investment account to Congress before June 30 of the year following the budget
bill's approval. 146 Within the legislature, a special bicameral committee
analyzes the investment account and submits a report to both Houses. 147 The
legislature can either accept or, if it considers that the executive infringed the
budget law or any other statute regulating the budget's execution, reject the
143. Art. 75, Sec. 8; Art. 99, Sec. 10; Art. 100, Secs. 6-7, CONsTrrucI6N NACIONAL [CONST.
NAC.] (Arg.).
144. See Apru6base la estructura organizativa del primer nivel operativo del citado
Departamento de Estado, Decree No. 1359, Oct. 5, 2004 (Arg.), available at http://infoleg.mecon.
gov.ar/infoleglnternet/anexos/95000-99999/99689/texact.htm.
145. Disposiciones generales. Sistemas presupuestario, de crddito pdblico, de tesoreria, de
contabilidad gubernamental y de control interno, Law No. 24156, Arts. 16-17, 26, Sept. 30, 1992
(Arg.) [hereafter "Financial Management Act"], available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/
infoleglntemet/anexos/0-4999/554/texact.htm.
146. Id. art. 95.
147. Comision Parlementaria Mixta Revisora de Cuentas, Law No. 23847, Arts. 2, 5, Sept. 26,
1990, [1990-D] A.D.L.A. 3692 (Arg.) (establishing the functions of the Mixed Parlimentary
Commission encharged with reviewing the national administration accounts).
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investment account. 148 This process is a weak oversight mechanism. The main
problem is delay, both in the committee and in the legislature. For example,
according to a 2005 report of the General Accounting Office of the Ministry of
Economy, the President submitted the 1990 investment account to Congress in
1993, and Congress approved it in 1994.149 Congress approved the 1992
account in 1996, and the 1993 account in 1997.150 Further, in November 2007,
the legislature passed a single statute that approved the investment accounts of
the budgets for the period from 1999 to 2004.151
Second, although the legislature is supposed to estimate revenues and
expenditures, in reality it rarely adjusts the executive's formulation of the
budget. The General Audit Office, which is an external oversight body, assists
the legislature in monitoring the executive and is controlled by a special
bicameral committee that oversees the execution of the budget.152 In theory, the
General Audit Office should help evaluate the budget and prevent delays.
However, it does not have sufficient power or independence to carry out its
duties due to several organizational and practical weaknesses. We will outline
these in section IV.A. 1 as part of our assessment of oversight institutions.
Finally, in addition to the difficulties that the legislative branch and
independent governmental institutions face in controlling and limiting the
executive branch, two specific practices enhance its discretionary authority.
These are the use of secret funds and the congressional practice of giving the
executive branch special powers to circumvent budgetary controls. These later
powers are termed "superpowers," and they reside in the Chief of Cabinet. The
Executive could seek to justify these practices on both national emergency and
good management grounds. However, in practice they often do little more than
enhance the powers of the President.
Two secret decrees issued in 1955-1956 first authorized the use of secret
funds to maintain state secrets related to intelligence activities. These were later
ratified by a secret decree-law (a "law" issued by a de facto president) in
1969.153 Under these decrees, the executive can issue rules that are never
published nor subject to congressional control. In time, the intelligence agency
148. Art. 75, Sec. 8, CONSTITUCI6NNACIONAL [CoNsT. NAC.] (Arg.).
149. Ministerio de Economia y Finanzas Nblicas, La Cuenta de Inversi6n: El Control de la
Cuenta de Inversi6n, (Oct. 8, 2010), available at. http://www.mecon.gov.ar/hacienda/cgn/
xxcongreso/trabajos/comisionmixta.pdf.
150. Id.
151. Aprudbanse las Cuentas de Inversi6n presentadas por el Poder Ejecutivo, Law No. 26328,
Nov. 28, 2007 (Arg.), available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/135000-
139999/136123/norma.htm.
152. See Art. 85, CONSTITUCION NACIONAL [CoNsT. NAC.] (Arg.); see also Financial
Management Act, Law No. 24156, supra note 144, at art. 127.
153. See Lucio Fernindez Moores, La Justicia Apunta a los Bienes Declarados por Ex
Funcionarios, CLARIN (May 10, 2005), http://www.clarin.com/diario/2005/05/10/elpais/p-
00301.htm.
2011] 279
HeinOnline  -- 29 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 279 2011
280 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Secretaria de Inteligencia del Estado (SIDE) and several other agencies, such as
the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and Congress itself, obtained authorization to use such funds. Little is
known about the use of these secret funds because of this lack of oversight,
although occasionally a persistent journalist manages to obtain information
about their allocation. 154 An expert report, commissioned by the Supreme Court
in connection with a corruption investigation, determined that from 1988 to
2001, secret funds totaled $4 billion pesos (about $1 billion dollars at current
exchange rates), and that SIDE received 70% of these funds. 155 It is a common
suspicion within society that secret funds are also likely used to finance political
campaigns, a suspicion supported by the fact that these funds significantly
increase during electoral periods. 15 6 In 2001, the National Intelligence Act
created a Bicameral Oversight Committee of Intelligence Agencies and
Activities to monitor both intelligence activities and the secret funds. 157
However, the committee remained inactive until 2004, and its initial members
explained that, although the Committee would subject SIDE to tighter control, it
would not monitor secret funds. 158 The Committee did not give any reason for
ignoring the second part of its mandate, and there is no real reason-at least not
a legal one-for that.
The Congress has also delegated "superpowers" to the executive that allow
it to reallocate budgetary accounts at will, circumventing budgetary controls.
This practice began in March 2001, when the legislature delegated to the
executive broad legislative powers to handle the severe economic and financial
crisis. 159 Although Congress later repealed these special powers, ensuing
governments restored them by including emergency provisions in the budget
acts from 2002 to 2006 that delegated the powers directly to the Chief of
Cabinet. 160 In 2006, amendments to the Financial Management Act
154. In 2005, Clarin reported that Duhalde and Kirchner had respectively assigned $99 and $12
million pesos to the SIDE through secret decrees. See Daniel Santoro, Fondos Reservados
Confirman que Kirchner y Duhalde Aumentaron los Gastos de la SIDE, CLARIN (Feb. 13, 2005),
http://www.clarin.com/diario/2005/02/13/elpais/p-00315.htm.
155. See Gerardo Young, Revelan el Uso de Mds de 4.000 Millones de Fondos Reservados,
CLARIN (Feb. 1, 2004), http://www.clarin.com/diario/2004/02/01/p-00315.htm.
156. See Laura Saldivia, Secret Expenditures and Record Voting (2004) (unpublished working
paper) (on file with authors) (providing data on SIDE's expenditures in times of elections from 1993
to 2004).
157. Bases juridicas, orgdnicas y funcionales del Sistema de Inteligencia de la Naci6n, Law No.
25520, Dec. 3, 2001 (Arg.), available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/70000-
74999/70496/norna.htm.
158. See Alfredo Gutidrrez, El Congreso vigila la SIDE, pero sin controlar los fondos
reservados, CLARIN (Jan. 04, 2004), http://www.clarin.com/diario/2004/01/04/p-00601.htm.
159. Delegaci6n del ejercicio de atribuciones legislativas, Law No. 25414, Mar. 29, 2001
(Arg.), available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infoleglntemet/anexos/65000-69999/ 6 65 59 /norma.
htm.
160. See, e.g., Aprudbase el Presupuesto de Gastos y Recursos de la Administraci6n Nacional
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institutionalized these superpowers. 16 1 Today, the Chief of Cabinet may
reassign budgetary accounts at will. The only restriction on the Chief of Cabinet
is that the legislature must approve increases in budgetary lines related to secret
funds or intelligence funds. 162 Hence, the Chief of Cabinet, who was meant to
function as an escape valve in times of political crises, has become instead a
means for the executive to acquire even more power. Alleged misuse of these
superpowers has been at the heart of current controversies over President
Kirchner's issuance of the DNUs in connection with the transfer of funds from
the central bank, discussed in section II.A. In June 2010, the lower house
approved a bill, which was still pending in the Senate when this article went to
print, that eliminates the President's superpowers, although the executive has
stated that if the bill is approved in the Senate, the President will veto the
statute.163
Further, when the government faces a fiscal surplus, it can deliberately
underestimate revenues and then use the excess revenues free from budgetary
control. Every budgetary law since 2004 shows a surplus, and billions of dollars
per year have been managed outside the regular budgetary process. The bill
approved by the lower house in June dealing with superpowers also provides
that the executive cannot reassign excess revenues without congressional
approval.164 It has yet to pass in the upper house, and its approval is highly
unlikely, because the opposition does not control the Senate. Since the last
legislative election, the Senate has been unable to approve major bills passed by
the lower house that seek to check the executive. 165
In addition to secret funds, the executive branch has increasingly made use
of fiduciary funds, which, since 2003, are subject to fewer budgetary constraints
than other categories. The budget act does not determine their precise use or
their geographical distribution. Although the Chief of Cabinet is supposed to
inform the legislature about the use of fiduciary funds, he made no reports in
2003 and 2004 and only incomplete reports in 2005 and 2006, but Congress did
not attempt to improve its control over these funds. 166 The combination of these
para el Ejercicio 2004, Law No. 25827, Nov. 26, 2003 (Arg.) (setting the budget for 2004), available
at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infoleglnternet/anexos/90000-94999/91229/texact.htm.
161. Modificaci6n, Law No. 26124, Aug. 7, 2006 (Arg.), available at
http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/1 15000-119999/118648/norma.htm.
162. Id.
163. See El Oficialismo Insiste en Amenazar Con el Veto al Recorte de los Superpoderes,
CLARIN, Jun. 24, 2010, available at http://www.clarin.com/politica/congreso/superpoderes-
kirchnerismo-oposicion-veto_presidencial_0_286171544.html.
164. See Atilio Bleta, Diputados Dio Media Sancidn a la Eliminaci6n de los Superpoderes,
CLARIN, Jun. 24, 2010, available at http://www.clarin.com/politica/congreso/Diputados-media-
sancion-eliminacion-superpoderes 0_286171400.html.
165. See Gabriel Sued, La Oposici6n, Sin Exitos en el Congreso, LA NACION, Oct. 12, 2010,
available at http://www.1anacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota-id=1314018.
166. See Oscar Dario Rinaldi and Damidn Staffa, Control de la Ejecucidn de los Fondos
Fiduciarios Estatales: Debilidades en la Presentaci6n de Informes del Poder Ejecutivo y su
2011] 28 1
HeinOnline  -- 29 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 281 2011
282 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
discretionary mechanisms-secret funds, superpowers, budget underestimation,
and fiduciary funds-has allowed successive executives to manage public funds
with little or no control. The executive's discretion over budget management and
the lack of adequate checks have systematically expanded opportunities for
corruption. 167 The use of secret funds of the SIDE allowed three major cases of
corruption to emerge. One case related to the cover up of a terrorist attack on the
Jewish organization AMIA in 1994. A second case involved the alleged
payment of bribes from the government to a group of Senators to ensure the
passage of a labor law in 2000. A third concerned the payment of extra-salaries
to high-level officials during Menem's ten years of government. Other recent
scandals also show the consequences of these discretionary spending
mechanisms, such as the Skanska scandal, where alleged bribes were connected
to a procurement contract managed through a fiduciary fund, and the various
investigations of ministries and secretaries, some of whom have been forced to
resign, for the suspicious use of public funds.
B. The Philippines
The Philippine President has considerable freedom to redirect budgetary
authority and to reorganize the government. The Constitution clearly delegates
some of these broad powers to the President. However, the President appears
simply to assume others in ways that could violate constitutional constraints on
executive power.
The 1987 Constitution separates the legislature's appropriations power and
the President's authority to propose the annual budget for Congressional
approval. 16 8 The President can line-item veto "any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill," including the General Appropriations Act
(GAA)-which outlines the annual government budget.169 The President cannot
unilaterally introduce or add items omitted from the final bill. A vote by two-
thirds of the membership of each legislative chamber can override the executive
veto. 170
The legislature is responsible for approving the annual GAAs, and the
Constitution expressly prohibits transfers of appropriations without legislative
Tratamiento por el Congreso, ASOCIACI)N MUTUA FEDERAL DE EMPLEADOS DE LAS
ADMINISTRACIONES P&BLICAS (Sept. 28, 2006), available at www.amfeafip.org.ar/seminarios/
2006/jujuy/documentos/08.pdf.
167. See Natalia A. Volosin, Presidential Corruption: a Case Study of Argentina 1989-2009
(unpublished, on file with authors) (connecting Argentina's hyper-presidential system to corruption
at high levels of the executive branch through a study of major cases from 1989 to 2009).
168. CONST. (1987), art. VII, sec. 22; art. VI, sec. 25 (Phil.).
169. Id. art. VI, sec. 27(1)-(2).
170. Id.
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authorization. 17 1 The Administrative Code of 1987 requires the GAA to specify
budgetary programs and projects for each government agency. 172 Salary
increases or adjustments cannot be funded from GAA appropriations unless
specifically authorized by law or appropriate budget circular. 173 In practice,
however, each GAA since 1996 has authorized the President to augment items
in the general appropriations law with savings from other appropriated items
within the Executive branch, in spite of the constitutional requirement that the
legislature authorize transfers of appropriations in the budget bill. 174 The
President can only realign its budget subject to prior statutory authorization. 175
In recent years, the Arroyo presidency did not appear to have paid
sufficient attention to the standard of specificity and accountability mandated
under the Administrative Code. According to some critics, there has been a
profusion of budget increases for some government projects with little, if any,
description of their use. In 2008, the Alternative Budget Initiative, a budget
reform advocacy NGO consortium, claimed that the "economic stimulus fund"
signed into law in 2009 would be used as an "election-stimulus fund" to aid the
President's political allies. 176 It also worried that discretionary funds invited
corruption. 177 A recent audit report showed that, in 2009, the President funded
some of her foreign travel with the government's emergency fund earmarked for
calamities. She used almost the entire $16.6 million in the fund, leaving the
government with few resources to respond to numerous natural disasters and
massive flooding, which occurred that same year.178 Budget impounding-that
is, presidential actions withholding funds already appropriated "when revenues
are scarce" 179-thus creates a lack of transparency in the administration of the
171. Id. sec. 25(5).
172. Admin. Code 1987, Exec. Ord No. 292, supra note 85.
173. Id. book VI, ch. 7, sec. 60.
174. See, e.g., General Appropriations Act of 2005, Rep. Act No. 9336, Sec. 59, available at
http://www.dbm.gov.ph/dbm_publications/gaa_2005/gaa 2005.htm; General Appropriations Act of
2002, Rep. Act No. 9162, Sec. 53, available at http://www.dbm.gov.ph/dbmpublications/gaa 2002/
dl/gaa2002.htrn.
175. CONST. (1987), art. VII, sec. 25 (Phil.).
176. Tita Valderarna, P50-B 'economic stimulus fund' also 'election stimulus fund'?,
PHILIPPINE CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Feb. 1, 2009), http://www.pcij.org/i-
report/2009/budget-process2.html.
177. Id. (quoting Professor Leonor Magtolis-Briones, lead convener of Social Watch
Philippines, the NGO that initiated the Alternative Budget Initiative). See also Claire Delfin,
Transparent as a Moonless Night: The Budget Process and Spending, PHILIPPINE PUBLIC
TRANSPARENCY REPORTING PROJECT (Mar. 12, 2010), http://www.transparencyreporting.net/
index.php?option=com content&view=article&id=5 1:transparent-as-a-moonless-night-the-budget-
process-and-spending&catid=44:stories&Itemid=94.
178. Jess Diaz, GMA used P800-million emergency fun for foreign trips, PHILIPPINE STAR,
Aug. 15, 2009, available at http://www.philstar.com/article.aspx?articleid=496123. See also
Executive Summary of the COMMISSION OF AUDIT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT REPORT FOR 2009 ii-v
(2009), available at http://www.coa.gov.ph/Audit/AAR.htm.
179. See Paolo Romero, GMA to impound 'pork' when needed - Palace, THE PHILIPPINE STAR,
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national budget. 8 0
President Arroyo also used administrative reorganizations to erode
Congressional authority over budgetary realignments or transfers of
appropriations.1 8 1 Under the Administrative Code, the President can reorganize
the administrative structure of the Office of the President by restructuring the
office or transferring any agency or "function or agency under the Office of the
President to any other Department or Agency ... [or] to the Office of the
President from other Departments or Agencies." 1 82 Judicial review of
administrative reorganizations only applies a test of "good faith" to limit the
President's reorganization authority. 183
By invoking the need for "administrative efficiency," the President has
transferred functions from one agency to another, created new agencies, and
given specific agencies discretion over certain investments, contracts, or other
specialized economic issues. 184 All of these acts bypass the legislature's
constitutional power to promulgate statutes that restructure or create new
governmental institutions and the legislature's constitutional power to allocate
funds for such restructured institutions. These unilateral actions limit the
legislature's impact on government operations and policymaking. The legal
structure did not prevent the President from announcing drastic reorganizations
of the Executive Branch. However, in practice there do appear to be some
popular political limits on the President's reorganization efforts. For example, in
November 2005, the President created an agency called the Philippine Strategic
Oil, Gas, Energy Resources and Power Infrastructure Office (PSOGERPIO),
which had nebulous but wide-ranging authority over energy projects, including
Jan. 5, 2010, available at http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleid=538189; see also Paolo
Romero, GMA retains presidential power to impound 'pork', THE PHILIPPINE STAR, May 22, 2010,
available at http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleld=577346&publicationSubCategoryld=63.
180. Jarius Bondoc, Everything's wrong with budget process, PHILIPPINE STAR, Feb. 2, 2009,
available at http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleid=436679.
181. See Desierto, Presidential Veil, supra note 92.
182. Admin. Code 1987, Exec. Ord. No. 292, supra note 85, at Book III, Ch. 10, Sec. 31.
183. Malaria Emps. and Workers Ass'n of the Philippines, Inc. v. Romulo, G.R. No. 160093
(S.C., July 31, 2007) (Phil.), available at http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jul2007/
gr 160093 2007.html.
184. Rationalizing the Agencies Under or Attached to the Office of the President, Exec. Ord.
No. 72 (Phil.), http://www.chanrobles.com/executiveorders/2002/executiveorderno72-2002.html;
Directing the Reorganizing and Streamlining of the National Development Company, Exec. Ord.
No. 184 (Phil.), http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/indexI0.php?doctype=Executive%200rlers&docid=
a45475allec72b843d74959b6Ofd7bd645f5cedceac; 91, Directing a Strategic Review of the
Operations and Organizations of the Executive Branch, Exec. Ord. No. 366 (Phil.),
http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/index10.php?doctype=Executive%200rders&docid=1210212428106
0479186. See also Isa Lorenzo and Malou Mangahas, New CSC Chief Faces Pack of Ineligible
Bureaucrats, PHILIPPINE CENTRE FOR INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, Apr. 24, 2008, available at
http://www.pcij.org/stories/2008/ineligible-bureaucrats.html; Isa Lorenzo and Malou Mangahas,
Malacanang is No. 1 in excess exec hires, MALAYA, Mar. 20, 2009, available at
http://www.malaya.com.ph/apr25/news6.htm.
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the right to create partnerships with private firms. 185 The power industry sharply
criticized PSOGERPIO as an illegal encroachment on the functions of the
Department of Energy and a mechanism to favor specific interests. 186 As a
result of the criticism, the President abolished PSOGERPIO in 2006. Similarly,
in mid-2007 President Arroyo issued an Executive Order that transferred the
Philippine Mining Development Corporation (PMDC) from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to the Office of the President so
that Arroyo could directly oversee mining contracts with foreign investors. 187
Less than six months later, Arroyo issued a tersely worded Executive Order that
transferred PDMC back to the DENR.18 8 Civil society groups had assailed the
lack of transparency and corruption that resulted from her supervision of these
contracts. 189
The Philippine Constitution provides for several independent offices-such
as the Commission on Audit (COA), the National Economic Development
Authority (NEDA), the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) and the Monetary
Board (MB)-that are supposed to weigh in on the President's use of budgetary
authority. The COA is a constitutionally independent office responsible for
185. Ensuring Separation of Powers, Exec. Ord. No. 474, supra note 49. See Donnabelle L.
Gatdula, EO 474 seen to drive away investors in the power sector, THE PHILIPPINE STAR, Jan. 27,
2006, at B4.
186. Gov't May Assume Power Firm's P43MDebt: Palace, SUN STAR MANILA, Dec. 19, 2005,
available at http://blogs.sunstar.com.ph/citizenwatch/?p-402; Ray S. Enano, Mysterious Energy
Superbody, MANILA STANDARD, Dec. 29, 2005, available at Lexis Academic, File No.
A2005122837-F921-GNW.
187. Transferring the Philippine Mining Development Corporation from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to the Office of the President, Exec. Ord. No. 636 (Phil.),
http://www.gov.ph/2007/07/18/executive-order-no-636/; Conferring Cabinet Rank Upon the
Chairman of the Philippine Mining Development Corporation, Exec. Ord. No. 665 (Phil), available
at http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/indexl0.php?doctype=Executive%200rders&docid=12101220691
382859577; see Michael Lim Ubac, Mining out of DENR; Now Under President's Office,
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, Jul. 27, 2007, available at http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/
inquirerheadlines/nation/view/2007072778988/Mining outof DENR%3Bnowunder President%
92soffice; see Johanna Camille Sisante, Solon: Mining Contract with ZTE Disadvantageous to the
Government, GMA NEWS, Nov. 24, 2008, available at http://www.gmanews.tv/story/135289/Solon-
Mining-contract-with-ZTE-disadvantageous-to-govt; see also Carmel Crimmins, Skepticism greets
Philippine Mining Industry Revival, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Apr. 3, 2008, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/04/03/business/mine.php.
188. Transferring the Philippine Mining Development Corporation from the Office of the
President to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Exec. Ord. No. 689 (Phil.),
available at http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.phlindexl0.php?doctype-Executive%200rders&docid=
1210137999777230148.
189. Pat C. Santos, Abrogate mining law, junk GMA E~s on sector, THE DAILY TRIBUNE, Jul.
17, 2010, available at http://www.tribuneonline.org/nation/20100717natl.html. Note that the former
House Speaker, Jose de Venecia, endorsed the first (failed) impeachment complaint against
President Arroyo, which included allegations of corruption in the ZTE-Diwalwal mining contract.
John Bramhall, De Venecia endorses Arroyo impeachment, says corruption has 'got to stop, '
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examining, auditing, and settling all accounts pertaining to the revenue, receipts,
and expenditures of Government. 19 0 The Constitution also designates the
NEDA as the "independent planning agency of government"1 9 1 and the BSP as
the "independent central monetary authority... [providing] policy direction in
the areas of money, banking, and credit," as well as with bank supervision and
financial institution regulation.192 Finally, the President cannot contract foreign
loans on behalf of the Republic without the "prior concurrence of the MB."l 93
In practice, the President exerts considerable influence over these
independent agencies due to the vast and largely unchecked reach of her
appointment power. The President appoints all COA commissioners and the
BSP Governor, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
(CA).1 94 The President also wholly and exclusively appoints all members of the
NEDA and the MB. 195 Except for the BSP, which has not figured in any
controversy in relation to the President's powers, the other constitutional
agencies have been weak in the face of presidential influence over the past
decade. The CA does not appear to have made timely pre- and post-audits of
some of the President's disbursements of public funds for allegedly personal
political purposes, including expensive infrastructure projects in the district
where President Arroyo ran for Congress as her term-limited presidency drew to
a close. 196 Examples are the bridge across the Porac-Gumain River and other
projects for which the audit requests were filed with the Commission on
Audit. 19 7 A recent scandal involving the NEDA revealed that the President
bypassed NEDA processes and the requirement that the MB approve foreign
loans by giving a broad reading to her "residual" administrative power. 198
Presidential control over the national budget and executive branch
reorganization allowed President Arroyo to "[wield] the substantial powers of
the presidency to keep herself in office, and in the process she exhibit[ed] no
190. CONST. (1987), Art. IX(D), Sec. 2(1) (Phil.).
191. Id. art. XII, sec. 9.
192. Id. sec. 20.
193. Id. art. VII, sec. 20.
194. Id. art. IX(D), sec. 1(2); The New Central Bank Act, Rep. Act No. 7653, art. III, sec. 17,
available at http://www.chanrobles.com/republicactno7653.htm. Note that the CA confirmation is of
little significance because the President can issue ad interim appointments pending confirmation.
Moreover, the majority of CA members are dominated by the President's relatives or allies in
Congress.
195. Reorganizing the National Economic and Development Authority, Exec. Ord. No. 230,
Sec. 4 (Phil.), available at http://www.lawphil net/executive/execord/eol987/eo2301987.html;
Central Bank Act, Rep. Act No. 7653, supra note 194, at art. II, sec. 6.
196. COA dared; Audit Arroyo's P2-B power doleout, GMA NEWS, Jun. 12, 2008, available at
http://www.gmanews.tv/story/100813/COA-dated-Audit-Arroyos-P2-B-power-doleout; Johanna
Camille Sisante, COA asked to audit Arroyo's Pampanga projects, GMA NEWS, (Jan. 13, 2010),
available at http://www.gnanews.tv/story/181484/coa-asked-to-audit-arroyos-pampanga-projects.
197. Sisante, Pampanaga Projects, supra note 196.
198. Desierto, Presidential Veil, supra note 92.
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qualms about undermining the country's already weak political institutions."1 99
The Supreme Court has not adjudicated the President's broad executive
interpretations of budgetary authority and administrative reorganization. Absent
judicial review, the President wields budgetary authority that is reminiscent of
the strong executive model of the 1973 Constitution, despite the existence of
legislative checks on appropriations under the 1987 Constitution.
In his first State of the Nation Address (SONA) on July 26, 2010, President
Benigno Aquino III-son of the reformist former President Corazon Aquino-
pointed to former President Arroyo's misuse of her budgetary authority based on
her broad view of executive power. 20 0 In the same SONA, he declared that his
administration would lobby for the passage of laws on fiscal responsibility,
procurement, and antitrust, as well as the re-codification of many laws for legal
consistency. Whether legal reforms will include redefining the broad
interpretation of the President's budgetary authority and power of administrative
reorganization remains as yet unanswered by the new administration.
C. Conclusions
In Argentina, the President frequently delays submitting required reports to
the legislature, thus limiting its ability to oversee spending. These exercises of
presidential power largely go unchallenged because they are not publicized and
there is no effective recourse in the legislature or the courts. In the Philippines,
executive interference with budgets is often more direct and primarily takes the
form of reorganizing the administrative or impounding funds allocated for
specific items. However, even in that case there are political limits. Public
outcry has reversed some of the President's reorganization efforts.
Although the mechanisms are somewhat different, Presidents in Argentina
and the Philippines have considerable independent influence on government
spending. They can redirect spending by moving funds between budget
categories, allocate secret funds, and reorganize some government bodies and
functions. This means that legislative decisions about spending priorities have
less impact on actual public spending than might be expected from a review of
budget documents. Using a mixture of legally delegated authority and shear
power politics, Presidents have claimed a legal right to redirect funds to their
favored projects.
199. Paul D. Hutchcroft, The Arroyo Imbroglio in the Philippines, 19(1) J. DEMOCRACY 141,
142 (2008).
200. Benigno S. Aquino III, President, State of the Nation Address (Jul. 26, 2010), available at
http://www.gov.ph/2010/07/26/state-of-the-nation-address-2010-en.
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IV.
APPOINTMENT POWERS
Presidents seek to appoint their allies to important positions in the
executive branch and in agencies, courts, and other nominally independent
bodies. Complementary to this power, Presidents may seek the resignation of
sitting officials to create vacancies that can be filled with political stalwarts.
Presidential power is measured both by the relative status of civil servants and
political appointees and by the President's ability to make political appointments
without input from other political actors.
A. Argentina's President's Strong Appointment Powers
The Argentine President is very powerful both with respect to the civil
service and to the appointment of political allies. The President's power is at its
strongest when making appointments to administrative departments directly
under her control in the cabinet structure of government. We also document the
way her influence extends to appointments to the Supreme Court, prosecutors'
offices, and some nominally independent agencies.
1. Executive Departments and "Independent Agencies"
The President alone makes top executive appointments to offices directly
under her in the cabinet structure of government. 20 1 The President has authority
to appoint and remove the Chief of Cabinet and the Ministers, the officers of her
Secretariat, consular agents, and employees whose appointments are not
otherwise regulated by the Constitution. The Chief of Cabinet, in turn, can make
all appointments in the presidential administration, except those appointments
delegated to the President by the Constitution. 202 In practice, the President
usually appoints high-level officials, and she delegates the power to appoint
rank-and-file officials to the Chief of Cabinet and other ministries and
secretaries. There are no constraints on the President's appointment powers to
such offices. The Constitution does not require that Congress confirm the
President's appointees. No mechanism for citizen participation exists. Nor do
rules exist to constrain nepotism or to require minimum standards of proficiency
for presidential appointees.
The merit-based civil service is the one important exception to the
executive branch's robust appointment powers. 203 However, the civil service
201. Only ambassadors, ministers plenipotentiary and commercial attaches are appointed and
removed by the President with the consent of the Senate. Art. 99, Sec. 7, CONSTITUcI6N NACIONAL
[CONST. NAC.] (Arg.).
202. Id. art. 100, sec. 3.
203. See Homol6gase el Convenio Colectivo de Trabajo Sectorial del personal del Sistema
Nacional de Empleo Piblico, Decree No. 2098, Dec. 3, 2008 (Arg.), available at
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law does not apply to officials whom the President has a constitutional right to
appoint-the Chief of Cabinet, Ministers, and Secretaries-nor to
Undersecretaries, the chief authorities of the decentralized agencies and
institutions that comprise the social security system, and other similar
officials. 204 Under the Constitution and associated statutes, civil servants enjoy
professional stability in office. 205 They can only be dismissed with cause. This
contrasts with other government employees-such as high-level appointees and
those rank-and-file bureaucrats who are hired by contract-who usually occupy
their positions only as long as the Minister remains in office.
However, not all public agencies are under the direct control of the
President and the Cabinet. One might suppose that those appointed to such
independent agencies should be able to operate free of presidential control. In
practice, this is not true. Many agencies that are legally independent are not
structurally or functionally insulated from the executive. The operations of the
Central Bank, the Pension Agency, the Revenue Agency, and several public
utilities boards illustrate the weakness of legal independence standing alone.
The Central Bank is a self-governing entity of the State.2 06 The Central
Bank's Board of Directors includes a president, a vice-president, and eight
members. The Argentine President appoints the members of the board, who are
subject to Senate confirmation, although the President can make interim
appointments pending confirmation. Board members serve for six years and they
can be reappointed once. The six-year term exceeds the executive's term by two
years. The President can remove board members only for serious legal violations
and with the previous non-binding advice of a special congressional bicameral
committee. 20 7
Although this structure seems adequate to insulate monetary and exchange
policies from the executive branch's interference, in practice it has not. This is
because the government has ignored the Central Bank's independent status, the
Senate confirmation requirement, and the fixed six-year term. Thus, there have
only been two instances in which the Central Bank's President continued to
serve the federal government despite a change in administration. 20 8 The
President expects that members of the Central Bank's board, and especially its
Chief, will align their policy views with those of the executive. The board
http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infoleglnternet/anexos/145000-149999/148090/norma.htm.
204. Marco normativo y autoridad de aplicaci6n, Law No. 25164, Sept. 15, 1999 (Arg.),
available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infoleglntemet/anexos/60000-64999/60458/norma.htm.
205. Id. arts. 14 bis, 16, CoNsTiTuci6N NACIONAL [CONST. NAc.] (Arg.); Marco normativo,
Law No. 25164, supra note 203.
206. Carta Orginica. R6gimen General, Law No. 24144, Sept. 23, 1992 (Arg.), available at
http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infoleglnternet/anexos/0-4999/542/texactley20539.htm.
207. Id.
208. The two Presidents are Pedro Pou from 1996 to 2001, and Alfonso Prat Gay from 2002 to
2004. Pou eventually was removed due to his involvement in a corruption scandal, and Prat Gay
resigned once the new administration realized that he did not share its views on bank policies.
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members often resign when the executive requests or requires it of them, and it
is unusual for a board member to resist resignation as the Chief of the Central
Bank did when President Kirchner tried to oust him through a DNU in early
2010. Further, when the Central Bank's President resigns, it is not unusual for
the executive to make a temporary appointment, who then remains in office
without Senate confirmation. The interim appointment is justified by the
argument that the appointee is only completing the term of the official who
resigned. As a result, since 1990, no President of the Central Bank has
completed a six-year term.20 9 Thus, although the formal structure appears
favorable to the establishment of independence, the practical political reality
undermines the institutional protections.
Similar to the Central Bank, the Pension Agency also illustrates the impact
of presidential appointments powers. In 1994, when Argentina privatized its
social security system, individuals chose between leaving their retirement funds
in the public system and transferring them to a private system. 2 10 In December
2008, under a congressional statute, the government re-nationalized the system.
It confiscated the private retirement funds and transferred them to the State
under the administration of the Administraci6n Nacional de la Seguridad Social
("Pension Agency"), which is charged with administering the social security
system. 2 11
Although the Pension Agency's mandate specifies its independence from
the executive branch, the President has co-opted its leadership. Consequently,
the President has been able to use pension fund assets to make loans to private
and national utilities, automobile companies and construction projects, in direct
violation of a 2007 Supreme Court decision that ordered the State to align
pensions with the growing salaries of active workers. 2 12 The President's ability
209. For a list of the Central Bank's Presidents and their terms, see www.bcra.gov.ar.
210. Sanci6n, Law No. 24241, Sept. 23, 1993 (Arg.), available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/
infolegIntemet/anexos/0-4999/639/norma.htm. In March 2007, under Kirchner's administration,
Congress passed a law giving workers an opportunity to move from the private system to the public
system. Modificase la Ley No 24.241, estableciendo la libre opci6n del Rdgimen Jubilatorio, Law
No. 26222, Feb. 27 2007 (Arg.), available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/
125000-129999/126072/norma.htm.
211. R6gimen Previsional Nblico. Unificaci6n, Law No. 26452, Nov. 20, 2008 (Arg.),
available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infoleglnternet/anexos/145000-149999/148141/norma.htm.
212. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice],
26/11/2007, "Badaro, Adolfo Valentin c. Administraci6n Nacional de la Seguridad Social," Fallos
(2007-330-4866) (Arg.). This case shows that there is always an implicit threat in any Supreme
Court decision that the President will refuse to comply, thereby undermining the judiciary as a strong
check on the other branches. Two recent cases show this weakness. First, because the executive did
not comply with the Court's decision in the Badaro case, Congress is attempting to enforce the
decision through a law. The bill has already been approved-with a new tie-breaking vote by the
Vice President in the Senate-and the executive has already announced that it will veto it. See
Anibal Ferndndez Estimb que la Presidenta Vetard hoy el 82% M6vily Tild6 a Cobos de "Traidor,"
LA NACI6N, Oct. 14, 2010, available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota-id=1314792.
Second, a recent Argentinean Supreme Court decision, which also touches on hyper-presidentialism
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to control the use of Pension Agency assets is a direct result of its legal
foundation: it was created by executive decree in 1991. Hence, it operates at the
sole discretion of the President.2 13 The Minister of Labor, who is a presidential
appointee, appoints the Agency's Director. In practice, therefore, the President
appoints the Director even though this violates the executive decree that first
established the Pension Agency as an independent institution.2 14
This lack of independence was problematic even when private firms
administered the retirement and pension funds. However, it has become even
more worrisome now. The government's re-nationalization of social security not
only gives the Pension Agency control over vast resources, but also gives it a
significant ownership share in several private firms, including banks, privatized
utilities, real estate, foods and beverages, construction, and the iron and steel
industry. This is because the private firms that until December 2008 managed
retirement and pension funds had invested in many publicly traded companies,
so that with the nationalization the State now owns those shares, and has
consequently named officials to the boards of those companies. 2 15 A single
official, who is appointed by the President without legislative oversight over the
appointment process, manages an agency controlling billions of dollars of social
security. Technically, the legislature does have a bicameral oversight committee
that controls the operation of these funds and could monitor the agency's
and federalism, put the Court's enforcement powers into question. In 1995, a local legislature
removed the attorney general of the province through an irregular procedure and at the request of the
governor of the province (former president Ndstor Kirchner, who governed the province for about 10
years). Since then, the removed attorney general's case reached the Argentinean Supreme Court, and
he obtained several decisions ordering the province to reinstate him. The province never complied.
Recently, the Supreme Court ruled, once again, that he be reinstated, that the current Governor be
criminally prosecuted, and it suggested to the Congress that it should intervene in the province to
guarantee its ruling. See Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of
Justice], 14/09/2010, "Sosa, Eduardo Emilio c/Provincia de Santa Cruz," Fallos (Doc. No. 2083-
XLI) (Arg.), available at http://www.csjn.gov.ar/cfal/fallos/cfal3/tocfallos.jsp.
Articles 6 and 75 of the Constitution allow Congress to intervene in a province to ensure the
republican form of government. However, both the national and provincial governments are
claiming that an intervention would amount to a coup, and that the province's independence from the
federal powers is at stake. See El Gobernador Peralta Acusd a la Corte de Promover la
"Desestabilizacidn, " LA NACI6N, Sept. 15, 2010, available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar/
nota.asp?nota id=1304861.
213. The National Social Security Administration (ANSES) was created by Decree No. 2741,
Dec. 21, 1991, available at Lexis No. LNACDE2741. Congress ratified this DNU through the law
that privatized the social security system.
214. Presidents argue that their authority to appoint the director arises from the general
appointment powers as set out by Article 99, Section 7 of the Constitution. An example of an
executive decree appointing the ANSES director is Designase Director Ejecutivo, Decree No. 1619,
Dec. 7, 2001 (Arg.), available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/70000-
74999/70636/norma.htm.
215. See, e.g., La Anses Empieza a Meterse en la Gestidn de Empresas Privadas, LA NAClON,
Mar. 20, 2009, available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota id=l 110458.
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behavior if it wished, although in practice it does not. 2 16 To strengthen its
oversight role, Argentina's lower House approved a bill in June 2010-the same
bill eliminating the "superpowers" referred to in section III.A.-preventing the
executive from redirecting funds from agencies such as the Central Bank and the
Pension Agency without congressional approval. As we saw, the bill was
pending in the Senate at the time of writing.
A third example of the President's extensive use of appointment power to
aggrandize her position is illustrated by her relationship with the Revenue
Agency, or the Administraci6n Federal de Ingresos Priblicos ("Revenue
Agency"). This agency collects tax and customs revenues. Similar to the
Pension Agency, the Revenue Agency was created by a DNU, or necessity and
urgency decree as previously discussed.2 17 In November 2001, the executive
issued a delegated decree reorganizing the Revenue Agency under
congressionally granted "superpowers." 2 18 The decree's stated purpose was to
afford the Agency more independence from the executive branch. It sought to
achieve this by: (1) requiring that the President appoint the Agency's Federal
Manager no earlier than one year after assuming the presidency, and (2)
establishing a four-year term of appointment, with the possibility of successive
terms, as long as the Federal Manager fulfills the previous term's management
plan. If the Federal Manager fails to complete his or her term, the President may
appoint a replacement who will serve for the remaining time. The Federal
Manager can only be removed by the executive for cause and only upon the
recommendation of a committee that includes the Chief Legal Advisor to the
government, both the President's Legal and Technical Secretaries, and the
Director of the Internal Audit Office of the executive. 2 19
A scandal in March 2008 illustrates the Revenue Agency's susceptibility to
the executive branch's authority. At that time, the President forced the Agency's
Federal Manager and his Director of the Customs Services to resign after a
public fight between the two over the computerized system that controls
customs duties. 220 The Revenue Agency's legal structure provides that the
Federal Manager may appoint and remove the Director of the Customs Service.
When the Federal Manager attempted to remove the Director, however, the
216. See R6gimen Previsional, Law No. 26452, supra note 211.
217. Organizaci6n y Competencia, Decree No. 618 (Arg.), available at
http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infoleglntemet/anexos/40000-44999/44432/texact.htm.
218. EstablIcense normas para la organizaci6n de su fincionamiento, Decree No. 1399 (Arg.),
available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infoleglnternet/anexos/65000-69999/69716/norma.htm.
219. Id.
220. After both officials resigned, the media published stories claiming that the fight had been
over a 90 million dollar contract to replace the old computerized system. See En Plena Interna, Caen
Abad y Echegaray, LA NACI6N, Mar. 19, 2008, available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar/
nota.asp?notaid-996984; see also Detrds de la Pelea Abad-Echegaray, Hay un Negocio de US$ 90
Millones, CLARIN, Mar. 20, 2008, available at http://www.clarin.com/diario/2008/03/20/elpais/p-
00801.htm.
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President forced both to resign. Less than a year later, the President appointed
the former Director of Customs Services to head the Revenue Agency. The new
Director had strong political connections, 22 1 which raises the possibility that the
President's involvement in the scandal had more to do with political patronage
than efficient government management. Although the Revenue Agency is
legally subject to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Economy and the President,
it operates under a decree designed to grant it considerable independence.
However, in practice, its freedom of action depends upon a President willing to
keep her distance, not on strong legal protections.
Finally, like the Central Bank, the Pension Agency and the Revenue
Agency, the various regulatory agencies that oversee privatized utilities also
suffer from undue executive influence. These agencies should be insulated to
avoid conflicts of interest and political interference with their activities from the
executive branch. Once again, the legal mechanisms that created these agencies
theoretically insulate them from such interference. In practice, they do not
function as independent agencies.
As we will see, many have operated under a system of "intervention"
(intervenci6n) for longer or shorter periods of time. In Spanish, this term
identifies circumstances where the executive appoints a single person to direct
an agency temporarily, without following the legally required procedures. The
President's power to intervene in a national agency is implied by the general
powers of administration in the Constitution as set forth in Article 99, Section 1.
However, the constitutional language fails to define when and for how long an
intervention is appropriate. In principle, intervention is supposed to be employed
only in cases of grave mismanagement and for a limited period of time.2 22 As
we will see, in the case of certain regulatory agencies, however, the President
has used interventions to appoint a single person where there ought to be a
Board of Directors and permitted that person to serve for an extended period.
In addition to the use of interventions, the undue influence of the executive
over most regulatory agencies is also attributable to the fact that many are
established by executive decrees, not legislative statutes. These decrees usually
call for executive boards with three to eight members, all of whom the President
or one of the President's cabinet members appoints. The decrees impose various
conditions on appointments. Some require appointees to have professional
qualifications. Others give non-executive bodies a role in recommending names
to the President or the responsible cabinet secretary. In some cases, the
executive branch has to consult Congress during this process, but Congress has
no veto power over such appointments by the executive or her cabinet members.
In general, board members have five-year staggered terms; removal is often only
221. See Claudio Moroni renunci6 como titular de la AFIP y lo reemplazard Echegaray,
CLARIN, Dec. 29, 2008, available at http://www.clarin.com/diario/2008/12/29/um/m-01830644.htm.
222. Officials who have not been appointed in accordance with the law frequently chair even
those agencies in which the President has not intervened.
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for cause. Hence, the President cannot entirely control the agencies. The
following is a survey of the appointment processes for Argentina's most
important agencies.
Congress passed a law that established the regulatory agencies for gas and
electricity, Ente Nacional Regulador del Gas ("Gas Agency") and Ente
Nacional Regulador de la Electricidad ("Electricity Agency"), in 1991-1992.
Both entities have a five-member board appointed by the President; members
serve staggered five-year terms. Board members may be reappointed
indefinitely. 2 23 For each board, the Secretary of Energy must organize a merit-
based selection process, the purpose of which is to appoint professionals with
sufficient knowledge and background.224 When appointing and removing
members of the board, the executive must state its reasons to a bicameral
congressional committee. The committee must issue a response within 30 days,
after which the executive is permitted to act. 225 In the electricity sector,
although the executive appoints the board, the Federal Electricity Council
provides input toward the selection of two members. 226
The regulatory agency for the water and sanitation sector, Ente Regulador
de Agua y Saneamiento ("Water and Sanitation Agency") has a three-member
board with one member appointed by the executive, one appointed by the
President at the suggestion of the Government of the City of Buenos Aires and
one at the suggestion of the Government of the Province of Buenos Aires. 227
Board Members serve four-year terms, which can be extended by one successive
period, and the appointees must have relevant technical and professional
background. 228 There is no formal process for merit recruitment. 229 Unlike the
223. Marco Regulatorio de la Actividad. Privatizaci6n de Gas del Estado Sociedad del Estado,
Law No. 24076, May 20, 1992 (Arg.), available at
http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infoleglnternet/anexos/ 0-4999/475/texact.htm. The members of the board
can only be removed through a reasoned act of the executive (Article 55). The members must also
have technical and professional skills in the area. Regimen de la Energia Electrica, Law No. 24065,
Dec. 19, 1991 (Arg.), available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegIntemet/anexos/0-
4999/464/texact.htm.
224. Aprubase la "Reglamentaci6n de la Ley No 24.076", que regula la actividad de transporte
y distribuci6n de gas natural como servicio pfiblico nacional, Decree No. 1738, Sep. 18, 1992 (Arg.),
available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infoleglntemet/anexos/10000-14999/10239/texact.htm.
225. Privatizaci6n de Gas, Law No. 24076, supra note 223.
226. The Federal Electricity Council is a body that includes representation of the provinces,
manages funds that must be used in the energy sector, and advises on electricity policies.
227. Aprudbase el Convenio Tripartito, Law. No. 26221, Feb. 13, 2007 (Arg.), available at
http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infoleglntemet/anexos/125000-129999/125875/norma.htm. The decree
that implemented the law - Servicio piblico de agua potable y desagties cloacales [Potable Water
and Sewers], Decree No. 763, Jun. 20, 2007 (Arg.), available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/
infoleglntemet/anexos/125000-129999/129384/norma.htm - established a period of 15 days for both
jurisdictions to propose appointees.
228. The appointees need to have a degree in the field and professional experience related to
their tasks. Water and Sewers, Decree No. 763, supra note 227.
229. The members of the Water and Sanitation Agency can only be removed by the executive
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Gas and Electricity Agencies, neither the appointment nor the removal of the
members of the Water and Sanitation Agency requires congressional
participation.
In 1996, a delegated decree authorized the executive to reorganize the
public administration. This decree gave rise to both the Comisidn Nacional de
Regulaci6n del Transporte ("Transport Agency") and the Comisi6n Nacional de
Comunicaciones ("Telecoms Agency"). 23 0 Another decree specified the
organization of the Transport Agency, establishing a board of five members,
with five-year terms that can be extended for one successive period. 23 1 There is
no merit-based appointment process and no involvement of the legislature. A
board of eight members appointed by the executive manages the Telecom
Agency, under a resolution of the Secretary of Communications; members have
five-year terms with one reappointment. 232 There are no requirements of
professional experience, no merit reviews for appointments or removals, and no
role for the legislature.
In all five cases, the formal provisions are seldom followed. Thus for the
Gas Agency, none of the 2004 appointees fulfilled the professional requirements
established by the Secretary of Energy. 2 33 Although the executive claimed that
it used the legally established procedure, a 2008 report by an NGO documented
numerous irregularities that pointed to the violation of the law's merit-based
requirements. 234 Later, in May 2007, the Gas Agency experienced an executive
intervention after its President was involved in a corruption scandal. 2 35 As a
result, the executive replaced the agency board with a single official appointed
in case of violation of any of the provisions of the regulatory framework, conviction for intentional
crimes, or for falling under one of the provisions determining ineligibility. Convenio Tripartito, Law
No. 26221, supra note 227.
230. Modificaci6n de la actual estructura de la Administraci6n Nacional, Decree No. 660, Jun.
24, 1996 (Arg.), available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infoleglntemetanexos/350 0 0 -3 9999/ 3 7 5 74 /
norma.htm; Sancionada, Law No. 24629, Feb. 22, 1996 (Arg.), available at http://www.infoleg.
gov.ar/infoleglnternet/anexos/30000-34999/34209/texact.htm.
231. The board is to be appointed by the executive from among people with technical and
professional backgrounds relevant in the sector. The members of the board can only be removed
through a reasoned act of the executive for violation of their duties. Establdcese la integraci6n de la
mencionada Comisi6n Nacional, Decree No. 1388, Nov. 29, 1996 (Arg.), available at
http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infoleglnternet/anexos/40000-44999/40785/nortna.htm.
232. Aprobaci6n del Manual de Misiones y Funciones de la CNC, Res. No. 2065, Sept. 29,
1999 (Arg.), available at http://www.cnc.gov.ar/institucional/nuestro-orgintroduccion.asp (PDF
link at the bottom of the page).
233. Designase Presidente del Directorio, Decree No. 812, Jun. 23, 2004 (Arg.), available at
http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infoleglntemet/anexos/95000-99999/960 8 8 /norma.htm; Demandan al
Ejecutivo por la designaci6n de las autoridades del Enargas, ASOCIAClIN CIVIL POR LA IGUALDAD
Y LA JUSTICIA (2006), http://www.hardineros.com.ar/acij/mostrarNoticia.php?id=217.
234. La situacidn institucional actual en los entes de control de servicios pdblicos,
ASOCIACIN CIVIL POR LA IGUALDAD Y LA JUSTICIA (2008), http://www.acij.org.ar/ [hereafter
"Servicios Publicos"].
235. Disp6nese la intervenci6n del citado Organismo, Decree No. 571, May 21, 2007 (Arg.),
available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegnternet/anexos/125000-129999/1283 7 6/norma.htm.
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by decree. The initial intervention was for six months, but the President
extended it for the same period four times. 236 An official, appointed by the
President without legislative oversight or merit-based review, has managed the
Gas Agency for over two years. 237
In a similar exercise of power over appointments to regulatory agencies, the
executive has appointed Board Members to the Electricity Agency without
congressional approval or merit review, although it does not operate under an
intervention. During the previous administration, the executive unilaterally
appointed two members of the board. The current administration followed suit
and unilaterally appointed a new president and vice-president. 238
In the Water and Sanitation Agency all but one board seat remained empty
until 2008. The executive had appointed the single Board Member. 23 9 Finally,
in September 2008, more than one year after the appointments should have been
made, the executive appointed the City of Buenos Aires' candidate.24 0 At the
time of writing, however, the Province of Buenos Aires' candidate continues to
wait for a presidential appointment. The reason for this situation is unclear.
Although partisan issues might in theory be at play, this is highly unlikely,
because the city is governed by a political opponent of the national
administration, while the province's government belongs to the same party
ruling the nation. The case does illustrate, however, the need for reformers
carefully to consider hyper-presidentialism not only with regards to the three
branches of government but also with respect to federalism at both the
provincial and municipal levels, a topic not directly covered in this article for
reasons of space.
The Transport Agency is unique relative to the other regulatory agencies
because it supervises private firms that receive about $2.5 billion dollars a year
in subsidies. 24 1 Thus its decisions are important because it can provide
236. Prorr6gase la intervenci6n al citado Ente, Decree No. 1646, Nov. 14, 2007 (Arg.),
available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infoleglnternet/anexos/130000-134999/134573/norma.htm;
Prorr6gase la intervenci6n del citado organismo autArquico de la Secretaria de Energia, Decree No.
953, Jun. 17, 2008 (Arg.), available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/140000-
144999/141627/norma.htm; Prorr6gase la intervenci6n del Ente Nacional Regulador del Gas, Decree
No. 2138, Dec. 11, 2008 (Arg.), available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infoleglntemet/
anexos/145000-149999/148605/norna.htm; Prorr6ganse la intervenci6n del Ente Nacional
Regulador del Gas y la designaci6n del Interventor, Decree No. 616, May 26, 2009 (Arg.), available
at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/150000-154999/153805/norma.htm.
237. See Servicios Publicos, supra note 234.
238. Id.
239. Id.; see also Designase Presidente del Directorio, Decree No. 702, Jun. 06, 2007 (Arg.),
available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegntemet/anexos/125000-129999/128989/norma.htm.
240. Designase Directora en representaci6n del Gobierno de la Ciudad Aut6noma de Buenos
Aires, Decree No. 1497, Sept. 16, 2008 (Arg.), available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/
infoleglntemet/anexos/140000-144999/144828/norma.htm.
241. See Subsidios al Transporte Irdn Directo a Jubilados y Beneficiarios de Planes, PERFIL,
Sept. 19, 2010, available at http://www.diarioperfil.com.ar/edimp/0505/articulo.php?art-
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opportunities to political allies. The executive has exercised power over the
Transport Agency by intervention since 2001;242 a single Director appointed by
the President governs the agency. Although the Transport Agency allegedly
suffered from irregularities that justified the initial intervention, the President
continues to issue decrees maintaining the intervention and appointing new
Directors. These decrees, however, do not set forth plans to restructure the
agency nor make any move to select candidates for the board. This suggests that
the intervention has improperly become a mechanism to validate the President's
control over a politically useful agency, rather than as an interim mechanism to
normalize the institutional situation of the agency. After more than seven years
and seven different Directors, the government has yet to produce a plan to
reform the Transport Agency and to select candidates for its Board. 24 3 No
government action exists to suggest that the executive will normalize the
Transport Agency's institutional situation anytime soon.
Similarly, the executive has operated the Telecom Agency under a state of
intervention for many years. In March 2002, all the Telecom Agency Board
Members were forced to resign, and the President appointed a single Director in
the Board's place, publicly declaring that the purpose of the intervention was to
reorganize the agency. 244 The executive has continued to maintain the
intervention, claiming that the reorganization process is still under way. 245 The
subsequent intervention decrees set no time period for carrying out the
reorganization, nor do they set out specific provisions to regulate this process.
Thus, as in the other agencies and with the tacit support of the 2002 incumbents,
the President has been able to undermine the statutory scheme.
2. Judges and Prosecutors
We give separate consideration to presidential influence on the
appointment of judges and prosecutors because these offices are so central to the
oversight of executive power. In both cases the Argentine President plays an
important role during the selection process. Nevertheless, as we will see below,
some judges have asserted their independence from the executive branch in a
few instances. Even judges appointed by an incumbent President have
sometimes ruled against his or her unilateral exercises of power.
Those who drafted the 1994 amendment sought to enhance the judiciary's
24348&ed=0505.
242. Intervidnese al citado organismo, Decree No. 454, Apr. 24, 2001 (Arg.), available at
http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infoleglnternet/anexos/65000-69999/66779/norma.htm.
243. Servicios Publicos, supra note 234.
244. Disp6nese su intervenci6n, Decree No. 521, Mar. 19, 2002 (Arg.), available at
http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegIntemet/anexos/70000-74999/73007/norma.htm.
245. See, e.g., Prorr6gase la Intervenci6n del citado organismo descentralizado de la Secretaria
de Comunicaciones, Decree 1983, Jun. 28, 2006 (Arg.), available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/
infolegInternet/anexos/120000-124999/124174/norma.htm.
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ability to check executive power adequately by improving its competence and
independence. The amendment established a Judicial Council and an
examination system to oversee the appointment of all federal judges except
those of the Supreme Court. The Council selects the judges and oversees
administration of the judiciary. It consists of representatives chosen by the
political parties in the legislature, by the judges of all courts, and by lawyers
admitted to practice at the federal level. It must also include scholars and
academics. After each election, the Council is "refreshed." Those members who
were chosen by the legislature must resign and new members are appointed.
This is done to assure that the Council reflects the present political composition
of Congress. The Council functions initially as a public competition, after which
it issues a binding proposal with a list of three candidates. The President then
selects one candidate from that list, who the Senate confirms after holding a
hearing in which it publicly vets the candidate's qualifications. 24 6
The Judicial Council also plays a role in the removal of judges, deciding
when to open proceedings and bringing accusations before the Impeachment
Jury. Judges can be removed for the same causes as Justices, that is, misconduct,
crimes committed in the fulfillment of their duties, or ordinary crimes. After the
Judicial Council makes an accusation, the Impeachment Jury, whose members
are legislators, judges, and lawyers with federal registration, has six months to
decide whether to remove the judge. 247 The structure of this process aims to
create a non-politicized, impartial, transparent, and technical procedure to
appoint and remove federal judges. 24 8
The Judicial Council, however, has not curtailed the influence of the
executive in appointing judges. It is common knowledge that if a Judicial
Council's approved candidate is not politically connected, the President will
never select that person, and the Senate will never confirm the candidate.
Further, in February 2006, Congress passed an amendment to the Judicial
Council Act, which compromised the impartiality and independence of the
Council. The legislation reduced the Council's size from twenty to thirteen
members and augmented the influence of the members representing the ruling
party by giving them veto power over the Council's major decisions. 2 49
Congress justified these reforms on efficiency grounds. The result, however,
was to increase the majority's control over the Judicial Council from at most
25% to having veto power over every major decision. 250 In July 2010, the lower
246. Art. 99, Secs. 4, 114, CONSTITUCI6N NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.).
247. Id. arts. 114, 115.
248. Funcionamiento. Autoridades. Comisiones y secretaria general, Law No. 24937, Dec. 10,
1997 (Arg.), available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/4500049999/48231/
norma.htm.
249. Modificase la Ley No 24937, Law No. 26080, Feb. 22, 2006 (Arg.), available at
http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infoleglnternetlanexos/l 10000-114999/114258/norma.htm.
250. The original Judicial Council had twenty members. These included the Chief Justice, four
judges, eight legislators, four lawyers, one representative of the executive, and one scholar. The
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House approved a bill (pending in the Senate) that would reinstate some of the
Council's independence by increasing the Council's size by five members and
allocating the members in such a way as to eliminate the ruling party's veto
power.25 1 If this bill becomes law, it will be important to track the impact of
these changes on the judicial appointment process.
Appointments to the Supreme Court do not go through the Judicial Council.
Instead, the President appoints its members subject to confirmation by two-
thirds of the Senate members who are present. The Justices have secure tenure
and can only be removed for serious misconduct. If and when this happens, an
impeachment process further protects the Justices' positions. 252 This process
should in theory be more or less likely to produce strong nonpartisan candidates
depending upon the political composition of the Senate. However, beyond the
partisanship issue, expert NGOs have claimed that, both at the executive and the
legislative stages, the process is highly deficient in terms of transparency,
independence, and fairness, and does not guarantee the selection of competent,
independent and honest individuals. 25 3 As with Supreme Court appointments,
the General Prosecutor and the General Defense Attorney are appointed by the
President subject to Senate confirmation. 25 4 The 1994 constitutional amendment
gave the General Prosecutor and the General Defense Attorney functional
autonomy and financial independence in order to reduce these appointees'
susceptibility to directives from the executive branch. 255
In an additional move to improve public accountability, President N6stor
eight-legislators included four per house, with two representing the majority party, one from the first
minority, and one from the second minority. The political sector, composed of nine members, thus
represented 45% of the total Council. The majority and minorities of the legislature were equally
represented. Assuming that the ruling party had a majority in the legislature, it would control five
members of twenty. In contrast, according to the new Act, the Council has 13 members: three judges
(the Chief Justice and one judge were removed); six legislators (three per house, two from the
majority party and one from the first minority); two lawyers; one representative of the executive; and
one scholar. The political sector thus represents 54% of the total (seven members); and, if the ruling
party has a majority in the legislature, it would have five out of 13 members or 38.5% of the total-
more than one third. Most important decisions (selection and accusation) require a two-thirds vote
(nine votes). Hence, the governing party has veto power over every major decision.
251. The new bill increases membership from 13 to 18 people. These would be allocated as
follows: the Chief Justice (who would also chair the Council and vote only to break a tie or if
necessary due to a qualified majority requirement); three judges; six legislators (three per house, one
from each of the three largest political parties); four lawyers; one representative of the executive;
and three scholars. The political sector would thus represent 38.8% of the total (seven members);
and if the ruling party has a majority in the legislature, it would only have three out of 18 members,
and thus would therefore cease to have veto power.
252. Arts. 53, 59, 110; Art. 99, Sec. 4, CONSTITUCIONNACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.)
253. See Asociaci6n por los Derechos Civiles et al., Una Corte para la Democracia 1 (2002);
see also Asociaci6n por los Derechos Civiles et al., Una Corte para la Democracia II (undated),
http://www.adccorte.org.ar/verarticulo.php?iddocumento=91.
254. Organizaci6n e integraci6n, Law No. 24946, Mar. 11, 1998 (Arg.), available at
http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infoleglntemet/anexos/45000-49999/49874/texact.htm.
255. Art. 120, CONSTITUcI6NNACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.); See ZARINI, supra note 31.
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Kirchner-husband of current President Cristina Kirchner-issued two decrees
that limited the executive branch's discretion over appointments to the Supreme
Court,2 56 the General National Prosecutor's office, the General National
Defender's office, and all other federal prosecutorial and defenders offices that
require Senate confirmation. 25 7 The decrees set up a participatory process that
allows private citizens, nongovernmental organizations, human rights
organizations, academic associations and professional associations (for example,
the bar) to present comments, observations, and information regarding the
President's potential appointees. The executive must publish the names and
professional resumes of its candidates. 258 The participatory process must remain
open and active for fifteen days, so that interested parties may submit written
comments. 2 59 However, this system exists only by presidential decree. If at any
time the President were to find that the process is too burdensome, she could end
it. The system also fails to account for potential presidential influence after
appointments are made-a possibility that we illustrate below in connection
with the anti-corruption prosecutor.
For a while during the past few years, the Prosecutor of Administrative
Investigations, an office within the General Prosecutor's office, was quite
independent. This position is charged with investigating and prosecuting crimes
committed by officials in the public administration, by firms partially or totally
owned by the state, and by any institution or association receiving public
funds. 260 Largely due to the last Prosecutor's personal commitment to fight
corruption, and thus not to the agency's institutional structure, the office accused
many high level executive officials, including even Presidents Kirchner and
Femndez de Kirchner. 261
256. Procedimiento para el ejercicio de la facultad, Decree No. 222, Jun. 19, 2003 (Arg.),
available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infoleglnternet/anexos/85000-89999/86247/norma.htm.
257. Establdcese que el procedimiento para el nombramiento de Magistrados de la Corte
Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n, Decree No. 588, Aug. 13, 2003 (Arg.) (establishing the procedure
to name Supreme Court justices), available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegIntemet/
anexos/85000-89999/87634/norma.htm.
258. Ejercicio de la facultad, Decree No. 222, supra note 256; Decree No. 588, supra note 257
(establishing that a publication must include a local newspaper to consider federal judges with
standing in a province).
259. Id.
260. See Organizaci6n e integraci6n, Law No. 24946, supra note 254.
261. The Prosecutor's major actions were: (a) prosecuting two consecutive Ministers of
Economy who authorized a suspicious compensation payment to a private firm; (b) prosecuting the
Secretary of Media, who was forced to resign, under charges of having awarded official publicity
contracts to companies to which himself, his family members, and close friends were associated, an
investigation that also yielded another prosecution for illicit enrichment; (c) performing a joint
investigation with the General Audit Office over a contract for power lines construction in the
Province of Santa Cruz, governed for ten years by Kirchner, for a 48% overpricing; (d) prosecuting
the Secretary of Transport, who was forced to resign, for suspicious concessions, contracts, and
subsidies related to the trains and subways sectors, and for influence peddling with regards to free
plane tickets for private flights that he and his family received from several privatized companies
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However, that commitment did not last long. The Prosecutor of
Administrative Investigations is under the direction of the General Prosecutor,
who is nominally independent under the Constitution. However, Presidents have
managed to undermine their independence. In 2004, for example, former
President Kirchner appointed Esteban Righi as the Nation's General Prosecutor.
Arguably, a conflict of interest existed because Righi's law firm had defended
President Kirchner when he was investigated for illicit enrichment during his
term as Governor of the Province of Santa Cruz. 2 62 Congress, nevertheless,
approved his appointment.
In 2008, Righi, who was still in office, severely restricted the powers of the
Prosecutor of Administrative Investigations, denying the office direct authority
to launch cases that it had not initiated and, in cases initiated through its own
accusation, limiting it to instances where the regular prosecutor had decided to
drop the charges. 263 Righi explained his decision as an effort to reorganize the
special prosecutor's caseload to reduce conflicts with the regular prosecutor's
activities. 264 In practice, these actions reduced the power of an agency that had
been attacking misconduct, excesses, and corruption in the national
administration. 265 In March 2009, the Prosecutor of Administrative
Investigations resigned. As a justification, he said that although corruption is
present everywhere in greater and lesser degrees, Argentina "stands out for the
almost absolute impunity of this phenomenon, and for the lack of will and
seriousness to attack it." 26 6 Not surprisingly, when a federal judge closed the
illicit enrichment case against the Kirchners in December 2009, neither the
regular prosecutor of the case nor the one who temporarily replaced the resigned
Prosecutor of Administrative Investigations appealed. 267 Although a politician
promoted the impeachment of the judge before the Judicial Council because of
the suspiciously swift closure of the case, the ruling party's representatives and
allies in the Council cast a majority vote against it.268
under his supervision and to which he directed subsidies; and (e) prosecuting the Kirchners for illicit
enrichment. See Volosin, Presidential Corruption, supra note 167.
262. See Rodrigo Alegre, Esteban Righi, el Amigo de Kirchner que Limitd el Poder del Fiscal
Anticorrupcidn, PERFIL, Nov. 8, 2008, available at http://www.diarioperfil.com.ar/edimp/0310/
articulo.php?art-10873&ed=03 10.
263. See Res. No. 147, Nov. 5, 2008 (Arg.), available at http://www.mpf.gov.ar/resoluciones/
pgn/2008/pgn-0147-2008-001.pdf.
264. Id.
265. See Paz Rodriguez Niell, Limitan las Facultades de la Fiscalia Que Investiga la
Corrupcidn, LA NACION, Nov. 7, 2008, available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota-id=
1067547&high=skanska.
266. See Renuncid el fiscal Garrido en medio de la poldmica por el recorte de funciones,
CLARIN, Mar. 12, 2009, available at http://edant.clarin.com/diario/2009/03/12/um/m-01875888.htm.
267. See Enriquecimiento K: Piden el Juicio Politico de Oyarbide, CLARIN, Mar. 13, 2010,
available at http://edant.clarin.com/diario/2010/03/13/elpais/p-02158414.htm.
268. See El Consejo de la Magistratura Vuelve a Salvar a Oyarbide, LA NAClON, Jul. 8, 2010,
available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota id=1282850.
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In short, the combination of the Judicial Council and Senate confirmation
for top posts does not provide an adequate check on presidential power.
President Kirchner instituted more transparent and participatory processes in
connection with his own high level appointments. Although a positive step, this
process does not apply to federal judges other than the Supreme Court Justices.
As we saw, these lower level judges are crucial for corruption prosecutions
within the executive branch, but close political allies with few qualifications are
sometimes still appointed and/or "saved" by the ruling party in the Judicial
Council. Nevertheless, there are some situations where the courts do act
independently, as suggested by the cases we summarize in the next section. As
for the prosecutors, although the 1994 amendment purported to grant them real
independence, their prosecutorial decisions are not fully insulated from the
President, especially for high profile cases.
B. The Philippines
Like her Argentine counterpart, the Philippine President has considerable
influence over appointments under the 1987 Constitution. 269 In the Philippines,
only two institutions limit the President's power to appoint: Congress, through
the Commission on Appointments (CA), 270 and the seven-member Judicial and
Bar Council (JBC). 2 71 Neither of these operates as a strong check on the
President.
Instead of full Senate confirmation, the 25-member Commission on
Appointments must consent to high-level appointments, including heads of
executive departments, ambassadors and top military officials. The CA must
also give its consent to appointments to oversight bodies that perform checking
functions vis-A-vis the executive. 272 Outside of the CA process, the President,
on her own, appoints many less senior officers in cabinet departments although
the Congress may assign some appointment authority elsewhere. 273 The
President can make recess appointments when Congress is not is session, which
are "effective only until disapproval by the Appointments Commission or until
the next adjournment of the Congress." The appointment provisions-copied
269. See CONST. (1987), art. VII, sec. 16 (Phil.).
270. Id. art. VI, sec. 18.
271. Id. art. VHI, sec. 8(1).
272. These include the top posts at the Commission on Audit, the Civil Service Commission,
and the Commission on Elections. Id. art. IX(B), sec. 1; art. IX(C), sec. 1; art. IX(D), sec. 1; art. IX,
sec. 9. The Governor of the Central Bank is also included by statute. New Central Bank Act, Rep.
Act No. 7653, supra note 194, at sec. 6(a). The Ombudsman and his deputies must be recommended
by the Judicial Council.
273. Prominent examples include the members of the Monetary Board, pursuant to the New
Central Bank Act and members of the Securities and Exchange Commission, pursuant to the
Securities Regulation Code. Central Bank Act, Rep. Act No. 7653, supra note 194; Securities
Regulation Code, Rep Act No. 8799 (Phil.), available at http://www.chanrobles.com/
republicactno8799.htm.
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almost verbatim from the 1935 Constitution-also permit Congress to dilute the
President's appointment power by sharing or reallocating the President's
authority. 274 For example, in statutes that create new government agencies,
Congress has included provisions that limit the President's appointees to specific
people recommended by another government body or to a list of candidates. 2 75
The second institution that checks the executive's influence is the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC). The JBC makes recommendations to the President
regarding appointees to the judiciary 276 and to constitutional commissions such
as the Civil Service, Elections, and Audit Commissions. 277 In a few cases, the
President is prohibited from even proposing potential appointees; for example,
she must appoint members of the Supreme Court, the Ombudsman and the
Ombudsman's deputies from a list provided by the JBC.2 78
In the last decade, however, neither institution has meaningfully
counterbalanced the President's vast appointment power. If the Appointments
Commission fails to act on a proposed appointment while Congress is in session,
the President can keep renewing the appointment on an interim basis until the
Appointments Commission acts. 279 The Philippine Supreme Court has held that
the President can also make a temporary stopgap appointment "to fill an office
for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the
office." 280 This broad interpretation of the President's appointment power
therefore limits the Appointments Commission from acting as a meaningful
check on the President. 28 1 Instead of keeping a vacancy in the office or
permitting the incumbent official to remain, the President can virtually appoint
her original CA nominee to the ad interim appointment despite the absence of
approval from the CA.
Although the President must select nominees to the Supreme Court from a
list prepared by the JBC, the incumbent President can influence the list. In mid-
summer 2009, for example, President Arroyo returned the shortlist of nominees
274. Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. No. 139554 (S.C., July 21, 2006) (Phil.) (en banc) ("The original
text of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as written in Resolution No. 517 of the
Constitutional Commission, is almost a verbatim copy of the one found in the 1935 Constitution."),
available at http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2006/july2006/G.R.%2ONo.%
20139554.php.
275. CoNsT. (1987), art. VIII, sec. 8(2), (5); sec. 9 (Phil.)
276. Id. sec. 8(2), (5).
277. Id. art. IX(B), sec. 1; art. IX(C), sec. 1; art. IX(D), sec. 1; art. IX(D), sec. 1.
278. Id. srt. VIII, sec, 9; art. XI, sec. 9.
279. Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036 (S.C., April 2, 2002) (Phil.) (en banc),
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2002/apr2002/gr 149036_2002.html.
280. Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978 (S.C., Oct. 13, 2005) (Phil.) (en banc),
http://sc.judiciary.gov.phljurisprudence/2005/oct2005/164978.htm.
281. See Isagani Cruz, President Arroyo's Unconfirmed Appointments, PHILIPPINE DAILY
INQUIRER, Sept. 14, 2008, available at http://opinion.inquirer.net/inquireropinion/columns/view/
20080914-160503/President-Arroyos-unconfirmed-appointments. Cruz is a former member of the
Supreme Court.
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for the Philippine Supreme Court to the JBC, despite the fact that it exceeded the
three-person minimum requirement. 28 2 She declared: "the President cannot be
too careful about the selection and appointment of the associate justices of the
[Supreme Court]. It is respectfully submitted that the two positions deserve a
wider array of nominees to be submitted for the President's consideration." 283
This was the second time that President Arroyo had rejected the JBC's list of
nominees and requested another.
The President appoints officials intended to check the use of her appointing
authority-the members of the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman,
and the Civil Service Commission. The incumbent President moved from the
vice-presidency to the presidency in 2001, following the resignation of former
President Joseph Estrada. She was then elected in 2004 for a full six-year term.
This means the incumbent legally occupied the presidency for nearly a decade
by the time her term expired in 2010. Thus, the deliberate staggering of terms
for various constitutional officials under the 1987 Constitution has had little
impact. Consequently, the President's political allies now dominate these key
institutions. 284 The Ombudsman, who is supposed to implement an anti-
corruption mandate, was an Arroyo ally during her presidency. He was notably
inactive in pursuing allegations of graft against government insiders. 285 In late
2009, the former President made her sixth appointment to the Supreme Court in
that year, bringing the total number of her appointees to fourteen out of fifteen
members. 286 She also sought to appoint a new Chief Justice before leaving
office. 287
In her final months as President, she aggressively pushed to appoint the
next Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, despite an explicit constitutional
prohibition on making presidential appointments two months prior to the
expiration of the executive's term. 288 The prohibition in Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the
Constitution states:
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and
up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
282. CONST. (1987), art. VIII, sec. 9 (Phil.).
283. Evangeline De Vera, GMA wants more SC nominees from JBC, MALAYA NEWS, Jul. 29,
2009, available at http://www.malaya.com.ph/jul29/news7.htm.
284. Purple S. Romero, GMA Appointees dominate SC, Anti-Corruption Bodies, ABS-CBN
NEWS, Jul. 23, 2008, available at http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/node/14593.
285. Id
286. The incumbent's term expires within a two-month window before the end of her term
when the President is not constitutionally permitted to make judicial appointments. See Chiz: GMA
Wants to an "all Arroyo" Supreme Court, ABS-CBN NEWS, Jan. 12, 2010, available at
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/01/12/10/chiz-gma-wants-all-arroyo-appointed-supreme-court.
287. Id.
288. CoNsT. (1987), art. VII, sec. 15 (Phil.); Edu Punay, Supreme Court asked: Let GMA name
Chief Justice, PHILIPPINE STAR, Mar. 1, 2010, available at http://www.philstar.com/
Article.aspx?articleld=553965&publicationSubCategoryld=63.
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continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety. 2 89
In the landmark ruling in De Castro et al. v. Judicial and Bar Council et
al.,290 nine out of the fifteen justices of the Supreme Court held that the
constitutional ban against midnight appointments did not extend to appointments
to the Supreme Court. Notwithstanding the plain and ordinary letter of Art. VII,
Sec. 15, the De Castro majority strangely relied on the ordering or sequence of
provisions in the Constitution, declaring, among others, that since the ban on
midnight appointments was located in Article VII, Sec. 15 (The Executive
Branch) and not in Article VIII (The Judiciary), the ban could not extend to the
Supreme Court. 29 1 Moreover, the De Castro majority purposely "reversed" a
decade-long precedent, In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon.
Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional
Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City,
respectively (Valenzuela),292 where the Court explicitly held that the ban against
midnight appointments extended to the Judiciary. The De Castro decision came
under tremendous criticism from legal experts as well as the public, more so
since the nine-member De Castro majority was composed of all Arroyo
appointees,293 and her appointee would also have presided over the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal, that could have heard any election controversies arising from
the presidential election in 2010,294 a factor that may well have motivated the
former President Arroyo. President Arroyo appointed then Senior Associate
Justice Renato Corona as the next Chief Justice of the Philippine Supreme
Court. In the days leading to his presidential inauguration, however, President-
elect Benigno 'Noynoy'Aquino declared that he would not recognize Chief
Justice Corona's appointment. 295 Contrary to settled tradition, President-elect
289. CONST. (1987), art. VII, sec. 15 (Phil.).
290. Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council et al., G.R. Nos. 191002 et seq., (S.C., Mar. 17, 2010)
(Phil.) (en banc), available at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/191002.htm.
291. Id. ("Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They
could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIll. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the President's or Acting President's term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court.").
292. Castro v. Judicial Bar Council, G.R. No. 191002 (S.C., Apr. 20, 2010) (Phil.) (en banc),
available at http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri20lO/apr2OlO/gr_191002_2010.html.
293. Edu Punay, Supreme Court: GMA can appoint the next Chief Justice, THE PHILIPPINE
STAR, Mar. 18 2010, available at http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleid=558957.
294. CONST. (1987), art. VII, sec. 4 (Phil.) ("The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.").
295. Noynoy urged anew to accept Corona as ChiefJustice, ABS-CBN NEWS (May 16, 2010),
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Aquino did not take his oath of office before the Chief Justice, choosing another
member of the Court instead to administer his Presidential Oath. 296 In October
2010, when the Supreme Court reversed President Aquino's Executive Order
No. 2 which was meant to revoke midnight appointees of Arroyo, President
Aquino sharply criticized the decision and invoked the separation of powers
under the Constitution. 29 7 As of this writing, the controversy over the wide
breadth of Presidential appointment power as wielded by former President
Arroyo has not yet been resolved.
Political appointments permeate the civil service. The President directly
appoints 3,500 third-level officers and another 6,500 lesser officials that are not
reviewed by the Commission on Appointments. Over half have not fulfilled civil
service eligibility criteria, which require an examination, a simulation exercise
testing managerial ability, on-the-job validation, and an interview. 298 Many of
her key appointments to specialized agencies requiring technical expertise have
been of military officers-a move which has not improved administrative
agency performance but has helped her stave off coups and ensure the loyalty of
the majority of the armed forces. 299
The President's power has several sources, none of which has been
substantially checked by the Supreme Court. First, the President can make ad
interim appointments or appointments in an "acting capacity," thus avoiding
Appointment Committee approval. Second, presidential appointees dominate the
JBC, making it vulnerable to presidential pressure. The recent case, where the
President asked the JBC for new shortlists of nominees, illustrates this point.
Third, political appointees, whose qualifications are effectively waived by the
President, enable her political allies to occupy positions even in the career civil
service. Accountability is difficult to achieve because most institutions that were
constitutionally designed to check the President's exercise of power contain at
least a majority of her direct appointees and, as a result, quality has suffered.
The current controversy over the revocation of President Arroyo's
"midnight appointees," through President Aquino III's Executive Order Nos. 2
and 3, continues to reflect the executive branch's notion of the scope of its
appointment power. As one Senator observed, the executive branch's recent
orders demonstrate its preference for unilateral action and for avoiding
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/05/16/10/noynoy-urged-anew-accept-corona-chief-justice-0.
296. Edu Punay, Corona respects Noynoy's decision on oath-taking, ABS-CBN NEWS (Jun. 11,
2010), http://www.philstar.com/microsite/noynoy aquino inauguration 2010/article.aspx?articleld=
583260&publicationSubCategoryld=63.
297. Jam Sisante, Aquino hits SC decision on midnight appointee, GMA NEWS (Oct. 14, 2010),
http://www.gmanews.tv/story/203387/aquino-hits-sc-decision-on-midnight-appointee.
298. Isa Lorenzo & Malou Mangahas, New CSC Chief Faces Pack of Ineligible Bureaucrats,
PHIL. CENTRE FOR INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Apr. 24, 2008), http://www.pcij.org/stories/2008/
ineligible-bureaucrats.html.
299. Joel D. Adriano, Arroyo's risky politics ofpatronage, ASIA TIMES ONLINE (Dec. 9, 2008),
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/SoutheastAsia/JLO9Ae0 I.html.
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coordination with the legislative branch. 300
C. Conclusions
The Presidents of Argentina and the Philippines both face relatively weak
constraints on their appointment powers. They have each been able to
circumvent even the limits that do exist through a mixture of personal pressure
and extensive use of emergency and temporary powers. Even bodies that
exercise independent regulatory and oversight functions are dominated by the
President's appointees. There is little distinction between cabinet departments,
where the President should arguably have considerable discretion to appoint and
remove high level officials, and supposedly independent agencies. Most
appointments do not require confirmation by the Senate, and other procedures to
reduce the President's discretion do not function effectively. Regulatory and
oversight agencies, courts, and prosecutors should, in theory, be insulated from
undue executive influence. In practice, however, they are unable to operate free
of presidential influence in either country.
V.
CHALLENGES TO PRESIDENTIAL POWER
Most modem democracies include institutional mechanisms to challenge
presidential overreaching. Presidents may try to co-opt these institutions, but
they are sometimes effective counterweights to presidential power. We show
how such challenges have had limited positive effects in Argentina but do not
work well in the Philippines. We concentrate on the role of the judiciary and of
specialized independent agencies that seek to bring transparency and
accountability to the operation of government.
We leave impeachment to one side. It is an extreme method for challenging
an incumbent president and does not function as a routine form of oversight.
Rather, it serves as a blunt legislative response to a crisis. Both the Argentine
and Philippine constitutions contain impeachment mechanisms for the President
and other high-level officials. 30 1 Argentina's legislature has never attempted to
impeach the President. The Philippine legislature did initiate the impeachment
process against President Joseph Estrada in 2001, and he resigned before the
process was complete. Thus, this option is always a possibility, but if used
frequently would represent a breakdown of the constitutional compact.
Furthermore, it may be a less credible threat if the President perceives the
300. Gil C. Cabacungan Jr., Joker tells Aquino 's legal team: Don't act rashly, PHILIPPINE
DAILY INQUIRER, Aug. 16, 2010, available at http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/
view/20100816-287029/Joker-tells-Aquinos-legal-team-Dont-act-rashly.
301. Arts. 53, 59, CONSTITUCI6N NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.); CONST. (1987), art. XI
(Phil.).
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legislature as politically weak.
A. Argentina
Neither judicial review of the executive's constitutional powers nor
congressional oversight of her behavior has significantly limited the President,
despite the fact that she occasionally loses a congressional vote. Two structural
mechanisms, however, serve as more effective ways to challenge or limit
presidential powers, and these have met with some success. First, independent
agencies specifically designed to control and monitor the executive have won
modest victories. Second, court cases sometimes enable ordinary citizens, the
ombudsman, and civil society groups to challenge the powers of the executive.
1. Independent Agencies
In Argentina, three major independent agencies check the executive: the
General Audit Office, the Anticorruption Office, and the National Ombudsman.
Both the Audit Office and the Ombudsman report to the Congress. The
Anticorruption Office reports to the Ministry of Justice. This hierarchy suggests
that the Audit Office and the Ombudsman are in a better position to control
excesses of presidential power than the Anticorruption Office, which is better
positioned to sanction low-level malfeasance. In practice, the Ombudsman
appears to be the most effective of the three at checking executive power, as we
illustrate below.
The Audit Office reports to the Congress on the legal aspects, management,
and auditing of all the activities of the administration, and it participates in the
approval or rejection of the revenue and investment accounts for public
funds. 302 The Audit Office has seven members who serve eight-year terms,
which can be renewed once. The Senate and the House each appoint three
members, so as to reflect the political composition of each House. 303 The
presidents of both Houses appoint a seventh auditor by joint resolution to serve
as the Audit Office's Chair.3 04 The law requires that the auditors must have
professional qualifications and specifies that they may only be removed for
grave misconduct or evident violation of their duties. 30 5 The removal process
follows the same procedure established for appointments. 306 The law does not
further clarify the removal procedure, but the reference to the appointments
302. Art. 85, CONSTITUCI6N NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.). The 1994 Constitution requires
Congress to pass a special law to regulate the creation and operation of the GAO, but it has never
been passed. The 1992 Financial Management Act continues in force even though it does not fulfill
the constitutional requirements.
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process means that each House removes the members it appoints, and both
jointly remove the Chair. In order to strengthen the legislature's role, a special
bicameral committee oversees the Audit Office's review of the national
budget. 307 Further, the Constitution requires that the Audit Office's Chair be a
member of the political opposition. 308 This gives the opposition a prominent
role in the external control of the executive, and theoretically it should help give
an incentive to the Audit Office to increase the transparency and accountability
of government through its work.
In practice, however, the Audit Office does not operate as independently of
the executive branch as the 1994 reformers might have hoped. This is because
the Financial Management Act, which rules it, was not amended after the
constitutional reform and, in many respects, is against its spirit. 30 9 First, the
Audit Office makes decisions collectively and by majority rule. This greatly
reduces the chairman's ability to act independently. 3 10 Second, because the
Audit Office's composition is proportional to the composition of Congress, if
the ruling party has a majority in Congress, the opposition's role is limited. This
typically reduces the Audit Office's ability to uncover mismanagement and
wrongdoing. In addition, the requirement that the Audit Office reflect the
political composition of the Congress is incompatible with the auditors' eight-
year term. Congressional elections occur every two years; thus, the composition
of the legislature varies every two years. As a result, it is impossible for the
auditors both to fulfill eight-year terms and for the Office to maintain a party
balance that tracks the legislature. 3 11
The selection process for auditors, problems with day-to-day operations,
and lack of follow-up mechanisms also compromise the effectiveness of the
Audit Office. Despite the requirement that the Audit Office's appointees' have
professional backgrounds that fit with their mandate, the political parties simply
select those whose political views align with their own, rather than conduct
investigations into their qualifications. There is also no public hearing to enable
citizen participation in choosing auditors. Because the system does not
guarantee transparency, publicity, citizen participation and merit qualifications,
but instead reflects partisan interests, conflicts of interest can easily arise that
may jeopardize the Audit Office's objectivity. 3 12 The agency's day-to-day
307. Id.
308. Art. 85, CONsTrrUCI6NNACIONAL [CONST.NAC.] (Arg.).
309. Asociaci6n Civil por la Igualdad y la Justicia, En Busca del Control Perdido III: Informe
Sobre el Trabajo y Estructura de la Auditoria General de la Nacidn y Propuestas para su
Modificaci6n 10-11 (2007), www.acij.org.ar [hereafter "ACU Control Perdido"].
310. Financial Management Act, Law No. 24156, supra note 145.
311. See ACU Control Perdido, supra note 309, at 14.
312. ACU's report mentions the infanous case of Rodolfo Barra, chairman of the GAO in
1999, who had been Minister of Justice and Supreme Court Justice of the administration which he
was supposed to control, and who had even provided consultancy services for major privatized
utilities that the GAO had to audit. Id. at 12-13.
2011] 309
HeinOnline  -- 29 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 309 2011
310 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
operations also suffer from several weaknesses including the lack of sufficiently
qualified personnel, the failure to carry out management audits, the excessive
technicality of its reports, and a general delay at every stage of the auditing
process. 3 13 Very few follow-up mechanisms exist to monitor and ensure that
investigated parties implement the agency's recommendations. 3 14 Also, the
Audit Office does little to coordinate its reports with other agencies that should
logically take an interest in its work, such as the Anticorruption Office or
prosecutors. 3 15
Finally, the ruling party has used its authority to curtail the powers of the
Audit Office. As a result, the Office does not function as a strong check on
executive power. This occurred, for example, in January 2009, when it became
public that the GAO was investigating a contract for power line construction that
was to be performed by a firm related to government officials in the Province of
Santa Cruz, which Ndstor Kirchner had governed for ten years. According to the
investigations, the construction of the second section of the project had cost, per
kilometer, 48% more than the first section. Almost immediately after the report
was published, the government attempted to limit the GAO's powers. After the
scandal went public, the GAO's members aligned with the government proposed
to constrain the chairman's authority to control the issues to be investigated, to
direct the debates, and to publish the reports. However, the proposal failed due
to a vigorous resistance from both opposition legislators and NGOs committed
to transparency issues.3 16
Next consider the Anticorruption Office, created by law in 1999 and
invested with investigative and policy-making functions. It can investigate
corruption in the national public administration, in state enterprises, and in any
other public or private entity in which the State participates or that has public
funds as its main source of resources. 3 17 In this role, the Anticorruption Office
receives accusations, undertakes preliminary investigations, files accusations
before the judiciary, and acts as plaintiff in those cases in which the State's
property is at stake. The Office also plays a major role in controlling unjustified
increases in a public official's assets, as well as identifying potential conflicts of
interest. It maintains a register of officials' financial disclosure statements and
313. Id. at 17-21.
314. Id. at 21-22.
315. Id. at 23-25.
316. See, e.g., Gabriel Ziblat, Electroingenieria Estd Sospechada Pero Puede Controlarse a si
Misma, PERFIL, Jan. 17, 2009, available at http://www.diarioperfil.com.ar/edimp/0330/articulo.php?
art-12182&ed=0330; see also Una Salida Que Debilita Alin Mais a los Organos de Control, LA
NACI6N, Mar. 13, 2009, available at http://www.1anacion.com.ar/nota.asp?notaid=1 108180.
317. See Modificaci6n. Crdase la Oficina Anticorrupci6n en el Ambito del Ministerio de Justicia
y Derechos Humanos, Law No. 25233, Dec. 10, 1999 (Arg.), available at
http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infoleglnternet/anexos/60000-64999/61394/norma.htm; Objeto y Ambito
de aplicaci6n, Decree No. 102, Dec. 23, 1999 (Arg.), available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/
infoleglnternet/anexos/60000-64999/61724/norma.htm.
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evaluates these statements to check for situations that indicate illicit enrichment
or activities incompatible with the public office. 3 18 The Office, however, is
constrained by its small budget. In 2008, for instance, it had a budget of only
$9.4 million pesos,3 19 which at the current exchange rate amounts to about
$2.35 million dollars. As with any other non-independent agency, the Office's
budget is decided by its superior, which in this case is the Ministry of Justice.
This lack of financial autonomy limits its ability to provide any real oversight of
the executive.
Even without sufficient resources, the Anticorruption Office has achieved
some results in using the data it collects to support the prosecution of cases.
Although it has obtained almost no convictions, the Office has a well-
functioning system that connects preliminary investigations and information
arising from the officials' financial statements to formal investigations within
the judiciary. This is a minor achievement in absolute terms, but a significant
one when compared to how the financial statements system works in the other
branches of government. 320 During 2007, the Anticorruption Office issued 725
resolutions pertaining to the investigation of potential corruption allegations,
100 of which were sent to the judiciary. Of these 100 files, 58% were criminal
accusations; 18% were files where the OA had no jurisdiction; 21% cases that
did not meet the OA's criteria of significance; and three percent were cases
where the OA decided to act as plaintiff.32 1
Argentina has a general system of financial disclosure, but each branch of
government has its own subsystem. In 1999, Congress passed an act concerning
ethics in public office that established mandatory financial disclosure statements
for certain public officials. These reports were to be presented to their respective
agencies and then sent to an independent body that would be in charge of
receiving and reviewing the statements. However, opposition by the Supreme
Court prevented the creation of this general agency. 32 2
The Anticorruption Office is the only body that systematically evaluates
these disclosure statements and that can seek to connect these evaluations to the
318. See Decree No. 102, supra note 317.
319. See Oficina Anticorrupci6n, Informe Anual de Gesti6n 6 (2008) [hereafter "OA Informe
Annual"J, available at http://www.anticorrupcion.gov.ar/documentos/Informe%20anual%202008%
200A.pdf.
320. See Natalia A. Volosin, Medidas Para Preveniry Detectar Transferencias del Producto de
la Corrupcidn Pziblica en la Argentina, in GUILLERMO JORGE ET AL., RECUPERACI6N DE ACTIvos
DE LA CORRUPCI6N (Editores del Puerto 2008) (describing the different financial statements systems
of the different branches of the federal government).
321. See OA Informe Annual, supra note 318, at 16-17. We refer to 2007 figures because the
2008 report, cited in note 319, does not include any statistics with regards to the files that the OA
sent to the judiciary.
322. See Deberes, prohibiciones e incompatibilidades aplicables, sin excepci6n, a todas las
personas que se desempefien en la funci6n pfiblica, Law No. 25188, Sep. 25, 1999 (Arg.), available
at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infoleglnternet/anexos/60000-64999/60847/texact.htm. See also
Volosin, Medidas, supra note 320.
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investigations of corruption before the judiciary. The Office is also charged with
controlling potential conflicts of interest. The agency uses the information in
financial disclosure statements to identify possible conflicts of interest and to
propose measures that officials should take to limit such conflicts. In its policy-
making role, the Anticorruption Office has sponsored initiatives to prevent
corruption and promote transparency by promulgating regulations that improve
access to information and promote the participation of civil society in the
decision-making processes of the federal administration. As a result, in 2003 the
executive issued a decree regulating public hearings, lobbying disclosure, the
participatory elaboration of rules, access to public information, and open
meetings of the regulatory agencies that oversee public utilities. 323 Although the
Anticorruption Office has limited resources, the main obstacle to its success lies
elsewhere. The Administrative Control Prosecutor, who heads the office, is
appointed by the president upon a recommendation from the Ministry of
Justice. 324 It is thus a specialized office within the Ministry. Each new
administration can appoint the director so that a political appointee of the
president always directs the agency. 32 5 The influence of the Ministry of Justice
was clear when it amended the Anticorruption Office's internal regulation in
2008. Until then, the Anticorruption Office staff attorneys could initiate
investigations on their own, that is, they did not need to wait to receive a
complaint. 326 The new regulation, however, only allows the director of the
Anticorruption Office, a political appointee, to initiate investigations without
receiving an accusation from someone outside the office. 3 27
Finally, we turn to consider the National Ombudsman, established by law
in 1993328 and given constitutional status in 1994 (article 86) as an independent
agency accountable to the legislature. The Ombudsman is appointed and
removed by Congress with the vote of two thirds of the members present in each
House, and has a five-year term that can be renewed for one more period. The
323. Aprudbanse los Reglamentos Generales de Audiencias Pblicas, Decree No. 1172, Dec. 3,
2003 (Arg.), available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegIntemet/anexos/90000-94999/90763/
norma.htm.
324. Decree No. 102, supra note 317.
325. The only requirements for appointment are citizenship, age (at least 30 years) and at least
six years of practice as a lawyer or in the prosecutor's office or the judiciary. Id.
326. See Res. No. 749, Aug. 11, 2000 (Arg.), available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/
infoleglnternet/anexos/60000-64999/64100/norma.htm.
327. See Apru6banse el Reglamento Interno de la Direcci6n de Investigaciones, el Reglamento
Interno de la Direcci6n de Planificaci6n de Politicas de Transparencia y las Disposiciones Comunes
a ambos Reglamentos, Res. No. 1316, May. 21, 2008 (Arg.), available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/
infoleglntemet/anexos/140000-144999/140863/norma.htm.
328. Crdase en el Ambito del Poder Legislativo de la Naci6n la citada instituci6n, Law No.
24284, Dec. 01, 1993 (Arg.), available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/0-
4999/680/norma.htm. After the 1994 amendment, the law was adapted to the constitutional
provisions through Modificaci6n, Law No. 24379, Sep. 28, 1994 (Arg.,), available at http://infoleg.
mecon.gov.ar/infoleglntemet/anexos/0-4999/766/norma.htm.
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Ombudsman has functional autonomy and, thus, does not receive instructions
from any other authority. In addition to the control of public administrative
functions, the ombudsman's task is to defend and protect human rights, as well
as other rights, guarantees, and interests established in the Constitution and the
laws, in the face of deeds, acts or omissions of the Administration. As we will
see below, the Ombudsman's main method of checking executive-as well as
legislative-excesses is to bring cases before the judiciary.
The Ombudsman can initiate investigations in order to uncover actions of
the national administration that amount to an illegitimate, defective, irregular,
abusive, arbitrary, discriminatory, negligent, or seriously incompetent exercise
of their functions, including those that might affect diffuse or collective
interests. 32 9 He must also pay special attention to behavior that shows a
systematic and general failure of the administration, and promote mechanisms to
eliminate or reduce them. 330 The Ombudsman's powers allow him to investigate
actions that judges cannot evaluate. Indeed, according to the political question
doctrine elaborated by the Supreme Court, judges cannot assess the opportunity,
merit, or convenience of a decision made by the political branches of
government. 33 1 In contrast, the Ombudsman can issue warnings,
recommendations, or reminders of the duties of public officials and propose new
measures to which the official has to answer in writing within 30 days. If the
official does not take adequate measures within a reasonable time, or does not
explain the reasons not to act, the Ombudsman can inform the ministry or the
official's superior. If he does not receive an adequate justification through this
mechanism, he must include the issue in his report to the legislature. 332
According to statistical data provided by the Ombudsman's office, from
1994 to 2007 the agency initiated 181,043 files. 3 33 Of the total, 95.4% were
initiated by an individual complaint, four-and-a-half percent originated in
another agency, and almost two percent were initiated by the ombudsman's
office alone. Complaints about public utilities represented 38.30% of the files,
followed by social security and employment (33.90%); human rights, justice,
women, and children (14%); health, education, and culture (13%); environment
and sustainable development (0.50%); and legal services (0.20%). The data
show that the ombudsman's office has been quite efficient: 77.83% of the files
have been concluded, three-and-one-third percept were sent to a different
agency, 13.52% were suspended, two percent have not been followed, and only
329. Reglamento Interno, Law No. 24284, supra note 328 (as amended).
330. Id. at art. 15.
331. See, e.g., Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of
Justice], 22/06/1960, "Cine Callao," Fallos (1960-247-241) (Arg.); Corte Suprema de Justicia de la
Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 13/07/1990, "Dromi, Jos6 R. c. Estado
Nacional / amparo," Fallos (1991-313-630) (Arg.); see also Peralta, supra note 69.
332. Reglamento Interno, Law No. 24284, supra note 328 (as amended).
333. DEFENSOR DEL PUEBLO DE LA NAClIN, DECIMOS CUARTO INFORME ANNUAL 235 (2007),
available at http://www.dpn.gob.ar/informes/ianual2007.pdf.
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three-and-one-third percent are still under way.
The Ombudsman's most celebrated actions involve privatized utilities, an
area where abuses abound. It has appealed to the judiciary to force the executive
or the regulatory agencies to call for public hearings, to stop rates hikes that are
considered illegal or unfair, and, in general, to gain access to administrative
policy-making in this area. We discuss a few of these cases below in
documenting judicial actions with respect to the executive and the regulatory
agencies. In comparison with the weaker GAO and the Anti-Corruption Office,
the Ombudsman is arguably the most significant state agency overseeing the
executive. However, as we demonstrate in our discussion of the judiciary, it is
most effective when it is able to appeal to the courts.
2. The Judiciary
In the absence of other checks on the executive, the judiciary has begun to
operate as a route for civil society to check the excesses of the executive and
regulatory agencies. The 1994 amendments to the Constitution incorporated
several provisions to protect diffuse and collective rights, particularly those
related to the environment and to consumers. These are mainly substantive
constitutional rights. However, the amendment concerning the environment
requires the authorities to "provide for environmental information and
education," (Article 41) while the amendment concerning consumer affairs
provides for "the necessary participation of consumer and user associations and
of the interested provinces" (Article 42). The Constitution also provides for a
prompt and summary judicial proceeding or amparo to enforce both individual
and collective rights (Article 43).334
The recognition of collective rights and of a specific procedural remedy for
their enforcement led to new options for those interested in constraining the
executive. Public interest litigation has increased judicial activism, in general,
and has sometimes influenced administrative policymaking, and thereby
constrained the executive's discretion. The following cases illustrate the way
public interest litigation has emerged as a tool by which citizens can influence
administrative policymaking. Examples of judicial activism spurred on by civil
society lawsuits fall into three categories: cases where plaintiffs seek more
participatory processes inside public agencies, cases initiated by public interest
groups with the aim of changing substantive policy, and cases in which the
courts, reacting to civil society lawsuits, directly intervene in the management of
a program.
334. The amparo had been previously recognized by the Supreme Court in the leading cases
Siri and Kot. See Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of
Justice], 27/12/1957, "Siri Angel / hibeas corpus," Fallos (1957-239-459) (Arg.); Corte Suprema de
Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 05/09/1958, "Kot, Samuel S.R.L.
/ hdbeas corpus," Fallos (1958-241-291) (Arg.).
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Consumers' associations and national and local Ombudsmen have
attempted to force the administration to carry out public hearings before making
important decisions involving public utilities. After the 1994 amendment,
scholars and practitioners initiated a debate over whether the Constitution
required the participation of public utility users and consumers through public
hearings. 335 The legal struggles outlined in this section highlight the sometimes
fraught connection between public hearings, advisory committees, and the terms
of contracts with privatized firms. Rather than limiting public power, hearings
can sometimes be part of the strategy used by regulators to rein in regulated
firms and limit the impact of advisory committees.
Agustin Gordilllo argues that in the regulation of public utilities due
process demands a public hearing "before issuing legal administrative rules and
even legislative rules of general character, or before approving projects of great
significance or impact on the environment or the community." 336 Furthermore,
general principles of public access and participation demand that the public be
heard "before adopting a decision, when it consists of a measure of general
character, a project that affects the user or the community, the environment, the
designation of a judge to the Supreme Court, etc." 3 37
Other scholars claim that public hearings are not mandatory in the absence
of a specific legal rule or regulation because the Constitution does not mandate
this process. They argue that their position is supported by the regulatory
frameworks of privatized public utilities that specify the cases in which public
hearings are mandatory. 338 Although we agree with Gordillo's position, it is
certainly the case that public hearings are not uniformly mandated in Argentine
regulatory agencies. The legal framework varies. Hearings are legally
mandatory for electric and gas utilities, but are optional for telecommunications
and water. Within this context, the judiciary has influenced hearing
requirements, but not always in the direction of requiring more participation.
Consider several examples.
In telecommunications regulation the Federal Administrative Court ruled
that public participation is constitutionally required for decisions with grave
social repercussions, such as the extension of a monopoly franchise.33 9 Public
participation can occur either through public hearings or through other
procedures that guarantee users and consumers access to the relevant
335. At issue are Articles 41,42, and 43 of the Argentine Constitution.
336. Gordillo, supra note 51.
337. Id.
338. See, e.g., Miximo Fonrouge, Las audiencias ptiblicas, 9 REVISTA DE DERECHO
ADMINISTRATIVo 3-4 (1997), available at http://www.cassagne.com.ar/publicaciones/Fonrounge/
AUDPUB.pdf.
339. Cimara Nacional Federal en lo Contencioso Administrativo [C.N. Fed. Cont. Adm.],
6/11/1997, "Youssefian Martin clEstado Nacional-Secretaria de comunicaciones s/ amparo, causa
22.776/97," La Ley [L.L.] 1997-F-270 (1997) (Arg.).
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information and a way to submit their points of view. Subsequent cases in other
courts extended the range of issues to include, for example, charging for a
service that was previously free. 340
In the regulation of gas and electricity, battles erupted when utility rates
were "pesified" in 2002.341 Here, the consumers' association opposed public
hearings because they could undermine a parallel process that included them as
a privileged member of an advisory committee under the 2002 Emergency
Act.342 The executive and the regulatory agencies called for public hearings in
order to approve an increase in tariffs without going through the renegotiation
process that included a consumers' representative and the Ombudsman as
participants. In response to a lawsuit by the consumers' association, the courts
called off the hearings. 343 The executive then ordered the increase through a
simple decree, 344 which was also struck down in court. 345 At last, it issued a
decree authorizing itself, allegedly in virtue of the Emergency Act, to modify the
rates of all the contracts subjected to the renegotiation process, 346 but the courts
suspended this decree upon a presentation by the Ombudsman. 347
The new Administration that took office in 2003 dissolved the previous
renegotiating commission, allowing consumers' participation only through
340. Id. In 2006, the Supreme Court reversed, although for reasons not related to the public
hearings issue. See Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJNJ [National Supreme Court of
Justice], 31/10/2006, "Defensoria del pueblo de la ciudad de Buenos Aires c. Secretaria de
comunicaciones / resoluci6n 2926/99," Fallos (2006-329-4542) (Arg.).
341. This refers to the fact that, since the beginning of the 1990s, Argentina was governed by a
convertibility statute that set a fixed rate of $1 peso = $1 dollar. This regime was eliminated after the
crisis of 2001 through an emergency law that reinstated a system of administered flotation and froze
utility rates until new contracts were agreed upon. See Decldrase la emergencia pfiblica en materia
social, econ6mica, administrativa, financiera y cambiaria, Law No. 25561, Jan. 6, 2002 (Arg.),
available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infoleglntemet/anexos/70000-74999/71477/texact.htm.
342. Id.; Encomidndase al citado Departamento de Estado la misi6n de Ilevar a cabo el proceso
de renegociaci6n de los contratos de obras y servicios pilblicos, Decree No. 293, Feb. 12, 2002
(Arg.), available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/70000-74999/72323/
norma.htm; Establ6cese que la Comisi6n de Renegociaci6n de Contratos de Obras y Servicios
Pblicos serA presidida por el Ministro de Economia e Infraestructura, Decree No. 370, Feb. 22,
2002 (Arg.), available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/70000-74999/72554/
norma.htm.
343. Juzgado Nacional de la Instancia en lo Contencioso Administrativo Federal [1a Inst.]
[Lower Courts of Ordinary Jurisdiction], 24/09/2002, "Uni6n de Usuarios y Consumidores y Otros
c/M. Economia e Infraestructua- Resol. 20/02 s/Amp. Proc. Sumarisimo."
344. Decree No. 2437, Dec. 2, 2002 (Arg.), available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/
infolegInternet/anexos/80000-84999/80098/norma.htm.
345. See La Luz y el Gas, Otra Vez al Freezer, PAGINA 12 (Dec. 13, 2002),
http://www.paginal2.com.ar/diario/economialindex-2002-12-13.html.
346. Decree No. 120, Jan. 23, 2003 (Arg.), available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/
infolegInternet/anexos/80000-84999/8171 1/norma.htm.
347. Juzgado Nacional de la Instancia en lo Contencioso Administrativo Federal [1P Inst.]
[lower courts of ordinary jurisdiction] No. 7, 03/03/2002, "Defensor del Pueblo de la Naci6n c.
Poder Ejecutivo Nacional," L.L. 2003-B, 796.
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public hearings carried out just before the executive signed the tariff
agreements. 34 8 The Administration also modified the original Emergency Act to
allow the executive to reach partial agreements with the companies and to avoid
the participation of the regulatory agencies and of consumers. 349 The new law
also allows Congress 60 days to either approve or reject the new contracts, but
once this period expires, the contracts are considered implicitly approved, which
violates Constitutional provisions regarding legislative procedure. 350 From 2004
to 2005, several contracts were renegotiated and tacitly "approved" by the
legislature, illustrating the weakness of mandated hearings, especially those
carried out by unsympathetic actors. 35 1 Judicial review has had an impact on the
process, but input from citizens and civil society seems weak and variable.
In a few cases, judges have taken aggressive action, including direct
oversight of executive actions and holding their own public hearings. We
summarize three recent cases concerning vaccines, prison reform, and water
pollution to illustrate the potential of judicial review in a political system that
has few other checks.
The first case involves a vaccine for Argentine hemorrhagic fever (AHF),
an acute viral disease that can lead to death in one to two weeks. The most
effective way to fight AFH is a vaccine known as Candid 1, which has 95%
effectiveness. 3 52 The State initially acquired the vaccine through a contract with
the U.S. Department of State and the Salk Institute. However, because the
number of doses was insufficient, the State decided to build laboratories to
produce Candid 1. Although some laboratories were built, the vaccine was never
produced. As a consequence, the NGO Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales
(CELS), along with a law student of the University of Buenos Aires, filed a
collective constitutional suit (the amparo) to force the State to produce the
vaccine and to provide it to the potentially affected population.
After losing in the lower court, the Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that
the State was obliged to produce the vaccine and establishing a period of time
for its production according to a schedule from the Ministry of Health. The
opinion also made the ministers involved personally responsible, and ordered
348. Decree No. 311, Jul. 3, 2003 (Arg.), available at http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/
infoleglntemet/anexos/85000-89999/86606/norma.htm.
349. Law No. 25790, Oct. 21, 2003 (Arg.), available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/
infoleglnternetlanexos/85000-89999/89434/norma.htm.
350. Article 82 of the Constitution states: "The will of each House shall be expressly stated; the
tacit or fictitious approval is excluded in all cases."
351. See, e.g., Diputados Avanza en la Prdrroga de los Contratos de las Privatizadas,
INFOBAE.COM (Dec. 15, 2005), http://www.infobae.com/notas/nota.php?Idx=228134&
IdxSeccion=0; see also Las Privatizadas se Quedaron Sin Lobby, CLARIN (Dec. 18, 2005),
http://edant.clarin.com/diario/2005/12/18/elpais/p-01301.htm.
352. See Gustavo Maurino, Ezequiel Nino & Martin Sigal, LAS ACCIONES COLECTIVAS.
ANALISIS CONCEPTUAL, CONSTITUTICIONAL, PROCESAL, JURISPRUDENCIAL Y COMPARADO 114
(Lexis Nexis 2005).
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the decision to be communicated to the President and the Chief of Cabinet.353
The executive did not observe the deadline. 354 In August 2000, the first instance
judge established a new deadline, which the executive also failed to meet.
Eventually, the judge froze the funds in the pertinent budgetary account and
instructed the executive to use those funds only for the fulfillment of the Court's
order. The judge also imposed a fine of $300 pesos per day of infringement. The
State appealed the decision.
The Court held a hearing to assess the situation and assign responsibility
for the infringement of its order. It subpoenaed the Minister of Health, and
ordered him to identify the obstacles to the production of Candid 1, to give
reasons for the failure to comply with the decision, and to submit a new
schedule. The Court put the national Ombudsman in charge of monitoring
compliance and informing the Court. Furthermore, the Court ordered the
executive's internal audit agency to audit the management of the funds assigned
to the production of the vaccine, to oversee fulfillment of the schedule presented
by the Ministry of Health, and to be sure funds were included in the budget bill
for 2002.355 From 2002 to 2006, when the government announced that it had
finally completed the vaccine's development, the execution of the Court's
decision was delayed, and several more hearings were held.356
The second case, prison reform, is one of the clearest examples of judicial
policymaking in Argentina. In Veribitsky, decided by the Supreme Court in May
2005, the Court went outside of normal judicial procedure to hold public
hearings, and it mandated heavy judicial involvement in implementing the
decision.3 57 The NGO Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS) filed a
collective habeas corpus before the Court of Cassation of the Province of
Buenos Aires in 2001. It asked the court to find that prison conditions in police
stations in the province were unconstitutional and to order the province to
remedy the situation. 358 The Court of Cassation rejected the case on the grounds
that it was up to the judges in each individual case to decide on these matters.
353. Cimara Nacional en lo Contencioso Administrativo Federal [CAm. Nac. en lo Cont. Adm.
Fed.], Sala IV, 02/06/1998, "Viceconte, Mariela C. c. Ministerio de Salud y Acci6n Social," LA LEY
1998-F, 102.
354. Maurino, Nino & Sigal, supra note 352, at 117-120.
355. Seeid.at117.
356. See Joaquin Mill6n, Triunfos de Papel. A Propdsito de Viceconte (unpublished, on file
with authors).
357. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice],
03/05/2005, "Verbitsky, Horacio s/hibeas corpus," FALLOs 328:1146.
358. According to a report of the NGO Asociacidn por los Derechos Civiles (ADC), when the
CELS filed the habeas corpus petition in November 2001, 6364 people were detained in police
stations and 23,264 people were detained in prison units. By the end of 2004, the number of people
detained in the province was 30,414. At the beginning of 2005, detainees in police stations were
5951, and the overpopulation of prisons was 55.97%. See ADC Report of the decision "Verbitsky,
Horacio s/habeas corpus," available at http://www.adccorte.org.ar/recursos/243/DOCUMENTO+
CASO+HABEAS+CORPUS.pdf.
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This decision was brought before the Supreme Court of the Province of Buenos
Aires, which also rejected the case. The case finally came before the Supreme
Court in early 2004.
Before the Court, CELS argued that the Court had to set the minimum
standards of protection for detainees to comply with the rights established in the
Constitution and in several human rights conventions; that the Court had to
order the provincial authorities to follow those standards; and that the Court
should establish a process for the execution of its ruling that guaranteed a
dialogue between CELS and the provincial authorities subject to the Court's
oversight.
In a departure from its own record, the Court held two public hearings with
representatives of CELS, the Province of Buenos Aires, and Human Rights
Watch, and it also accepted amicus curiae from eight organizations.35 9 In its
final ruling, the Court explained that it would not analyze public policies of
security, crime, and imprisonment but would only examine whether those
policies infringed on fundamental rights. Still, the Court found that the state of
imprisonment violated minimum standards of detainment according to UN rules;
it explained what those standards were; and it demanded that the local, executive
and legislative branches adjust legislation related to imprisonment. It also
instructed the Supreme Court of the Province and other provincial judges to
intensify their vigilance over the fulfillment of those standards, to urgently
determine whether there were violations of human rights, and to cease any cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment. 3 60 The province did not comply with the
Court's decision. In November 2009 the CELS went back to the Supreme Court
to denounce the infringement. In March 2010, the Supreme Court notified the
provincial court, urging it to respond to CELS's claims and to preserve the
security and physical integrity of those imprisoned. 36 1 The provincial
government has not yet complied. Thus, in practice the Supreme Court's
decisions did not have much consequence in reforming Buenos Aires' prisons.
The final case demonstrates a similar level of judicial activism in an
359. These were the ADC; the National Commission of Jurists; Human Rights Watch; the
World Organization against Torture; the Public Interest Law Clinic of the Province of C6rdoba; the
civil association "El Agora;" the civil association "Casa del Liberado" of the Province of C6rdoba;
and the Centro de Comunicaci6n Popular y Asesoramiento Legal. The amicus curiae were formally
recognized by a Supreme Court resolution in 2004. See Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n
[CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], Acordada No. 28, Jul. 14, 2004, B.O. 20/07/2004,
available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infoleglntemet/anexos/95000-99999/96742/norma.htm. As
for public hearings, the Court used them without formal authorization until, in November 2007, it
issued a resolution establishing them formally. See Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN]
[National Supreme Court of Justice], Acordada No. 30, Nov. 05, 2007, A.D.L.A. 2008-A-427 (2007)
(Arg.).
360. See Verbitsky, supra note 357, at XII (1-8).
361. See Ckirceles: la Corte Suprema Advierte por Incumplimiento del Gobierno Bonaerense,
CENTRO DE INFORMACION JUDICIAL (Mar. 19, 2010), available at http://www.cij.gov.ar/nota-3651-
Carceles--la-Corte-Suprema-advierte-por-incumplimiento-del-Gobierno-bonaerense.html.
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ongoing dispute over the pollution of the Matanza-Riachuelo River. A group of
neighbors sued the Federal Government, the Government of the Province of
Buenos Aires, and the Government of the City of Buenos Aires, as well as 44
firms for damages suffered as a consequence of the contamination of the river
Matanza-Riachuelo. In June 2006, the Court ordered the National, Provincial,
and Local governments to present a plan to clean up the river. The Court also
ordered the firms to keep the Court informed of any measures taken to prevent
and reverse the contamination of the river. 362
Just as with the prison reform case, this case was particularly novel because
the Court decided to hold public hearings with all the parties involved. In
September 2006, the Court held a hearing in which the three governments
presented a plan for cleaning the river and creating an inter-jurisdictional
authority, called ACUMAR, that later initiated a participatory process to discuss
policy related to the clean-up of the river.36 3 One week later, the Court heard
from four NGOs. 364 A second hearing was held in February 2007 where the
Secretary of the Environment explained the progress made in the
implementation of the plan presented six months before. Later hearings were
held in July and November 2007, where all the parties made comments on the
clean-up plan. 36 5
The Court finally held the three governments responsible for the cleanup of
the river and for the prevention of further environmental damages. 366 The
decision set time limits and distributed responsibility for carrying out the
necessary actions. The Court made the ACUMAR's head personally responsible
for fulfillment of its ruling, who would have to pay fines in the event of non-
compliance, and it empowered a local federal judge to oversee compliance. The
Court also instructed the General Audit Office to oversee the allocation of the
funds and their execution by ACUMAR as it implemented the clean-up plan.
Finally, the tribunal created a collective ad hoc oversight body formed by the
National Ombudsman and the NGOs that intervened in the case. Although the
river has not been cleaned-up yet, the Supreme Court's decisions had some real
362. See Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice],
08/07/2008, "Mendoza, Beatriz Silvia y otros c/ Estado Nacional y otros s/ dailos y perjuicios (dailos
derivados de la contaminaci6n ambiental del Rio Matanza-Riachuelo)," E.D. 18-7-08 (supl.), nro.
365, available at http://www.csjn.gov.ar/documentos/verdoc.jsp.
363. The creation of an interjurisdictional authority for the Cuenca Matanza Riachuelo
(ACUMAR) came about by law a few months after the first Supreme Court ruling. See Cr6ase la
Autoridad de Cuenca Matanza Riachuelo, Law No. 26168, Nov. 15, 2006 (Arg.), available at
http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infoleglnternet/anexos/120000-124999/122769/norma.htm. The Province
and the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires then adopted this law's provisions.
364. These NGOs were the Fundaci6n Ambiente y Recursos Naturales, CELS, Greenpeace, and
the Asociaci6n de Vecinos de la Boca.
365. For a detailed description of this case, see the amicus curiae presented by a group of legal
scholars to the Supreme Court of the Province in September 2010 to support the CELS' position
(especially pp. 4-6), available at http://www.cels.org.ar/common/documentos/Amicus-Curiae.pdf
366. Mendoza, supra note 362.
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bite. Its first ruling yielded the congressional decision to create the ACUMAR.
Although the execution of the Court's orders by the local federal judge has been
difficult and even required the Supreme Court to issue a new ruling in August
2010,367 the new agency represents real progress. The ACUMAR is
functioning; it systematically includes civil society through participatory policy-
making processes; it periodically informs the local federal judge on the progress
of the plan's execution, and it has created some important technical tools, such
as the creation of a unified registry where firms operating in the area have to be
registered so that the agency can oversee them with regards to environmental
damage. 368 Scholars have also highlighted that, by giving enhanced publicity to
its decisions and hearings, the Supreme Court put environmental issues on the
public agenda, a result that is of great importance when it comes to remedying
structural violations of rights.369
Thus, we see that the 1994 reforms encouraged many civil society groups
to bring court challenges. These challenges have produced some significant
judicial rulings that reined in the executive, particularly in cases involving
privatized utilities. More recently, judicial activism over administrative policy-
making has increased, with the Supreme Court paving the way for structural
litigation. It will be important to trace future developments to see if these rulings
are unusual events or the beginning of a trend toward more judicial oversight.
B. The Philippines
Institutional checks on presidential power work poorly in the Philippines.
Under the Constitution the primary institutions for challenging unlawful
exercises of presidential power are the Supreme Court and the Office of the
Ombudsman. Under President Arroyo, neither was an effective, independent
voice, largely because the incumbents were politically beholden to the President.
No other bodies are effective substitutes, and impeachment is a remedy of last
resort. It remains to be seen whether the recently elected President Aquino will
take advantage of these weaknesses or whether he will seek to govern in a more
accountable manner.
The Supreme Court was strengthened in the 1987 Constitution. Article
VIII, Section 1 states that the judicial power includes review of cases of "grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government." 3 70 The rationale for this
provision was the experience of martial law under the Marcos dictatorship when
the Court failed to resolve crucial human rights cases due to the obstacle of the
367. See id.
368. This information stems from the agency's website, www.acumar.gov.ar.
369. See the amicus curiae presented by a group of legal scholars to the Supreme Court of the
Province in September 2010 to support the CELS' position, supra note 365, at 5.
370. CONST. (1987), art. VIII, sec. 1 (Phil.).
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political question doctrine that was taken to limit the Court's ability to check
even obvious excesses of presidential power. 371
Given this power of judicial review, individuals and citizens' groups have
filed petitions for writs to annul, enjoin, or prohibit governmental acts that
violate fundamental human rights and civil liberties, and/or to compel the
government to observe such rights and liberties. In the words of the Court, this
expansion ofjudicial power "is an antidote to and a safety net against whimsical,
despotic, and oppressive exercise of governmental power." 37 2 The Court's
power of judicial review can extend to any governmental deprivation of rights
within the penumbra of the individual's constitutionally guaranteed rights to life,
liberty, and due process. 373
The 1987 Constitution also gives the Supreme Court the completely new
authority to promulgate rules "concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights." [Article VIII, Section 5(5)]374 No case has yet interpreted
the constitutional intent behind this expansion of the Court's rule-making power.
When the Court promulgated the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in October 2007,
it also authorized the release of its Annotation. 375 This Annotation states that the
Supreme Court's rule-making power "is the result of our experience under the
dark years of the martial law regime ... In light of the prevalence of extralegal
killing and enforced disappearances, the Supreme Court resolved to exercise for
the first time its power to promulgate rules to protect our people's constitutional
rights." 376 However, the Annotation goes on to limit its power by stating that
the right "should be allowed to evolve through time and jurisprudence and
371. Francisco v. House, supra note 47 (citing I Record of the Constitutional Commission). See
also Estrada v. Desierto et al., G.R. Nos. et seq., 146710, Mar. 2, 2001 (Phil.) (en banc) ("To a great
degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it
expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the 'thou shalt
not's' of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision,
however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government.") (Emphasis in the original.), available at http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri200l/
mar2001/gr 146710_2001 .html.
372. Macabago v. Comm'n on Elections, G.R. No. 152163, (S.C., Nov. 18, 2002) (Phil.) (en
banc), available at http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2002/nov2002/gr 152163_2002.html.
373. See Andal v. People, G.R. Nos. 138268-69 (S.C., May 26, 1999) (Phil.) (en banc),
available at http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juril999/mayl999/gr_138268_1999.html.
374. Reynato S. Puno, No Turning Back on Human Rights, Speech at Silliman University
(Aug. 25, 2007), available at http://ia341243.us.archive.org/3/items/TextOfChieflusticeReynato
PunoSillimanSpeech/PunoOnHumanRights.doc.
375. See Rule on the Writ of Amparo, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/
RULEAMPARO.pdf.
376. See Annotation to the Write of Amparo, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/
Annotationamparo.pdf.
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through substantive laws as they may be promulgated by Congress." 377
Judicial review of impeachment convictions might restrain an overzealous
legislature; however, they might also limit the force of the provision. In a 2003
ruling, involving a second impeachment complaint filed against the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court,37 8 the Supreme Court expressly declared that
impeachment proceedings are within the scope of its expanded power of
review.379 Impeachment is not a purely political action according to the Court
because "there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies." 3 80 Because such limits exist, "our courts are
duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government
properly acted within such limits." 381 Here, the Court is acting as a check
against possible legislative overreaching. Of course, if the Court itself is not
independent of the president and the administration, it cannot serve as
independent check. Further, if, as here, the process involves a justice of the
Court, it will hardly be a neutral arbiter.
The Ombudsman is hailed as the "protector of the people" (Constitution,
Art. XI, Secs. 5-1,4), but in practice it has failed to be a strong check on the
President. Unlike Argentina's Ombudsman, who is appointed by the legislature,
the Philippine Ombudsman and his Deputies are appointed by the President
from a list of nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council. Such
appointments require no confirmation. This means that the President can veto
anyone expected to be a particularly independent voice.
The Ombudsman must have at least ten years of experience as a judge or a
practicing lawyer. He or she serves a seven-year term with no reappointment
and cannot immediately run for office. The Ombudsman can investigate "on its
own, or upon complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient." 382 He or she can direct officials to
perform duties required by law or to correct abuses. The office can demand
documents and other information from officers and can report irregularities in
the use of funds to the Audit Commission. It can: "determine the cause of
inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government
and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high
377. Id.
378. Based on its close interpretation of the Constitutional text and intent from 1986
Constitutional Commission records, the Court held that the second impeachment complaint filed by
two legislators against the Chief Justice violated the constitutional prohibition against the initiation
of impeachment proceedings against the same officer within a one-year period.
379. Francisco v. House, supra note 47.
380. Id.
3 8 1. Id.
382. CONST., art. XI, sec. 13(1).
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standards of ethics and efficiency." 383
The Philippine Legislature increased the powers of the Ombudsman in
Republic Act No. 6770 ("Ombudsman Act of 1989"), which provided the office
with prosecutorial functions. 3 84 In contrast, Argentina's Ombudsman lacks such
functions, which are assigned to the Prosecutor of Administrative Investigation
and/or regulator prosecutors. In the Philippines, the Ombudsman's
administrative authority and his prosecutorial jurisdiction over public officers
are broad but exclude the President herself, who enjoys immunity from suit
during her incumbency. 3 85 It is only after the President has left office that the
Ombudsman can investigate, and if warranted, prosecute her, even for criminal
acts committed while in office. The highest profile prosecution involved the
Ombudsman's criminal prosecution of former President Joseph Estrada for
plunder, graft and corruption, among other serious crimes. This prosecution was
possible after the Supreme Court declared Estrada to have "constructively
resigned" from office. 386 The current Ombudsman, whose term ends in
December 2012, was appointed by President Arroyo and is unlikely to challenge
her past performance.
The Supreme Court has generally not interfered in the Ombudsman's
constitutionally-mandated investigatory and prosecutorial powers, unless for
"good and compelling reasons." The Court explains its policy as one that is
respectful of the Ombudsman, who, "beholden to no one, acts as the champion
of the people and the preserver of integrity in the public service." 387 In its view
the Ombudsman is constitutionally designed precisely to give individuals direct
recourse and remedial means against abusive excesses of governmental
power.388 Because the appointee and her deputies are not subject to approval
383. Ledesma v. Ct. of App., G.R. No. 161629 (S.C., Jul. 29, 2005) (Phil.), available at
http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2005/jul2005/161629.php.
384. Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. et seq., 105965 (S.C., Mar. 20, 2001) (Phil.) (en banc),
available at http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence200l/mar2001105965 70.php.
385. For statements of the Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary authority, see among
others Santos v. Rasalan, G.R. No. 155749 (S.C., Feb. 8, 2007) (Phil.), available at
http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2007/feb2007/155749.php; Office of the
Ombudsman v. Estandarte, G.R. No. 168670 (S.C., Apr. 13, 2007) (Phil.), available at
http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2007/april2007/168670.php; Balbastro v.
Junio, G.R. No. 154678 (S.C., Jul. 17, 2007) (Phil.), available at http://www.chanrobles.com/
scdecisions/jurisprudence2007/july2007/154678.php.
386. Estrada v. Desierto, supra note 370; Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738 (S.C.,
Mar. 2, 2001) (Phil.) (en banc), http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri200l/mar200l/
gr_146738_2001.html. And see Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 156160, (Dec. 9, 2004) (Phil.) (en
banc), available at http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2004/dec2004/156160.php.
387. Salvador v. Desierto, G.R. No. 136192 (S.C., Aug. 14,2001) (Phil.) (en banc), available at
http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence200l/aug200l/135482.php.
388. See among others Galario v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 166797 (S.C., Jul. 10,
2007) (Phil.), available at http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2007/july20071
166797.php; Office of the Ombudsman v. Ct. of App., G.R. No. 160675 (S.C., Jun. 16, 2006) (Phil.),
available at http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2006/june2006/G.R.%2No.%
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even by the Commission on Appointments, the President has considerable
influence over appointments, just as with the Supreme Court Justices.
Impeachment is available as an ex post method of legislative control, but it is a
difficult and controversial method of oversight. Thus, in spite of stronger
prosecutorial powers than her Argentine counterpart, the office's dependence on
presidential appointment undermines the Ombudsman's independence and
authority vis-i-vis the executive branch.
Other oversight bodies exist, but they lack independence, both de jure and
de facto. We briefly discuss three of them. They are the Constitutional
Commission on Audit (hereafter "the Audit Commission"), the Department of
Justice and the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission.
The Audit Commission has significant power to "examine, audit, and settle
all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses
of funds and property, owned or held in trust by or pertaining to, the
Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters." 389 It
then reports on these activities to the President and Congress. 390 Although Audit
Commission reports cannot compel or restrain unilateral executive action, they
can form the basis for private challenges to executive power, albeit issued long
after the executive action has been committed. Plaintiffs usually mount private
challenges through complaints filed with the Ombudsman, or through Rule 65
certiorari actions filed with the Supreme Court. 391 So far, however, this has not
been an effective method of control, in part because of the lack of independence
of the Ombudsman and the Supreme Court discussed above, and also because
the Audit Commission mainly conducts belated post-audits of government
20160675.php; Honasan Hl v. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors, G.R. No. 159747 (S.C., Apr. 13,
2004) (Phil.), available at http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/apr2004/gr 159747 2004.html;
Roxas v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 114944 (S.C., June 19, 2001) (Phil.), available at
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/jun2001/gr_ 14944_2001.html; Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Comm. On Behest Loans v. Desierto, G.R. No. 130140 (S.C., Oct. 25, 1999) (Phil.) (en
banc), http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juril999/octl999/gr_130140 1999.html; Garcia-Rueda v.
Pascasio, G.R. No. 118141 (S.C., Sept. 5, 1997) (Phil.), available at http://www.lawphil.net/
judjuris/juril997/sepl997/gr_118141_1997.html; Deloso v. Domingo, G.R. No. 90591 (S.C., Nov.
21, 1990) (Phil.).
389. CONsT. (1987), art. IX(D), sec. 2(1).
390. Id. sec 4.
391. New impeachment complaint filed vs Arroyo, ABS-CBN NEWS (Nov. 21, 1990),
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/10/13/08/new-impeachment-complaint-filed-vs-arroyo; Press
Release, Senate of the Philippines, Drilon dares Ombudsman to file charges versus execs in fertilizer
scam (Feb. 3, 2006), http://www.senate.gov.ph/press-release/2006/0203_drilonl.asp; Opponents
Seek Probe of Philippine President Over Corruption Scandal, Fox NEWS (Feb. 24, 2008),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,332109,00.html. See also Leslie Jamie Cobar, Checks and
Balances: Audit and Accountability in Philippine Public Finances, PHILIPPINE PUBLIC
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contracts executed by the Office of the President and executive agencies. The
Audit Commission reinstated pre-audit review of these contracts and other
instances of executive spending only in mid-2009, after public uproar over
allegations of corruption in government procurement contracts during the
Arroyo administration. 39 2
Other executive agencies, such as the Department of Justice and the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission,3 93 have investigative and prosecutorial
jurisdiction over executive officers. However, because these agencies are
dependent on the Office of the President and their top officials serve at the
pleasure of the President, these agencies unsurprisingly have not attempted to
check the incumbent President's use of executive power. 394
C. Conclusions
In spite of Argentina's strong executive power, marginal victories have had
a modest impact on the overall operation of government. When civil society and
law reform groups collaborated to bring court challenges to administrative
actions on constitutional and other grounds, they have often succeeded in
obtaining a favorable judgment, especially in cases related to consumers' issues.
In a few cases, these groups have also obtained enforcement of judgments in
complex, structural litigation cases. Furthermore, oversight bodies can
sometimes provide a check, although they operate more effectively if they can
connect with institutions outside of government.
In the Philippines the Supreme Court has had limited success in restraining
excessive presidential power,3 95 but only after these excesses have ripened into
392. Karen Tiongson-Mayrina, COA confirms problems with ODA projects; billions of pesos
wasted, GMANEWS (Feb. 21, 2008), http://www.gmanews.tv/story/81658/COA-confirms-problems-
with-ODA-projects-billions-wasted; Commission on Audit Circular No. 2009-002 (May 18, 2009),
http://www.coa.gov.ph/COAIssuances/COACirculars/Circ2009/COA C2009-002.pdf; Reinir
Padua, Commission on Audit to conduct pre-audit of big-ticket projects, THE PHILIPPINE STAR, May
10, 2009, available at http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleld=466113.
393. Admin. Code 1987, Exec. Ord No. 292, supra note 85; Creating the Presidential Anti-
Graft Commission, Exec. Order No. 12 (Apr. 16, 2001), available at http://www.pagc.gov.ph/
File/Exec%200rders/Exec%200rder/o2012%20s%202001 .pdf.
394. See Isa Lorenzo, How credible is PAGC cash gifts probe?, PHILIPPINE CENTER FOR
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM BLOG (Oct. 18, 2007), http://www.pcij.org/blog/?p=2015; Sophia
Dedace, Loyal and unrepentant: the passion of Raul Gonzalez, GMA NEWS (Jul. 29, 2009),
http://www.gmanews.tv/story/168584/loyal-and-unrepentant-the-passion-of-raul-gonzalez.
395. See, e.g., David v. Arroyo, supra note 97 (insofar as the Court denied the President's
attempt to takeover media companies on a claim of national emergency); Metro. Manila Dev. Auth.
v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-48 (S.C., Dec. 18, 2008) (Phil.) (en banc)
(where the Court ordered executive and administrative agencies to undertake the clean-up and
remediation of Manila Bay years after these agencies refused to comply), available at
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/dec2008/gr_171947_2008.html; Cotabato, supra note 140
(where the Court nullified the President's attempted execution of a Memorandum of Agreement that
would have conferred territorial sovereignty for the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, without the
required constitutional amendments).
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justiciable controversies. Because the Court does not issue advisory opinions,
presidential excesses-as in the use of budgetary authority and the conduct of
administrative reorganizations-may remain unchallenged. Impeachment and
the Office of the Ombudsman are not presently viable routes to executive
accountability. 39 6 Despite charges brought against the then-incumbent
President's family (particularly her spouse, the First Gentleman) for graft and
corruption, no suit was filed under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
Ombudsman herself faced impeachment charges for betrayal of public trust
through "inaction, mishandling, or downright dismissal of clear cases of graft
and corruption, some leading to the President herself or that of her closest
associates." 39 7 Hence, the Ombudsman was unlikely to mount a challenge to
presidential power.
Because impeachment is such a blunt tool, other institutional mechanisms
must.provide the primary checks on executive power. We demonstrated above
that the Presidents of Argentina and the Philippines have asserted their power
through decrees, public spending, and appointments, and that they face
insufficient institutional checks in all of these areas. That leaves national courts
and more targeted institutions, such as ombudsmen, audit offices, and anti-
corruption agencies, to impose limits on presidents who transgress constitutional
and statutory limits. We have explored the strengths and weaknesses of these
institutions in Argentina and the Philippines. Sometimes these bodies check
excesses, particularly when independent civil society organizations use them to
challenge presidential overreaching. In Argentina this system operates better
than in the Philippines, where oversight mechanisms are weak. However, even
in Argentina constraining a president determined to exercise power is difficult
and problematic without an active legislature. Courts and oversight agencies
cannot entirely make up for the relative weakness of the legislature as an
independent source of oversight. These case studies demonstrate that once
presidents succeed in exercising excessive levels of power, challenges to their
authority have only marginal success, particularly where there is little or no
opportunity to act before a controversy has become justiciable.
VI.
CONCLUSION: PERILS OF PRESIDENTIALISM REDUX
Critics of presidential systems argue that they tend toward hyper-
presidentialism, on the one hand, or gridlock, on the other. If gridlock prevails, it
396. See Arroyo escapes impeachment bid, BBC NEWS (Sept. 6, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hilasia-pacific/4217952.stm.
397. Gil C. Cabacungan Jr. and Lira-Dalangin Fernandez, Impeach rap filed vs Ombudsman
Gutierrez, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, Mar. 2, 2009, available at http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/
topstories/topstories/view/20090302-191829/lmpeach-rap-filed-vs-Ombudsman-Gutierrez; Wendell
Vigilia, Impeach Gutierrez: Salonga cites betrayal of public trust, gross incompetence, MALAYA
NEWS, Mar. 3, 2009, available at http://www.malaya.com.ph/mar03/newsl.htm.
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can justify presidential power grabs in the eyes of the Chief Executive. Juan
Linz's now famous essay of 1990, "The Perils of Presidentialism," 3 98 highlights
the possibility of divisive conflict between the legislature and the President,
particularly under constitutions that possess an inherent tension between "the
desire for a strong and stable executive and the latent suspicion of that same
presidential power." 399 The winner-take-all nature of presidential elections,
combined with the attraction to a "certain populism that may ... bring on a
refusal to acknowledge the limits of the mandate," 400 gives rise to a directly
elected President's rivalry rather than compromise with opposition party
legislators. Andrew Arato adds that under crisis conditions, "Presidential
gridlock has repeatedly justified authoritarian departures from the rules of the
game. . . [so that] Presidentialism can easily become a mere mask for or a road
to hyper-presidentialism, which can be introduced without changing the formal
constitution." 40 1 Although we accept their claim that, if evenly matched, the two
branches may be unable to act effectively, the risk of hyper-presidentialism
stressed by Arato gives particular cause for concern because it presents obstacles
that cannot be addressed through structural change alone. Argentina and the
Philippines provide specific examples of how Presidents manage to exercise
power in spite of legal structures designed to limit their influence.
These case studies demonstrate how elected Presidents can manipulate or
ignore legal and constitutional constraints to enhance their authority and
flexibility. The broad structural contours are very similar: both systems have
written constitutions under which the President heads both the state and the
government, as well as manages the bureaucracy. In both countries, the public
elects the President to a fixed term, with limited reelection. Both constitutions
have an impeachment process for the President and other high officials,
consisting of an indictment by the lower house and a trial in the upper house.
In addition, the Supreme Courts have accepted legislative provisions that
delegate policymaking power to the Executive and to independent agencies. At
first glance, Argentina and the Philippines have constitutional texts that severely
limit delegation to an unrealistic degree given modem realities. However, in
practice there are few practical constraints. De facto delegation in both countries
is very common and quite open-ended.
Within these parallel frameworks, the Presidents in Argentina and the
Philippines have acted in similar ways to enhance their power. They issue
decrees, especially under declarations of emergency or states of necessity; they
manipulate budget and spending priorities; and they seek to control
appointments to supposedly independent bodies, including the courts. Generally
398. Linz, Perils, supra note 2.
399. Id. at 55.
400. Id.at61.
401. Andrew Arato, The New Democracies and American Constitutional Design 7
CONsTrrufloNs 316, 322 (2000).
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these Presidents seek to maneuver around or ignore constraints. The legislature,
the courts, and civil society try, with more or less success, to hold the President
and the administration accountable.
Using these techniques, chief executives seek to expand their scope for
policymaking and to entrench their position of political dominance.
Constitutional and statutory limits have some effect, but they invite the search
for loopholes. These cases demonstrate that Presidents can push the bounds of
their authority where there is a weak structure of checks and balances. Checks
and balances ought to complement the separation of powers. Both cases
illustrate the dangers of raising the separation of powers to a canonical principle
that ignores the role of each branch as a check and monitor of the power of other
branches.
The separation of powers is defended both as a way to permit the Executive
to concentrate on efficient administration and as a way to facilitate inter-branch
oversight. As we have seen, these dual justifications can clash in practice. If
policymaking delegation is too heavily restricted, Presidents will have strong
incentives to find other ways to make policy and may turn to methods that are
less accountable, such as necessity and urgency decrees and declaration of states
of emergency. These actions may have little to do with security threats. Even if
there is a threat, the President's action may extend to policy areas only
tangentially related to the immediate problem or may impose excessively harsh
restrictions. The Argentine and Philippine Presidents avoid legislative
consultation and judicial oversight by appealing to the importance of an
independent executive that can act unilaterally, deliberately downplaying the
value of checks and balances as reflected in one view of the separation of
powers.
We have focused on the weakness of institutional checks on the presidency
in Argentina and the Philippines, but the full story of their democratic
functioning would require a much broader compass that includes both electoral
politics and the accidents of history.402 Opposition political parties can
challenge executive overreaching, but for different reasons they have not been
particularly effective in either country. Electoral rules and political mobilization
at the grass roots can also limit or enhance presidential power. Regional/central
government relations determine the strength of the central governments. Term
limits assure presidential turnover and help prevent a slide into outright
authoritarianism. However, special circumstances in each country helped extend
the last incumbent's time in office in the Philippines and permit a husband and
402. See CARLOS S. NINO, FUNDAMENTOS DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL. ANALISIS
FILos6FICO, JURlDICO Y POLITOL6GICO (2005); ALFRED W. MCCOY, AN ANARCHY OF FAMILIES:
STATE AND FAMILY IN THE PHILIPPINES (2009); JOHN W. LANGFORD AND K. LORNE BROWNSEY,
ECONOMIC POLICY-MAKING IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 111-12 (2001); DANTE C. SIMBULAN,
THE MODERN PRINCIPALIA: THE HISTORICAL EvOLUTION OF THE PHILIPPINE RULING OLIGARCHY
(2005).
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wife team to keep the Presidency in the family in Argentina. One would need to
incorporate all of these factors and more to produce a full account of these
democracies as they struggle to balance political power and public
accountability. Our aim is merely to suggest that those who study these more
conventional aspects of democratic functioning not forget to look at the impact
of structural factors that shape the separation of powers.
Both Linz and Arato claim that the United States is an exception to the
majority of presidential democracies that suffer from the pathologies of gridlock
and hyper-presidentialism, but this sense of exceptionalism should be re-
examined. Argentina and the Philippines may be extreme cases, but the
ineffectiveness of their recent constitutional revisions should serve as a warning.
Despite the obvious and substantial differences between the United States and
our cases, they should lead Americans to ponder both the need for checks on the
executive and practical ways to maintain government effectiveness and
efficiency. Our cases suggest that when Presidents have enhanced powers to
issue decrees, declare emergencies, make appointments, redirect funds, and
reorganize the Executive, the government structure can become unbalanced so
that legislatures and the judiciary take on secondary roles, undermining
democratic legitimacy.
Legislative delegations of policymaking power are a reality in all modem
states. Complex regulatory and spending programs could not function without
grants of rulemaking authority to the President and to Ministers and Cabinet
Secretaries.403 Although such delegations occur in the US under different
constitutional constraints compared with Argentina and the Philippines, the de
facto results are similar. Outside of international affairs and national security,
explicit legislative delegation of policymaking power to the Executive is
common in the U.S., and the Supreme Court permits such delegation within very
wide limits. 404 As long as the Executive exercises delegated authority in
politically responsible ways using procedures, such as notice and comment
rulemaking under the US Administrative Procedures Act, that invite public
participation and oversight, democracy can co-exist with extensive
policymaking in the Executive. 4 05
Risks arise when Presidents assert broad authority to act absent legislative
delegation, especially in times of crisis. Necessity and urgency decrees in
Argentina and states of emergency in the Philippines are common substitutes for
delegated authority. The courts in both countries have placed only modest limits
on these decree powers with corresponding risks for democracy. These decree
403. SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, FROM ELECTIONS TO DEMOCRACY: BUILDING ACCOUNTABLE
GOVERNMENT IN HUNGARY AND POLAND 1-7,216-39 (2005).
404. The most recent important discussion of this issue by the Supreme Court is Whitman v.
Am. Trucking Ass'n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
405. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 553. See ROSE-ACKERMAN, ELECTIONS TO DEMOCRACY, supra note 403, at
216-239.
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powers are perhaps the aspect of the Argentine and Philippine constitutions that
are least familiar to an American audience. The American President has no
formal, constitutional decree power, but frequently issues executive orders and
policy statements that do not have external force. 40 6 Unlike both the Argentine
and the Philippine constitutions, the American constitution contains no
provisions for the declaration of a state of emergency. Nevertheless, in the
absence of such provisions, unilateral actions by the US President are a common
way to deal with national security threats. 40 7 As long as US Presidents find
ways to act unilaterally under the national security umbrella, the US risks taking
on some aspect of hyper-presidentialism.
In all three countries, the reallocation of budgeted funds has become
another tactic for Presidents to implement their priorities. However, US efforts
to curb this practice have been significantly more successful. In Argentina and
the Philippines, as in the US, the legislature is a central player in the budgetary
process. Nevertheless, all three Presidents have developed methods to
undermine legislative limits. President Richard Nixon tried to impound (that is,
refuse to spend) funds appropriated by Congress and signed into law. His efforts
were blocked by successful court challenges based on statutory interpretation,
not the constitution, and the practice of redirecting funds is now limited by
statute. 40 8 The US Supreme Court has also found the line-item veto
unconstitutional. 409 Reorganization of the executive branch was often subject to
legislative vetoes, but since that practice has also been held to be
unconstitutional, major reorganizations, such as the creation of the Department
of Homeland Security, require a statute. 4 10 In both Argentina and the
Philippines, the redirection of funds and the reorganization of government by
presidential fiat are much easier and more common; they occur both within the
bounds of permissive laws and at the outer edges of legality. In the US, the
allocation of funds and restructuring of the executive are areas where the judicial
and legislative branches have consistently curbed the President's unilateral
406. Brian R. Sala, In Search of the Administrative President: Presidential "Decree" Power
and Policy Implementation in the United States, in EXECUTIVE DECREE AUTHORITY (John M. Carey
and Matthew Soberg Shugart eds., 1998). Executive orders importantly influence the President's
relations with the cabinet departments and agencies, and executive actions are crucially important in
foreign affairs and national security. For example, E.O. 12866 requires the cost-benefit analysis of
major rules. Exec. Order No. 12866, Secs. 3(d)-(e), 3(f)(1), 6(a)(3)(C), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641, 645-46
(1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. Sec. 601 (2006). See Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential
Power over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE L.J. 140 (2009).
407. For a discussion of this issue see BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK:
PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE AGE OF TERRORISM (2006).
408. The Nixon Administration cases are Train v. N.Y.C., 420 U.S. 35 (1975) and Train v.
Campaign Clean Water, Inc., 420 U.S. 136 (1975). The statute is the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C.A. §§681-88, PL No. 93-377, 88 Stat 297.
409. Clinton v. N.Y.C., 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
410. The legislative veto was held unconstitutional in I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
The statute is the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.
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actions. However, priority setting in regulatory areas is largely left to the
Executive, beyond statutory deadlines that are hard for Congress or the courts to
enforce. It is unclear why this variation exists beyond the obvious point that the
failure to spend appropriated funds seems more clearly to flout Congressional
wishes than failure to prioritize certain regulatory requirements.
Finally, the politicization of appointments is arguably just as significant in
the US as in Argentina and the Philippines, raising similar questions about the
balance between the President's desire to choose political allies and statutory
requirements for partisan balance or professional expertise. The United States is
often held up as an example of an excessively politicized bureaucracy with
thousands of positions subject to political appointment.411 Argentina and the
Philippines seem at least as politicized especially when one takes into account
appointments to regulatory agencies, nominally independent oversight bodies,
and the courts. Many presidential appointments do not require Senate
confirmation. Those that require confirmation may be left empty for years. In
the Philippines, the President makes some appointments from lists prepared by
independent bodies, but the President can reject all names on the list and
otherwise seek to control the process. In Argentina, partisan balance in
regulatory agencies is undermined when the President uses her regular powers to
place an agency under a "temporary" presidential appointee. The US President
has no such powers, but he can just leave seats vacant if the Senate will not
approve his favored appointees. 4 12 At the same time, the President may appoint
people to White House positions who do not require confirmations but whose
portfolios overlap with those of Cabinet departments. 4 13 Future research might
evaluate whether these efforts to avoid Senate approval have yielded policy
decisions that track presidential priorities and fail to accommodate a broad
spectrum of political interests.
We hope that our analysis of hyper-presidentialism in Argentina and the
Philippines will help reformers in those countries understand how weaknesses in
their constitutional structures provide openings for presidential action. The
411. Ackerman, supra note 6 ("New Separation"). The number of top-level positions requiring
Senate confirmation has grown from 196 under Kennedy administration to 786 under Clinton to
1141 under Bush II. S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Policy and
Supporting Positions 199 (2008), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/plumbook/2008/
index.html. Overall, the President has the authority to make 3,000 political appointments. DAVID E.
LEwis, THE POLrIcs OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS: POLITICAL CONTROL AND BUREAUCRATIC
PERFORMANCE 56 (2008).
412. Anne Joseph O'Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REvIEw 913 (2009); Anne Joseph O'Connell, Waiting for Leadership:
President Obama's Record in Staffing Key Agency Positions and How to Improve the Appointments
Process, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (Apr. 2010), http://www.americanprogress.org (last
accessed Nov. 3, 2010). The Supreme Court recently held that a regulatory agency with only two or
its five seats filled could not make legally binding decisions. See New Process Steel LP v. Nat'l
Labor Relations Bd., 130 S.Ct. 2635 (2010).
413. See ACKERMAN, DECLINE AND FALL, supra note 10.
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problem lies not only in the personalities and political allegiances of those in
power but also in the institutional frameworks in which they operate. Our study
of the interactions between institutional structure and political power illustrates
how often nominal legal constraints are undermined by determined Presidents.
Going further, we believe that some features of Argentine and Filipino
democracy are shared by the US so that our cases can serve as a warning to
American political actors. The use of decrees for emergency and national
security purposes is growing, and even economic crises have provoked the
executive to seek unusually open-ended delegations of authority. Policymaking
delegation is essential in the modem state, but for that very reason must be
constrained by institutions that permit public participation and monitoring. The
budgetary process risks descending into partisan bickering, and Presidential
appointments are routinely delayed by individual holds and filibuster threats in
the Senate. To the extent that the President and the Congress cannot resolve
these partisan conflicts, Presidents are likely to seek end runs around these
blockages. The federal courts may provide a backstop form of oversight, but the
Supreme Court's often-mechanical views of the separation of powers and of
Presidential power do not inspire confidence. 4 14 Perhaps our broader
comparative focus can help reorient the debate over the presidency in a way that
realistically recognizes the President's role as both chief executive of a large and
complex bureaucracy and as a political leader who must be accountable to the
population during his or her four years in office, not just at election time.
414. See Chadha, supra note 409. STEPHEN CALABRESI AND CHRISTOPHER S. Yoo, THE
UNITARY ExECUTIvE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008).
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